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Abstract 
Innovation is regarded as the principal source of sustainable competitive advantage, 
yet many firms approach innovation haphazardly and without discipline.  These firms 
appear poorly equipped to implement a comprehensive innovation strategy as they 
focus only on incremental innovation and are committed to preserving the status quo. 
 
A dynamic capabilities approach was selected because of its focus on the 
development of management capabilities.  This research has answered the call for 
fine-grained qualitative case studies to look at the detail of how dynamic capabilities 
are deployed to better understand how these capabilities work in practice and whether 
and how they might differ across firms.  By the analysis of three embedded business 
units in the one case organisation this research has opened the innovation “black box” 
and provided a capability framework for strategic managers to build, systematise and 
replicate within their organisations.  It is a higher order capability which provides 
managers with the capacity to manage the component capabilities of the 
Organisational Innovation Capability framework together with their linkages and 
interdependencies to impact the firm’s existing resource base.  It also identifies 
strategic entrepreneurship, organisational learning capability and alliance building 
capability as the essential preconditions for innovation capability renewal. 
 
In summary, this research is part of the increasing momentum in understanding the 
“how” of dynamic capabilities.  It provides learning for management practice on how 
dynamic capabilities originate, how firms built and deployed their Organisational 
Innovation Capability and how distinctive processes support the creation, 
modification, reconfiguration and augmentation of firm resources to achieve 
competitive advantage.  Most importantly, it has provided a framework for an 
Organisational Innovation Capability which can be applied in practice. 
 
Key words: organisational capability, organisational innovation capability, 
entrepreneurship, dynamic capabilities 
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Chapter One 
1INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH 
1.1 Introduction 
Innovation is regarded as an imperative for firms seeking to achieve sustainable 
competitive advantage with the expectation that it is endogenous to the firm (Hunt 
and Davis 2008, p. 12).  In rapidly changing market conditions with shrinking market 
knowledge driven by compressed life cycles, fragmenting and disaggregating 
markets, and proliferating media and distribution channels, developing successful 
innovation is challenging (Day 1994a, p. 9; Han, Kim and Srivastava 1998, p. 30). 
 
Yet, despite the universal acceptance of the need for innovation and the vast literature 
on the processes and approaches to support innovation success (Crossan and Apaydin 
2010; Cooper 1996; 1999), the academic literature suggests that innovation is rare 
and episodic and that few firms achieve innovation success on a consistent basis 
(Hamel 2006; Cooper 1996; 1999; Connell, Edgar et al., 2001; Rothwell et al., 1974).  
The McKinsey Global Survey, Innovation and Commercialisation supports this 
persistent challenge as 50% of the 2,240 executives surveyed responded positively to 
these questions: “We have pockets of successful innovation, but innovation is rarely 
scaled throughout the organisation” and “We have lots of good ideas but do not get 
enough of them through to commercialisation” (McKinsey 2010).  As 40% of 
respondents said that their companies made commercialisation decisions in an ad hoc 
manner, the inconsistency in innovation outcomes is not surprising. 
 
“How do firms develop an innovation capability to achieve continued differential 
firm performance within an industry?”  The dynamic capabilities framework provides 
an explanation of how firms might constantly renew their innovation capability in 
rapidly changing environments.  It is an influential framework for investigating 
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strategic renewal of the firm as researchers seek to understand and investigate 
managerial capabilities, organisational resources and strategies that enable a firm to 
renew, augment and adapt its innovation capability over time (Teece 2007). 
1.2 Background to the Research 
With the changing dynamics of business, innovation is regarded as the principal 
source of sustainable competitive advantage (Teece 2007; Teece 1998, pp. 55-60; 
Leonard and Sensiper, 1998, p. 112).  While the need for innovation is regarded as an 
organisational imperative, many firms approach innovation haphazardly and without 
discipline, expecting another serendipitous Newtonian apple to fall from the sky.  
Cooper argues that there has been little improvement in the innovation success rate as 
actors “seem to fall into the same traps that their predecessors did back in the 1970’s” 
(Cooper 1999, p. 2) and that merely studying successful and unsuccessful new 
product projects, as he and his colleague have done in the past, misses many of the 
key factors in success (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 2007, p. 2).  Most organisations 
appear poorly equipped to implement a radical innovation strategy as they focus on 
incremental innovation and are “genetically programmed to preserve the status quo” 
(Stringer 2000, p. 71). 
 
Why is the success rate for new product development and innovation so low 
particularly when numerous success/failure criteria have been identified in the 
academic literature? (Rothwell et al., 1974; Cooper 1980, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2004; 
Wycoff 2003; Connell, Edgar et al., 2001).  Crossan and Apaydin in their analysis of 
525 reviews and meta-analyses, highly cited papers, and recent papers on innovation 
found no overarching framework of innovation determinants.  In addition, their 
review found that while the organisational learning and knowledge-based views were 
quite prominent, innovation research was generally fragmented, lacked 
interconnectedness and was poorly grounded theoretically (2010, pp. 1164, 1165, 
1174). 
 
Hamel considered that the reason for the innovation hiatus is that “senior leaders do 
not have a clear, well-developed model of what innovation looks like as an 
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organisational capability” (2003).  One of the reasons for the lack of management 
understanding is that “innovation as a process is under developed in the literature” 
(Crossan and Apaydin 2010, p. 1167).  Hamel argued that firms need to “move from 
innovations as exceptions; move beyond innovation as a specific role or structure, 
beyond innovation as a once-in-a-while project, to thinking about innovation as a 
deep capability” (2003, emphasis added).  This position is consistent with the 
dynamic capabilities approach because of its focus on the ongoing renewal of 
management capabilities (Teece 2007; Helfat et al., 2007, p. 4; Agarwal and Helfat 
2009, p. 283).  
 
While some consider that the situation simply requires “more commitment and a 
more innovative approach to the process of innovation” (Booz Allen 2005, p. 4, 
emphasis added), following the recommendation of Hamel, the importance of an 
Organisational Innovation Capability (OIC) cannot be denied.  The objective of 
building such a capability is to create, distinctive and difficult-to-imitate value-
creating resource advantages through the integration, adaptation and reconfiguration 
of the firm’s endowed assets and resources (Hunt and Morgan 1995, p. 6; Teece et 
al., 1997, p. 528; Barney 1991, p. 102).  OIC’s represent the integration of systems, 
processes, skills and behaviours and it is within this architecture that an innovation 
capability will be investigated. 
1.3 Research Question  
The research question is “How can an Organisational Innovation Capability be 
conceptualised in an information technology solutions context, and what is the role of 
learning in organisational innovation capability renewal”.  The intention of this 
research question is to address the paucity of academic research in the management 
literature by opening the innovation “black box” and providing an explanation of the 
how an organisational innovation capability is constructed, i.e. how are structures, 
systems, processes, skills, and behaviours inherent in this organisational capability, 
what is the process of renewal and what are the organisational preconditions required 
to support a well balanced, productive and successful OIC. 
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1.4 Research Approach  
A postpositivist paradigm was selected because of its emphasis on critical multiplism 
as a means of falsifying, rather than verifying hypotheses and its increased reliance 
upon qualitative research techniques (Guba and Lincoln 2005, p. 193).  Case study 
research was selected as the research approach because of its ability to answer “how” 
and “why” questions in the context of a complex world of lived experience.  Another 
compelling reason is the formative stage of dynamic capabilities research as the 
boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not necessarily apparent 
(Yin 2009, p. 18). 
 
Based on the innovation capability literature this research conceptualised an OIC in 
the IT solutions context1.  The OIC was conceptualised using the dynamic 
capabilities approach consisting of three constructs: organisational innovation 
intensity, market-focused learning capability and innovation infrastructure renewal 
capability and two organisational preconditions: organisational learning capability 
and entrepreneurial intensity.  To analyse the validity of this framework a single case 
organisation (CO) was selected for research comprising three embedded units with 
substantially different paths, processes and positions.  A within-case analysis of three 
business units within the CO was conducted and followed by a cross-case analysis 
between the three business units to identify similarities and differences in the process 
of building an OIC.  While the researcher was employed by the CO, the CO was 
selected on the basis that it provided the highest “opportunity to learn” (Stake, 1994, 
p. 243) for the CO and the researcher, as at the time that the research was conducted, 
the CO was undergoing significant change as it endeavoured to capitalise on its 
acquisitions, expand into new markets and increase the success rate of innovation and 
the speed of commercialisation. 
 
From the case analysis, an OIC was conceptualised and then compared to the 
framework conceptualised from the innovation capability literature. 
                                                 
 
1 IT solutions context includes the integration of system sub-components into a single functioning 
system.  The sub-components may include software either developed or acquired by the integrator.  In 
this case study, IT solutions were often implemented to support major infrastructure projects. 
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1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
An outline of the thesis is contained in Figure 1.1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1  Outline of Thesis 
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1.6 Contributions to Theory 
This research has opened the innovation “black box” and provided a capability 
framework which will provide guidance to strategic managers as they attempt to 
build, systematise and replicate an innovation capability within their organisations.  
The OIC framework which emerged from the case analysis answers the call to 
address the “abstract and intractable” nature of dynamic capabilities (Danneels 2008, 
p. 536) through detailed, micro mechanisms based on qualitative fieldwork to identify 
how a capability is deployed and how it works (Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, p. 37). 
 
Through the analysis of the formation of an OIC in three embedded business units in 
the CO this research focused on understanding the complex world of contemporary 
experience from the point of view of its participants (Yin 2009, pp. 8, 11) and, in 
doing so, provided a closer, richer, thicker, more subjective view of idiosyncratic 
organisational innovation phenomena (McKelvey 2003, p. 6) beyond the common 
unit analysis of the firm.  This higher order capability provides managers with the 
capacity to achieve competitive advantage by managing the component capabilities of 
the OIC framework, together with their linkages and interdependencies, to create new 
or augmented resources by transforming the firm’s existing resource base. 
 
In addition, while most of the elements of the strategic entrepreneurship precondition 
had been identified previously in the literature this research has brought them 
together for the first time and provided a framework for strategic entrepreneurship.  
In doing so, while supporting the innovation literature and the inclusion of each 
construct, it extends the current understanding of entrepreneurship by combining it 
with the intentionality and discipline of strategic management to complement the risk 
orientation inherent in entrepreneurship.  The research has also extended the 
definition of innovation intensity from the internal focus to include external factors 
such as the firm’s business model, strategic alliances and its ecosystem. 
1.7 Contributions to Management Practice 
The key contributions of this dissertation to management practice include the 
imperative for management to understand the nature of the firm’s path dependencies 
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and their impact upon organisational change, the criticality of generative learning to 
challenging the status quo and the firm’s mental models, and the accuracy of 
management’s perceptions of the firm’s environment and their impact upon 
innovation capability development.  One other primary contribution is the emphasis 
upon coherency of the way the components are integrated and linked together to form 
the OIC as this coherency, rather than the components of the capability, may itself be 
the source of competitive advantage. 
1.8 Limitations 
This research, like all research, suffers from some limitations.  Firstly, it has 
investigated a single CO with its own peculiar characteristics.  Secondly, as the 
analysis is based upon data from one firm the ability to make inter-firm comparisons 
is limited.  A third limitation is that the primary industry focus of the research was on 
IT solutions firms operating in the government high level security sector (GHLSS) 
with a limited focus on the commercial high level security sector CHLSS.  Further, as 
the qualitative research was conducted over several months it did not provide 
opportunity to gain an understanding of the development of the OIC and the 
competitive advantage created over time.  A final limitation may be the employment 
of the researcher by the CO.  While this employment assisted in the research and 
facilitated access to interviewees and sensitive information, there is the possibility 
that the researcher’s experience within the CO may have influenced the selection of 
interviewees or led to a less objective analysis of the cases. 
1.9 Structure of the Dissertation 
This introductory Chapter 1 has outlined the practice and theoretical background to 
the problem that motivated this dissertation.  Subsequently, the research problem and 
the research approach selected to pursue this objective were described.  The key 
contributions to theory and management practice were also identified. 
 
In Chapter 2 a conceptualisation of the organisational innovation capability is 
presented.  The Chapter begins by providing a brief overview of innovation and the 
IT solutions environment.  It then describes organisational barriers to innovation 
 
17 
 
identified in the literature and builds a theoretical and conceptual framework to test 
the research question.  The Chapter includes an overview of the extant dynamic 
capabilities research and the theoretical foundations upon which this framework is 
based.  A dynamic capabilities framework was developed to guide an examination of 
an innovation capability to better understand how these capabilities work in practice 
and whether and how they might differ across firms (Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, 
p. 46). 
 
The third chapter justifies and describes the research methodology used to address the 
research question posed in section 1.3.  The research paradigm selected was identified 
together with the justification for the selection of the case study methodology as the 
research approach.  The Chapter then continues with a description of the research 
procedures implemented including the case study selection and design, the data 
collection and analysis processes before concluding with a discussion regarding 
validity and reliability. 
 
Chapter 4 provides an understanding of the case study data collected, identifies key 
themes and patterns in the data and describes the innovation capability dimensions in 
each case study.  The Chapter begins with an introduction to the case organisation.  
Inherited path dependencies of the three embedded business units were examined to 
reveal how current innovation approaches emerged.  The process of analysis involved 
building concepts from the data and seeking evidence to support linkages between 
those concepts.  The data was interrogated to identify evidence that confirmed the 
presence of dimensions evident in the literature as contributing to an OIC and 
clarified the constructs that defined them.  Evidence was then sought to support or 
reject the propositions generated from the innovation literature as well as the 
interrelationships between the dimensions.  The data was examined to identify the 
presence of additional dimensions, interrelationships and constructs that were not 
evident in the literature. 
 
A cross-case analysis was then conducted to highlight similarities and differences in 
approaches in the formation of an innovation capability within the three business 
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units and to inform the innovation dynamic capability frameworks which emerged 
from the data.  This analysis enabled a case derived OIC to be developed comprising 
three preconditions – an organisational learning capability, strategic entrepreneurship 
and an alliance building capability – and four components - innovation infrastructure 
and OIC renewal, an innovation absorptive capacity, an innovation culture and 
organisational innovation intensity. 
 
The fifth and concluding chapter provides a description of the core dimensions of the 
OIC derived from the research.  The capability descriptors of the OIC are compared 
to the literature and the linkages between the components identified.  The Chapter 
continues with an outline of the contributions of the research to innovation theory and 
management practice. 
 
In summary, this research is part of the increasing momentum focused on 
understanding the “how” of dynamic capabilities (Helfat and Maritan 2007, p. 37).  It 
has revealed management practice insights on how dynamic capabilities originate, 
how firms build and deploy an OIC and how distinctive processes support the 
creation, modification, reconfiguration and augmentation of firm resources to achieve 
competitive advantage.  Most importantly, it has provided a theoretical framework for 
an OIC which can be applied in practice. 
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Chapter Two 
2Conceptualising an Organisational Innovation Capability 
2.1 Introduction 
Irrespective of the success or failure metrics employed or the industry studied, the 
literature is united in the view that innovation success rates are unacceptable (de 
Waal, Maritz and Shieh 2010; Cooper 1996, 1999; Connell et al., 2001; Hamel 2003).  
The continued failure of organisations to achieve innovation-based sustainable 
competitive advantage can be partially attributed to the focus of innovation research 
on technological innovation (Weerawardena 2003, p. 409).  Where attempts have 
been made to open the innovation capability “black box” they have focused primarily 
on new product development (Pavlou and El Sawy 2006; Blum 2004; Verona and 
Ravasi 2003), specifically, processes related to new product development such as 
research and development (Macher and Mowery 2009; Blum 2005), and 
entrepreneurial venturing (Katzy et al., 2003). 
 
This chapter builds a theoretical foundation and a conceptual framework to address 
the research question “How can an Organisational Innovation Capability be 
conceptualised in an information technology solutions context, and what is the role of 
learning in organisational innovation capability renewal”.  The research of the 
innovation capability will not be confined to incremental or radical innovation as to 
do so would impinge upon the exploratory nature of the inquiry.  It begins in sections 
2.2 and 2.3 with an overview of innovation and the IT solutions industry respectively 
and then continues in section 2.4 with an analysis of the organisational barriers to 
innovation identified in the literature as these barriers have significant implications 
for firms seeking to build an innovation capability.  Section 2.5 provides a theoretical 
foundation for an OIC.  Initially, theory supporting the concept of capability renewal 
is introduced and conclusions drawn on how the notion of renewal might be 
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evidenced in an OIC.  Next, prior research on components of an OIC were organised, 
analysed, synthesised and arguments presented regarding the key dimensions of a 
well balanced, highly performing OIC.  To provide initial answers to the research 
question, an OIC framework derived from the innovation capability literature is 
depicted in section 2.6.1.  The preconditions of the OIC are described in detail in 
section 2.6.2 with the construct of the OIC described in section 2.6.3. 
 
The theoretical foundation is based on the dynamic capabilities framework which 
may enable a firm to effectively adapt to its changing environment and achieve 
competitive advantage Teece (2007).  An OIC provides an explanation of a firm’s 
ability to sustain its competitive advantage in terms of its ability to “integrate, build, 
and reconfigure” its innovation resources in response to dynamic environmental 
changes (Teece et al., 1997, p. 516).  The key to achieving comparative and 
competitive advantage is to identify the elements of firm-specific innovation 
capabilities that can be sources of advantage, and to explain how combinations of 
competences and resources can be deployed and developed (ibid., p. 510).  This 
“dynamic capability” approach, builds on the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) 
and evolutionary economics (Barney 2001a pp. 646, 647, Ambrosini and Bowman 
2009, p. 29; Helfat et al., 2007, pp. 13-15; Teece 2000, p. 1105, Collis and 
Montgomery 1995, p. 119). 
 
The RBV provided the foundation for developing a capability framework for the 
constant struggle to achieve “superior financial performance” (Hunt 1999, p. 153) in 
a “Schumpeterian world of innovation-based competition, price/performance rivalry, 
increasing returns, and the ‘creative destruction’ of existing competencies” (Teece et 
al., 1997, p. 509).  While the dynamic capabilities approach has been applied to many 
disciplines, little research has been directed to developing a holistic OIC, both 
technological and non-technological (Lawson and Samson 2001, p. 388), 
notwithstanding that “at its core, a theory of dynamic capabilities is a theory of 
innovation” (Rodan 2002, p.152). 
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2.2 Innovation Overview 
2.2.1 Introduction 
While innovation is widely considered as “the lifeblood of corporate survival and 
growth” (Zahra and Covin 1994, p. 183) and “represents the core renewal process in 
any organisation” (Bessant et al., 2005, p. 1366), there are at least “60 definitions 
from different disciplinary traditions and paradigms” (Baregheh et al., 2009, p. 1325) 
as “(i)nnovation is studied in many disciplines and has been defined from different 
perspectives” (Damanpour and Schneider 2006, p. 216). 
 
Joseph Schumpeter, regarded as the godfather of innovation (Tidd et al., 2005, p. 7), 
stressed the importance of innovation as a basis for achieving competitive advantage 
defining innovation as “the competition from the new commodity, the new 
technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organisation… 
competition…which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the 
existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives” (1975, p. 84). 
 
Newness is an underlying theme of most definitions of innovation (Schumpeter 1975, 
p. 84; Damanpour 1996, p. 694; Thompson 1965, p. 2).  Damanpour’s expansive 
definition of innovation has been selected by way of example: 
Innovation is conceived as a means of changing an organization, either as a 
response to changes in the external environment or as a pre-emptive action 
to influence the environment.  Hence, innovation is here broadly defined to 
encompass a range of types, including new product or service, new process 
technology, new organization structure or administrative systems, or new 
plans or program pertaining to organization members (1996, p. 694). 
 
As innovation is the specific tool of entrepreneurs and the means by which they 
exploit change, entrepreneurs need to search purposefully and intentionally for the 
sources of innovation, the changes and their symptoms that indicate opportunities for 
successful innovation to endow its resources with a new capacity to create wealth 
(Drucker 1985, pp. 17, 27).  Bessant and Tidd argue that the forms of innovation can 
be reduced to four dimensions of change (2011, p.19).  Product innovation focuses on 
changes in the products or services which an organisation offers whereas process 
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innovation changes in the way in which those products or services are created and 
delivered.  By contrast, position innovation brings changes in the context in which the 
products or services are introduced while paradigm innovation changes the 
underlying mental models which frame what the organisation does.  Another 
dimension is the degree of novelty involved in the innovation with novelty extending 
along a continuum from incremental to radical change.  Change is possible at 
component or sub-system level or across the whole system (ibid., p. 22). 
2.2.2 The Innovation Process 
Innovation is a core business process associated with survival and growth (Tidd et al., 
2005, p. 67).  Eveleens’ research found 12 innovation process models in management 
literature, policy papers as well as scientific handbooks with the general tendency for 
the models becoming, over time, “more complex, more interdisciplinary, more 
integrated and more connected with their surroundings” (2010, pp. 5, 6).  Three of the 
models developed during the period 1962 to 1994 remain in use, while the rest were 
published from 1999 onwards.  This analysis concluded that most of the innovation 
process models were largely “based on (1) radical (2) products and processes in the 
(3) private sector (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1986; Cormican and O Sullivan 2004; 
Verloop 2004; Andrew and Sirkin 2006)” but “other types of innovations 
(incremental and/or services) (were) considered as well (Tidd and Bessant 2005; 
Jacobs and Snijder 2008)” although with less attention (ibid., p. 6). 
 
All of the models identified by Eveleens included “certain phases, stages, 
components, building blocks, or main activities” with an implied or explicit order in 
these phases, though not necessarily linear (ibid., p. 7).  For instance, Hansen and 
Birkinshaw’s model “presents innovation as a sequential, three-phase process that 
involves idea generation, idea development, and the diffusion of developed concepts” 
(2007, p. 122).  Researchers continue to debate the linearity of the innovation process 
phases (Eveleens 2010, p. 7; Rosing 2011, p. 6).  Those supporting linearity argue 
that later phases are built on the phases which logically precede them in the linear 
succession with a superior innovation outcome being achieved if the ideal sequence 
of events can be followed.  By contrast, the opposing view argues that innovation 
 
23 
 
processes are complex, non-linear and interdependent with deviation from the “neat 
and linear succession of phases” as the “different activities underlying innovation 
processes such as idea generation and the implementation of ideas…(are) relevant 
throughout the whole innovation process and not only during certain time frames 
within the process” (Rosing 2011, p. 6). 
 
The importance of these innovation process models is that they focus management’s 
attention on the need “to take an end-to-end view of their innovation efforts” and on 
strengthening their weak links (Hansen and Birkinshaw 2007, p. 122, 125).  
However, the need to go beyond innovation as a process was stressed by Drucker 
where he argues that what most organisations have failed to recognise is that “the 
very foundation of entrepreneurship is the practice of systematic innovation” 
(Drucker 2002, p. 102). 
2.2.3 Open Innovation  
One major trend in regard to ideation has been the transition from closed to open 
innovation (Chesbrough 2003).  In the old model of closed innovation firms believed 
that successful innovation required control so “companies must generate their own 
ideas that they would then develop, manufacture, market, distribute and service 
themselves” (ibid., p. 36). 
 
With the growing availability of private venture capital, the increased number and 
mobility of knowledge workers and the consequent difficulty for companies to 
control their proprietary ideas and expertise, came a move toward the end of the 20th 
century to open innovation and the breaking down or increasing permeability of 
traditional corporate boundaries.  With the increased openness came the recognition 
that “a single organisation cannot innovate in isolation” (Dahlandera and Gann 2010, 
p. 699). 
 
Open innovation facilitates the flow of intellectual property, ideas and people into 
and out of a firm.  While much of the focus has been on outside-in open innovation 
attention also needs to be directed to inside-out open innovation where a firm places 
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some of its assets or projects outside its firm boundaries (Chesbrough and Garman 
2009, p. 70).  With this new model of open innovation, firms commercialise ideas 
from both internal and external sources with the knowledge from one source 
complemented by that of the other, thereby increasing the robustness of the idea 
screening process.  Through open innovation firms can commercialise internal ideas 
through licensing agreements or channels outside of their current businesses, such as 
companies (which might be financed and staffed with some of the company's own 
personnel), in order to generate value for the organisation.  This approach means that 
“the boundary between a firm and its surrounding environment is more porous, 
enabling innovation to move easily between the two” (ibid., pp. 36, 37). 
2.3 The IT Solutions Industry 
Information technology (IT) solutions and information systems (IS) disciplines have 
been transformed from the traditional “back office” orientation of administrative 
support towards a more strategic role within a firm where it cannot only support the 
business strategies but also define new strategies (Henderson and Venkatraman 1993, 
p. 4).  The continued evolution has led to the convergence of information and 
communication technology design, execution, storage, transmission and reusable 
knowledge has created new opportunities (Demirkan et al., 2008, p. 356). 
 
With the increasing focus on service orientation (ibid.), the IT solutions industry is 
characterised by the “fast pace of technological change, which leads to the rapid 
introduction of new products, presents unique challenges to incumbent firms in the IT 
industry” where “the cost of entry is usually low and startups with intellectual capital 
can emerge as industry leaders in a short time (for example, Cisco and Google)” 
(Banker et al., date unknown, p. 2).  These start ups target the “flaws or blind spots 
result from a company's mistaken or incomplete view of its industry and competition, 
the poor design of the competitive analysis system, inaccurate managerial 
perceptions, or ineffective organizational processes” (Zahra and Chaples 1993, p. 9). 
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In addition to the rapid changes taking place in technology “the complex and 
imposing challenges associated with IT management, development, and use demand 
interdisciplinary approaches to their resolution” (Benbasat and Zmud 2003, p. 185). 
2.4 Barriers to Innovation 
2.4.1 Introduction 
Cooper argued that there has been little improvement in the success rate as innovation 
actors “seem to fall into the same traps that their predecessors did back in the 1970’s” 
(Cooper 1999, p. 2).  These views are supported by a recent Accenture Survey (2008) 
of 601 senior executives from companies with annual turnover in excess of US$750m 
per annum which were pursuing business strategies that depend on a stream of 
innovation.  The Survey indicated that only 41% were fully satisfied with how their 
firms pursued innovation; only 15% were very satisfied with the conversion rate of 
ideas to new service offerings and 13% considered that the innovations were 
repeatable.  Most organisations appear poorly equipped to implement a radical 
innovation strategy as they are “genetically programmed to preserve the status quo” 
(Stringer 2000, p. 71) or are constrained by experience or their myopic management 
(Braganza et al., 2009, pp. 49, 51).  While organisations sense the changing nature of 
the world, they focus on incremental innovation as they have too much invested in 
the status quo to embrace radical innovation.  Even when innovation occurs, there is 
generally a focus on acquiring a new product, than acquiring a new capability 
(Stringer 2000, pp. 72, 80). 
 
The question that must be raised is “Why is the success rate for new product 
development and innovation so low particularly when numerous success/failure 
criteria have been identified in the academic literature?”  The lack of improvement in 
the innovation success rate is puzzling since a myriad of critical success factor lists 
and innovation killers have been published (Crossan and Apaydin 2010; Rothwell et 
al., 1974; Cooper 1980, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2004; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 2007; 
Wycoff 2003; Connell, Edgar et al., 2001). 
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Organisational barriers to innovation have been identified by many authors (Braganza 
et al., 2009, p. 46; Sapsed et al., 2007; Petersen 2010; Christensen et al., 2008; Baker 
and Sinkula 2002; Leonard 1998; Senge 1990) with Leonard concluding that an 
organisation’s strengths or capabilities are simultaneously also its weaknesses which 
manifest themselves in organisational rigidities (1998, p. 30).  In the same way that 
an organisation’s culture is difficult to articulate, the impediments to innovation may 
be equally as subtle particularly as core capabilities and rigidities are built through 
the same activities (Fastabend and Simpson 2004, p. 5; Leonard 1998, p. 30).  While 
a classification of innovation barriers has been developed (Sapsed et al., 2007), the 
key innovation barriers are institutional and relate to belief systems, information and 
behaviour as well as path dependency barriers and organisational inertial tendencies. 
2.4.2 Belief System Barriers 
Belief system barriers are based on the gap between an organisation’s real (theories in 
use) and perceived (espoused) reality with radical innovation potential decreasing 
with a widening gap (Baker and Sinkula 2002, p. 15; Argyris and Schon 1996, p. 13).  
Typically, organisations with high belief system barriers have flawed mental models 
and limit their behaviours and actions to the options and alternatives which are 
consistent with their existing mental models and theories-in-use. 
 
Belief system barriers frequently manifest themselves by omitting key activities in 
the new product process such as the nature and scope of market research (Cooper 
1999, p. 16).  A highly technical cognitive belief system may lead to “a bias towards 
placing disproportionate weight on hard evidence (i.e. tangible and visible factors)” 
leading to an undue emphasis on a product’s technical features (Han, Kim and 
Srivastava 1998, p. 30). 
 
Orlikowski and Gash provide an alternative and supportive view of belief system 
barriers.  They call the organisational “biases and limitations” frames and argue that 
they can have “both facilitating and constraining effects” (Orlikowski and Gash 1994, 
p. 176).  In commenting on the risks in promoting emerging technologies, Day and 
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Schoemaker warn about “the biases and limitations of people’s thinking frameworks” 
as limiting organisational vision and effective implementation (2000, p. 6). 
 
Frames are valuable when they “structure organisational experience, allow 
interpretation of ambiguous situations” and so “reduce uncertainty in conditions of 
complexity and change, and provide a basis for taking action” (Orlikowski and Gash 
1994, p. 176).  But, in an echo of the Day and Schoemaker warning, Orlikowski and 
Gash contend that “frames are constraining when they reinforce unreflective reliance 
on established assumptions and knowledge, distort information to make it fit existing 
cognitive structures, and inhibit creative problem solving” by creating “psychic 
prisons” that inhibit learning because people are unable to see old problems in a new 
light (Orlikowski and Gash 1994, p. 177; Bolman and Deal 1997, p. 5). 
 
Belief system barriers are also evident in the fundamental assumptions made by 
management in relation to the implementation of the managerial functional 
disciplines (Argyris 1999, p. 55).  Embedded in these managerial disciplines is the 
micro-causal theory of implementation; a theory based on the assumption that 
intended consequences follow from prescriptive roles and enablers.  With effective 
coaching, employees can achieve the required skill levels.  Ineffective performance 
can be eliminated as it can be traced to errors and mismatches with the result that 
actions become automatic, routine, and therefore, manageable (Argyris 1999, pp. 55, 
56).  These beliefs are deeply entrenched within organisation as they are largely tacit 
(Senge 1990, p. 12). 
2.4.3 Information Barriers 
Information barriers manifest themselves in “the propensity for managers to dismiss 
information and knowledge inconsistent with their current view of the world, their 
trusted mental models and theories-in-use believing that these are the outcome of 
rational analyses and successful experiences” (Baker and Sinkula 2002, p. 17).  
External knowledge is subject to a screening process biased towards familiar and 
existing knowledge types (Leonard 1998, p. 40; Braganza 2009, p. 49) or limited to 
established and local search locations (Sapsed 2007, p. 5). 
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Another information barrier is the “liability of success” which invests individual with 
“special interests in the status quo” and a propensity for risk averseness (playing the 
game “not to lose” rather than to win) (Sinkula 2002, p. 256; Lawler and Galbraith 
1994, p. 7; Braganza 2009, p. 49).  The repeated success leads the organisation to 
“the presumed correctness of past actions and interpretations” resulting in 
complacency and the rejection of information that conflicts with conventional 
wisdom (Day, 1994, p. 24).  Similarly, the success of an established business model 
can limit the information that gets fed into or filtered out of the corporate decision 
making process so that firms may forgo valuable business opportunities (Chesbrough 
2010, p. 358). 
2.4.4 Behavioural Barriers 
Organisational behavioural barriers include the failure to change behaviour even 
though disconfirming evidence or insight into the inadequacy of managerial mental 
models or theories-in-use is received (Baker and Sinkula 2002, p. 17; Pontiskoski and 
Asakawa 2010, p. 28; Braganza 2009, p. 51), as well as behaviours imposed by or 
entrenched in organisational routines (Van der Panne, van Beers and Kleinknecht 
2003, p. 314). 
 
Organisational defensive routines, while intended for individual and organisational 
survival, promote behaviour that is counterproductive to innovation and to learning 
(Argyris 1999, p. 56).  Defensive routines are individual or organisational threat or 
embarrassment minimisation or prevention strategies.  They have the effect of 
inhibiting the identification of or reducing the cause of the embarrassment or threat 
(Argyris 1999, p. 56).  These counterproductive routines promote behaviours that 
cover up errors and a culture of inflexibility, which in turn inhibits effective 
organisational performance.  They also promote a culture where failure is 
unacceptable and errors cannot be discussed without blame or criticism as “defensive 
reasoning prohibits questioning the defensive reasoning” (Argyris 1999, pp. 56, 57).  
Behaviours which are inconsistent with an innovation orientation such as failure to 
take responsibility, and suppressing negative emotions and feelings, especially those 
associated with embarrassment or threat, become the predominant organisational 
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logic (Argyris 1999, p. 57).  The result is that belief system and information barriers 
are maintained and entrenched with the self-fuelling process maintaining the status 
quo and inhibiting genuine learning (Argyris 1999, p. 57). 
 
Behavioural barriers are relevant to the IT solutions context.  The nature of software 
development is such that, in the absence of firm-wide disciplined and institutionalised 
practices, software teams and developers often turn to ad hoc and a multiplicity of 
individual and non standard practices in the software development process (Ethiraj et 
al., 2005, p. 34). 
2.4.5 Path Dependency Barriers 
The organisation’s historic legacy can intrude on the present and shape its future as 
the future is implicitly assumed to look much like the present, so that experimentation 
addresses doing what the organisation does now, better – not differently (Leonard 
1995, p. 35).  A firm’s historical legacy is associated with deep seated and embedded 
values which impact the accumulation of capabilities so that “to perhaps a surprising 
degree, many companies that appear to have evolved over time still have deep roots 
in their technological origins” (Leonard 1998, p. 26).  
 
An organisation’s resources also can also be a path dependency barrier.  As Penrose 
noted “the services that resources will yield depend on the capacities of the men using 
them, but the development of the capacities of men is partly shaped by the resources 
men deal with.  The two create the special productive opportunity of a particular 
firm” (2009, p. 70). 
 
The firm’s congenital knowledge, knowledge held at its birth (Sinkula 1994, p. 38), 
determines “what it searches for, what it experiences and how it interprets what it 
encounters” (Huber 1991, p. 91) with a heavy bias toward the types of knowledge 
already known to feed core capabilities (Leonard 1998, p. 40).  This results in limited 
experimentation as newly acquired knowledge flow along well-worn paths.  If 
allowed to continue “unchecked and unexamined…predilections towards core 
capabilities can choke off enriching knowledge from unexpected sources” (Leonard 
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1998, pp. 39, 40).  These limitations are often reinforced by the associated cognitive 
preference.  An organisation’s cognitive orientation will frequently lead to the 
implementation of the comfortable clone syndrome in which employees are hired 
based on their conformance to organisational cognitive thinking styles and the 
similarity of their interests and training (Leonard and Straus 1997, p. 112).  These 
preferences work as cognitive filters to the information sought and received so that 
unfamiliar information is rejected (ibid.) with the consequence that information 
barriers are formed and entrenched. 
 
Another critical consequence of path dependency is its impact on learning with 
Sinkula warning emphatically that “past learning inhibits new learning” (2002,         
p. 256).  Prior knowledge determines an organisation’s ability to recognise the value 
of new information, to learn from that new knowledge and to exploit it (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990, p. 128) as well as its ability to learn and the quantum of such learning 
(Zack 1999, p. 28). 
 
Path dependency also manifests itself in thought precluding innovative problem 
solving activities where “functional fixedness” – i.e. the tendency for people to be 
quite fixed in their perception of how objects could be used once that use was 
suggested - limits search patterns to prior experience and successes (Leonard 1998,   
p. 61).  As organisations develop excellence in one knowledge domain, it becomes 
relatively unreceptive to ideas from others (Leonard 1998, p. 59).  Functional 
fixedness mind-sets arise from “the brain’s tendency to store, process, and retrieve 
information in related blocks” with these blocks constituting the mental models, or 
schema, against which information is calibrated and that used to solve problems.  
While mind-sets are highly useful in routine activities, the limited range of problem-
solving responses developed can transform capabilities into dysfunctional and core 
rigidities (Leonard 1998, pp. 61, 62). 
2.4.6 Organisational Inertial Tendencies 
Mature organisations have a tendency to maintain the status quo rather than challenge 
it or the assumptions upon which it is based as “many pressures conspire to keep 
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managers internally focused and comfortable with the status quo long after 
disquieting signs should have made them edgy” (Braganza et al., 2009, p. 46; 
Leonard 1998, p. 31).  Organisational learning from history is seen as “a faulty 
mechanism” (Edmonson and Moingeon 1998, p. 8) as it involves “encoding 
inferences from history into routines that guide behaviour” (Levitt and March, 1988, 
p. 320).  The mechanism is faulty as the encapsulated routines make the lessons, but 
not the history, accessible to individuals and organisations that have not experienced 
the history (Levitt and March, 1988, p. 320).  In this way organisational routines, in 
which “action stems from a logic of appropriateness or legitimacy, more than from a 
logic of consequentiality or intention” (Levitt and March, 1988, p. 320), are “thus 
over-learned, such that actors are more habit driven and imitative than rational” 
(Edmonson and Moingeon 1998, p. 8; see also Pontiskoski and Asakawa 2010, p. 28). 
 
Organisational routines thus create organisations that have self-perpetuating 
processes that maintain the status quo by limiting genuine learning, and reinforcing 
the deception (Argyris 1999, p. 57).  Organisational inertia becomes institutionalised 
through the often unintended, implementation of belief, information and behavioural 
barriers.  For instance, Levitt and March assert that organisational routines and beliefs 
are changed through direct experience in regard to trial and error experimentation and 
organisational search (1988, p. 321).  In relation to the latter, an organisation may 
limit the range of its alternatives to resolving a problem or issue due to the 
experiences that they have accumulated with known routines (belief or information 
barrier) or fall into a competency trap where routines are regarded as rigid 
notwithstanding that organisational learning may have taken place in the application 
of a routine (Levitt and March 1988, pp. 321, 322). 
 
Prior investment choices are also a barrier to organisational innovation.  Where high 
technology products are involved, such as hardware and software, the investment is 
often in systems with strong functional interdependence among components of the 
system.  Accordingly, from both the point of view of the innovative firm and the 
prospective customer, there are path dependency barriers as well as a high tendency 
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for inertia because of investments made previously (Teece 2007, p. 1332; Duncan 
1995, p. 38). 
2.4.7 Conclusion 
The barriers to innovation referred to in this section have significant implications for 
organisations seeking to develop an innovation capability.  In particular, an 
organisation needs to be aware that its strengths and capabilities can simultaneously 
be its weaknesses, and accordingly, that core capabilities can become core rigidities 
in the absence of dynamism in the maintenance, development and continuous 
enhancement of that capability.  It is critical for any firm which wishes to develop an 
innovation capability to be aware of the innovation barriers within its organisation 
and to takes steps to ensure that strategies are implemented to minimise or eliminate 
the negative impacts of the identified barriers and path dependencies upon 
innovation. 
 
In order to overcome the persistent and often entrenched barriers to innovation firms 
need to intervene to overcome these innovation inhibitors (Petersen 2010; Braganza 
et al., 2009, p. 52; Sapsed et al., 2007).  The importance of preconditions to the 
innovation capability will be addressed in section 2.6.2.1. 
2.5 A Theoretical Foundation for an Organisational Innovation 
Capability 
2.5.1 The Resource–based View of the Firm 
The invisibility of critical success factors and the low innovation success rate (Cooper 
1999, pp. 2, 8, 9) requires the development of an organisational competency to bring 
about innovation as a result of intended action such that “the outcome bears a definite 
resemblance to what was intended” (Dosi et al., 2000, p. 2).  Some argue that the 
market for valuable strategic resources and competencies is efficient and that over 
time no real profits exist except in rare circumstances where information asymmetry 
occurs (Rodan 2002, p.152; Lockett et al., 2009, p. 11).  An alternative, and more 
compelling argument, is that as valuable organisational resources can rarely be 
acquired, they must be built inside the firm with the process sometimes taking years 
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or even decades (Rodan 2002, p.152; Teece 2007, p. 1338; Teece et al., 1997, p. 528; 
Spender 1996, p. 46).  For instance, Teece et al. are emphatic in their view that the 
“soft” constituent elements of competencies and capabilities such as “values, culture 
and organisational experience” cannot be traded or acquired. 
 
The RBV of the firm is an influential theoretical framework for planning and 
achieving firm-level sustainable competitive advantage (Teece 2000, p. 1105; Collis 
and Montgomery 1995, p. 119) and understanding the evolution of firm resource 
stock over time and the impact of the evolution of competitive advantage (Ambrosini 
and Bowman 2009, p. 29).  Accordingly, it provides the foundation for development 
of a capability framework for achieving “superior financial performance” (Hunt 
1999, p. 153) in a “Schumpeterian world of innovation-based competition, 
price/performance rivalry, increasing returns, and the ‘creative destruction’ of 
existing competencies” (Teece et al., 1997, p. 509). 
 
Barney was first to challenge the two Porterian assumptions - firm homogeneity in 
terms of resources and strategy, and temporal resource advantage – and substituted 
firm resource heterogeneity (i.e. asymmetric distribution of resources among 
competing firms) and immobility (i.e. not readily available in the factor markets), 
and the sustainability of the heterogeneity of its resources (1991, p. 101; Hunt 1999, 
p. 149) in their stead.  Under the RBV, firms now focused on their own internal 
resources and competencies to supplement the Porter-led external focus on industry 
structure and the search for a favourable competitive position within that structure 
(Porter 1985, p. 1). 
 
Barney defined a firm’s resources to include “all assets, capabilities, organisational 
processes, firm attributes, information (and) knowledge controlled by a firm that 
enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency 
and effectiveness” (1991, p. 101).  These “resources are firm-specific assets that are 
difficult, if not impossible, to imitate” (Teece et al., 1997, p. 516).  Therefore, if 
resources are valuable, rare, inimitable, durable, and difficult to substitute (Barney 
1995, Collis and Montgomery 1995, pp. 120-123) then sustainable competitive 
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advantage can be achieved through value-creating strategies (Barney 1991, p. 102).  
Teece et al. extended the RBV generally and also specifically to “rapidly changing 
environments” (1997, p. 516; see also Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, p. 31) and 
explained the firm’s ability to sustain its competitive advantage in terms of its 
dynamic capabilities – its ability to “integrate, build, and reconfigure” its resources in 
response to dynamic environmental changes (1997, p. 516; see also Ambrosini et al., 
2009, p. S9). 
 
Based on Bharadwaj, typical key resources within the IT solutions context include (1) 
tangible resources such as the hardware and software IT infrastructure components, 
(2) the human IT resources comprising the technical (programming, systems analysis 
and design in emerging technologies), managerial and project management IT 
solutions skills (including abilities such as the effective management of IS functions, 
coordination and interaction with the user community, and project management and 
leadership skills), and (3) the intangible idiosyncratic IT-enabled resources such as 
intellectual capital or knowledge assets, customer orientation, and synergy (2000, pp. 
1711732; see also Benbasat 2003, p. 186)  The tangible resources provide the delivery 
platform to enable information to be seamlessly and automatically shared across 
systems and services.   
 
Strong human IT resources (technical and managerial IT skills, employees culture of 
change and adaptability, empowering human resource structures) are critical for the 
effective integration and alignment of the IT and business planning functions as the 
absence of an integrated IT infrastructure severely restricts an organisation's business 
choices.  These human IT resources, when viewed from a resource-based perspective, 
are difficult to acquire and complex to imitate, thereby serving as sources of 
competitive advantage (ibid., pp. 172-174). 
                                                 
 
2 While this comment was made in relation to the development of an IT capability within a firm rather 
than the supply of IT solutions to another firm, it is submitted that a services firm must have those IT 
resources before it supply those services to another firm. 
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2.5.2 The Resource-based View and Evolutionary Economics 
With economic reward being transitory due to the propensity for competitors to 
imitate successful innovation, Schumpeter bypassed static economic theories and 
postulated that an evolutionary economic system would have within it the seeds for 
positive adjustment and change otherwise it could not evolve (Matthews 2003, p. 4).  
To Schumpeter, the fundamental source of organisational variation was in the 
entrepreneurial recombination of factors, resulting in new applications of existing 
processes or business models to new areas of application, rather than their innovation 
at first instance (ibid., p. 8). 
 
Barney’s positioning of RBV in evolutionary economics facilitates the development 
of arguments in respect of the way organisational routines and capabilities change 
over time (Barney 2001a, pp. 646, 647).  He observed that routines are part of the 
firm’s resources and capabilities and it is the “most efficient and effective routines, 
which generate competitive advantage” (Barney 2001, p. 646).  Routines contribute 
to sustainable competitive advantage by the creation of new resource sets through 
reconfiguring, transforming and recombining assets and resources, leveraging 
existing resources such as business models, processes or systems in other parts of the 
business, learning through experimentation to improve efficiency and effectiveness of 
the operations and processes, and the creative integration of resources (Ambrosini 
and Bowman 2009, p. 35). 
2.5.3 The Resource Advantage Theory of Competition 
The RBV has provided a foundation for the Resource-Advantage Theory (RA 
Theory) postulated by Hunt and Morgan (1995, 1997, 1999).  Under this evolving 
theory which describes the evolutionary, disequilibrium-provoking process of 
competition (Hunt 2011, p. 11), the firm’s objective is to attain superior financial 
performance by combining and exploiting its resources to achieve a position of 
comparative advantage in a market or a segment of a market (1995, p. 6).  In so 
doing, the firm’s internal capabilities (“what it does well’) are linked with the 
environment in which it competes (“what the market demands and what competitor’s 
offer”) (Collis and Montgomery 1995, p. 120).  While many other competition 
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theories are rooted in one discipline, the RA Theory is an interdisciplinary dynamic, 
process theory of competition that has been developed in various disciplines 
including marketing, management, economics, general business and ethics (Hunt and 
Arnett 2003, p. 1).  In addition, it has affinities with other theories including 
evolutionary economics, ‘Austrian’ economics, industrial-organisation theory, and 
the resource- and competence-based traditions (Hunt and David 2008, p. 12; Hunt 
2011, p. 9). 
 
The key to achieving comparative and, therefore, competitive advantage is to 
“identify the dimensions of firm-specific capabilities that can be sources of 
advantage, and to explain how combinations of competences and resources can be 
deployed and developed” (Teece et al., 1997, p. 510).  This dynamic capability 
approach, builds on the RBV of the firm and evolutionary economics by linking the 
dynamic (the ability to renew competencies in response to rapidly changing business 
environments) with capabilities (the strategic management role bringing congruence 
to the dynamic environment) (ibid., p. 515).  It is this linking which provides the 
context for resources and the active integration, construction and reconfiguration of 
those resources within a dynamic environment which enables firms to achieve market 
positions of comparative and/or competitive advantage through increases in 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
The RA Theory provides the theoretical framework for the firm’s constant struggle 
for comparative advantages in resources that will yield marketplace positions of 
competitive advantage and, thereby, superior financial performance (Hunt 2011,       
p. 11).  The competition is among firms within a market segment to achieve 
comparative advantage from their unique resource mix (Hunt 1997, p. 60).  
Accordingly, the competitive process yields “numerous, vigorous, ongoing, 
disequilibrating struggles among firms for comparative advantages in resources” 
(Hunt 1999, p. 153), and it is this disequilibria which is the driver for reactive and 
proactive innovation and thus increased efficiency/effectiveness (Hunt and Morgan 
1999, p. 149).  The firm achieves its competitive advantage objective if it creates 
comparative value, i.e. more customer value than its competitors at either the same or 
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a lower cost, or it creates the same value as its competitors at a lower cost (Hunt 
1999, pp.149, 154). 
 
While reactive innovation arises from a rival firm’s realisation that it is producing 
inefficiently/ineffectively, proactive innovation is “not prompted by specific 
competitive pressures as is genuinely entrepreneurial in the classic sense of 
entrepreneur” (Hunt 2011, p. 11).  While the advantaged firm already has a 
competitive advantage, the entrepreneurship is driven by the firm’s desire to increase 
the efficiency-effectiveness gap between it and its rivals, and so, increase its 
competitive advantage.  Accordingly, proactive innovation is the product of “renewal 
competencies” which move the firm to new levels of competitive advantage (Hunt 
1999, p. 154).  These competencies enable the firm to “(1) anticipate potential market 
segments (unmet, changing, and/or new needs, wants, and desires); (2) envision 
market offerings that might be attractive to such segments; and (3) foresee the need to 
acquire, to develop, or to create the required resources, including particular 
competences, to produce the envisioned market offerings” (Hunt 1999, p. 154).  
Thus, learning and innovation are endogenous to the RA Theory as they arise directly 
out of the process of competition (Hunt 1997, p. 60, 1999, p. 153; Hunt and Davis 
2008, p. 12). 
 
One of the key achievements of the RA Theory is the consolidation of the expanded 
view of what constitutes a resource and the relevance of that definition for a market-
based economy (Hunt and Morgan 1995, p. 8).  The view now encompasses both 
tangible and intangible resources which are available to the firm and which enable it 
to “produce efficiently and/or effectively a market offering that has some value for 
some market segment(s)” (Hunt 2011, p. 14). 
 
While the tangible resources are well understood and documented, the intangible, 
“higher order resources” (Hunt and Morgan 1995, p. 12) require consideration as it is 
often these which are most difficult to imitate (Barney 1995, p. 53), to neutralise or 
create causal ambiguity to either the resource owner or its competitors (Hunt and 
Davis 2008, p. 18).  For instance, in regard to a superior product offering, there could 
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be significant ambiguity as to which of the firm’s resources are being used to produce 
the desired attribute (Hunt and Morgan 1995, p. 12) or the mix of those resources. 
 
Each firm has a unique mix of resources due to the heterogeneity of resources and 
their imperfect mobility (Hunt and Morgan 1995, p. 7).  If a resource or the resource 
mix is sufficiently rare then it may produce competitive advantage for the firm (Hunt 
and Morgan 1995, p. 7).  The key is for the firm to create idiosyncratic resources – 
those which are “relatively immobile (difficult to buy in the factor markets), 
inimitable (difficult to copy or duplicate), nonsubstitutable (difficult to find or create 
functional equivalents for), and nonsurpassable (difficult to find or create functional 
superiors for)” (Hunt 1999, p. 152).  The key attributes which facilitate the 
identification and production of idiosyncratic resources are tacitness, causal 
ambiguity, social or technological complexity, interconnectedness, mass efficiencies, 
and time compression diseconomies so that they are less likely to be quickly and 
effectively neutralised and more likely to produce a sustainable competitive 
advantage (Hunt 1999, p. 152; Hunt and Davis 2008, p. 16). 
2.5.4 Corporate Entrepreneurship 
Corporate entrepreneurship has been growing in increasing importance as 
“entrepreneurial strategies suggest ways to revitalise existing organisations and make 
them more innovative” (Cooper, Markman, and Niss 2000, p. 116).  Research in 
entrepreneurship endeavours to find answers to questions such as, “(1) why, when, 
and how opportunities for the creation of goods and services come into existence; (2) 
why, when, and how some people and not others discover and exploit these 
opportunities; and (3) why, when, and how different modes of action are used to 
exploit entrepreneurial opportunities” (Shane and Venkataraman 2000, p. 218). 
 
To possess a corporate entrepreneurship strategy, firms must, through “consistency in 
approach and regularity in behaviour” (Ireland et al., 2009, p. 37), “significantly 
display the three foundational elements of an entrepreneurial strategic vision, a pro-
entrepreneurship organizational architecture, and entrepreneurial processes and 
behavior as exhibited throughout the organization.  The absence or weakness of any 
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of these elements would indicate that a corporate entrepreneurship strategy does not 
exist in a firm” as to operate effectively as a strategy it must “run deep” within the 
organisation (ibid., p. 38).  Corporate entrepreneurship has been described by Morris 
et al., (2008, p. 81) as being comprised of corporate venturing and strategic 
entrepreneurship and their characterisation is depicted in Figure 2.1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Corporate Entrepreneurship Framework 
 
The focus of corporate venturing is the addition of new businesses either internal or 
external to the firm or in partnership with one or more other entities.  By contrast, 
strategic entrepreneurship exhibits “large-scale or highly consequential innovations 
that are adopted in the firm’s pursuit of competitive advantage” (Kurato 2007, pp. 6, 
7).  Ireland et al. described entrepreneurship is terms of opportunity seeking so that 
strategic entrepreneurship, the integration of the mutually supportive disciplines of 
strategic management and entrepreneurship, is the combination and synthesis of 
opportunity-seeking and advantage-seeking behaviour (2003, pp. 964, 966). 
2.6 Dynamic Capabilities  
The concept of dynamic capabilities, while still in its infancy and focused on 
foundational level issues (Helfat and Peteraf 2009, p. 92), is an influential framework 
which has enabled strategic managers competing in a Schumpeterian world of 
innovation-based competition to analyse and operationalise the organisational 
resources and methods of effective wealth creation (Teece et al., 1997, p. 509; Teece 
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2007; Ambrosini and Bowman 2009).  This paper argues for the development of an 
organisational innovation capability.  The dynamic capabilities approach provides a 
theoretical framework for examining how a firm can integrate, adapt and reconfigure 
its endowed assets and resources to create “renewal capabilities” which lead to 
comparative and/or competitive advantage and “superior financial performance” in a 
market or a segment of a market (Teece 2007; Hunt and Morgan 1995, p. 6).  
Utilising this theoretical framework, this research provides a definitional context for 
evaluating key organisational capabilities that directly impact an organisation’s drive 
towards consistent and effective innovation in a rapidly changing environment. 
 
With the continuing development of the dynamic capabilities concept, the definition 
of dynamic capabilities has itself evolved through incremental improvements.  Teece 
et al. defined dynamic capabilities as “the firm's ability to integrate, build, and 
reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing 
environments” (1997, p. 516).  While Eisenhardt and Martin’s definition of dynamic 
capabilities is largely consistent with this definition, they extend the dynamism 
concept of Teece et al. (1997) beyond achieving environmental congruence to 
capabilities which produce value-creating market and ecosystem change as markets 
emerge, collide, split, evolve and die (2000, p. 1107; see also Teece 2007, p. 1341).  
In addition, Eisenhardt and Martin do not limit dynamic capabilities to a firm’s 
functional environment as they extend their definition to include “alliance and 
acquisition routines that bring new resources into the firm from external sources” 
(2000, p. 1108, emphasis added). 
 
Helfat et al. define dynamic capability as “the capacity of an organisation to 
purposefully create, extend, and modify its resource base” which includes its 
“tangible, intangible, and human assets (or resources) as well as capabilities which 
the organisation owns, controls or has access to on a preferential basis” (2007, p. 4).  
Following Ambrosini et al. (2009, pp. S10, S11), the Helfat definition has been 
adopted as it provides a synthesis of prior definitions and makes explicit the need for 
a minimal degree of intentionality (Helfat and Peteraf, 2009, pp. 94, 95). 
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In identifying organisational dynamic capabilities it is first necessary to identify “the 
foundations upon which distinctive and difficult-to-replicate advantages can be built, 
maintained and enhanced” (Teece et al., 1997, p. 516).  Three classes of factors that 
help determine the way in which the firm’s distinctive competencies and dynamic 
capabilities evolve were identified (ibid., pp. 518-524; Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, 
pp. 39, 40). 
 
Processes 
Processes include organisational and managerial firm-specific routines relating firstly, 
to co-ordination and integration of organisational activity such as recognising the 
congruencies and complementarities among processes, and between processes and 
incentives; secondly, to learning as a process by which repetition and experimentation 
enable tasks to be performed better and quicker both on an individual and 
organisational level which in turn result in newer and improved routines; and thirdly, 
to the reconfiguration of the organisation’s assets and structures in response to or 
anticipation of changing markets and technologies. 
 
Positions 
The organisation’s legacy of assets includes its technology and complementary 
assets, its difficult-to-trade knowledge assets and assets complementary to them, its 
organisational structure, internal linkages and its financial assets.  These factors also 
include the firm’s management, their ability to sense changes in their competitive 
environment and to reconfigure assets to meet the changing environment.  Another 
related internal factor is the management’s perception of the environmental change 
and the accuracy of those perceptions. 
 
In addition to the internal position, its external position “refers to the firm vis-à-vis its 
institutional environment and its markets” (Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, p. 39).  
Together with the paths a firm has travelled, positions enable or constrain dynamic 
capabilities (ibid.). 
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Path Dependencies 
An organisation’s strategic direction is a function of both its current position and the 
paths available to it, with the former being shaped by the path it has traveled and its 
previous investments.  The firm’s history and its strategic choices constrain its future 
behaviour and reinforce the propensity of learning to be close to previous activities 
(Teece et al., 1997, p. 522).  Similarly, according to Eisenhardt and Martin, path 
dependencies are more accurately described in terms of learning mechanisms which 
guide the evolution of dynamic capabilities (2000, p. 1114).  Consequently, path 
dependency “not only defines what choices are open to the firm…but puts bounds 
around what its internal repertoire is likely to be in the future (Teece et al., 1997,       
p. 515).  However, while path dependencies constrain strategic options “the business 
enterprise is not necessarily trapped by its paths” (Teece 2007, p. 1341). 
 
Fundamental to capability development is the concept of organisational routines.  
Routines are “the building blocks of capabilities” and represent successful solutions 
to particular problems (Dosi et al., 2000, p. 4; Teece et al., 1997, p. 520).  The 
managerial and organisational processes are embedded within the firm in its routines, 
patterns of current practice and learning, such as the way information is gathered and 
processed and encompass both individual and collective interaction, learning and 
knowledge generation (Teece 1997, pp. 518-520).  These routines, “whether 
deliberately organised or spontaneously evolved, structure activities, processes and 
information” (Van der Panne, van Beers and Kleinknecht 2003, p. 313).  Routines 
contribute to sustainable competitive advantage in “distinct ways of co-ordinating and 
combining” to facilitate the embedding of competence and capability with the firm 
(Teece et al., 1997, p. 519).  Other resource creation mechanisms include 
reconfiguration, leverage, learning and integration being applied at either the core 
process or support activity level (Bowman and Ambrosini 2003, p. 293).  
 
Ambrosini et al. (2009) also identified three levels of dynamic capabilities which are 
related to managers’ understanding of the need for change based on their perceptions 
of internal and external environmental dynamism.  In an environment which is 
perceived to be stable, incremental dynamic capabilities are applied to achieve 
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continuous improvement (incremental adjustment or adaptation) of the firm’s 
resource base.  In dynamic environments, core capabilities can become core rigidities 
and so renewing capabilities - those that refresh, adapt and augment the resource base 
– are required to create or introduce new resources or to combine existing resources 
in new ways.  Without this renewal of the way in which the firm performed it would 
not be able to “survive and prosper under conditions of change” (Helfat et al., 2007, 
p. 1).  These first two levels are usually what the literature refers to as dynamic 
capabilities.  However, dynamic capabilities are also part of the resource base of an 
organisation and since they act to create, modify or extend an organisation’s 
resources it implies that dynamic capabilities can modify or extend dynamic 
capabilities (Helfat et al., 2007, p. 4).  Therefore, where managers perceive the 
environment to be turbulent or where external changes are non-linear or 
discontinuous, regenerative capabilities are required to create, extend or modify the 
existing embedded dynamic capabilities, i.e. these change the way the firm changes 
its resource base (Ambrosini 2009). 
 
While the dynamic capability framework has been associated with the quest for 
sustainable competitive advantage, Helfat et al. (2007) and Ambrosini et al. (2009) 
have decoupled the notion that dynamic capabilities automatically lead to competitive 
advantage.  Capability life cycles were also identified as a source of heterogeneity in 
organisational capabilities (Helfat and Peteraf 2003) as dynamic capabilities follow a 
similar evolutionary life cycle to products with recognisable stages such as growth, 
maturity and decline.  In addition, there is opportunity for the capability to branch 
into retirement, retrenchment, renewal, replication, redeployment or recombination at 
any point in its life cycle (ibid., p. 1000). 
2.6.1 Organisational Innovation Capability Research 
Hamel considers that the reason for the innovation hiatus is that management needs to 
“move from innovations as exceptions; move beyond innovation as a specific role or 
structure, beyond innovation as a once-in-a-while project, to thinking about 
innovation as a deep capability” (2003, emphasis added).  This position is consistent 
with the dynamic capabilities approach because of its focus on the development of 
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management capabilities (Teece et al., 1997, p. 510).  Accordingly, innovation has 
been identified as a capability critical for competing in a dynamic and turbulent 
environment. 
 
Based on their knowledge content, Verona classifies rent-generating routines in 
terms of their functional or integrative capabilities.  Technical knowledge is 
enhanced by the firm’s functional capabilities.  Integrative capabilities, on the other 
hand, facilitate the integration of knowledge from outside the firm as well as blend 
technical competencies across departmental boundaries (Verona 1999, p. 134; 
Lawson and Samson 2001, p. 379). 
 
Innovation capability has been defined as “the ability to continuously transform 
knowledge and ideas into new products, processes and systems for the benefit of the 
firm and its stakeholders” with this higher order capability enabling the moulding and 
management of multiple capabilities to successfully stimulate innovation (Lawson 
and Samson 2001, pp. 380, 384).  In highly competitive and high-velocity markets, 
dynamic capabilities take on a different character being simple (not complicated), 
experiential (not analytic), and iterative (not linear) processes with situation-specific 
knowledge created and applied in the context of simple boundary and priority-setting 
rules (Eisenhardt 2000, p. 1113).  
 
Multiple views of the elements of a successful innovation enterprise are present in the 
literature (Waal, Maritz and Shieh 2010, p. 43; Lawson and Samson 2001; Tushman 
and O’Reilly 1997; Cooper 2004; Grant 1996; Verona and Ravasi 2003; Pavlou and 
El Sawy 2006; Blum 2004).  These range from an approach where the author includes 
a list of all tangentially relevant factors such as learning orientation, market 
orientation, culture, innovation metrics and subsequent and continued measurement, 
organisational structure (Waal, Maritz and Shieh 2010, p. 43; Lawson and Samson 
2001; Cooper 2004, 2005) to the approach where most factors are considered to be 
preconditions with the principal drivers for the dynamic capability being 
entrepreneurship and learning how to be better at innovation (Weerawardena 2003).  
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Another approach is where a single resource such as knowledge is said to capture the 
essence of the organisational innovation capability (Grant 1996, p. 375; also Verona 
and Ravasi 2003).  The theoretical framework defining the boundaries for this current 
research recognises that some of the dimensions identified in research investigating a 
firm’s OIC are components of the capability itself, while others are dimensions of the 
organisational environment which bound the skills and behaviour inherent in the 
capability. 
 
The debate about which dimensions to include in any OIC must take place in a 
broader context than new product development.  Teece et al. define dynamic 
capabilities as “the subset of competence/capabilities which allow the firm to create 
new products and processes” (1994, p. 541, emphasis added).  Therefore, the 
conceptualisation of an OIC that focuses only on technological innovation or new 
product development cannot, by definition, be a holistic model of innovation.  As 
Blum concluded, it provides “a disaggregated view of dynamic capabilities” (2005, p. 
11). 
 
Key organisational innovation dimensions synthesised from the literature are 
included in the Table 2.1 below.  While there is still no dominant organisational 
innovation theory, key dimensions are beginning to emerge with consistency.  Two 
factors have emerged as innovation preconditions – learning and entrepreneurial 
intensity.  Learning is prevalent as a key innovation dimension either explicitly 
(Bessant and Buckingham 1993; Lawson and Samson 2001; Pavlou and El Sawy 
2006; Blum 2004; Weerawardena 2003; Van der Panne et al., 2003) or implicitly in 
the type of organisational culture required for effective and consistent innovation 
(Cooper 2005; Tushman and O’Reilly 1997; Verona and Ravasi 2003).  
Entrepreneurial capability or intensity is displayed in types of organisational 
behaviour such as proactive risk taking, experimentation, promotion of cross-
functional teams (Miller 1983; Weerawardena 2003). 
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Table 2.1 Organisational Innovation Dimensions 
 
Author Innovation Dimensions 
Lawson and 
Samson 2001 
• Vision and strategy 
• Harnessing the competence base 
• Organisational intelligence (learning about customers and competitors) 
• Creativity and idea management 
• Organisational structure and systems 
• Culture and climate 
• Management of technology (p. 388) 
Tushman and 
O’Reilly 1997 
Ambidextrous organisation characterised by  
• Senior management “articulating a clear, emotionally engaging, and consistent 
vision; building a senior team with diverse competencies, developing a healthy 
team process (p.171). 
• Innovation infrastructures (comprehensive rewards and recognition that 
promote creativity and facilitate implementation, p. 172),  
Cooper 2005 
 
• Innovation diamond 
• Existence of a product innovation and technology strategy 
• Effective and efficient idea-to-launch process 
• Resource commitment and focus on the right projects (portfolio management) 
• People, positive culture for innovation and entrepreneurship (e.g. foster 
effective cross-functional teams and provide strong support and empowerment 
to those teams) and leadership 
Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt 
2007 
 
• High-quality new product process 
• Defined new product strategy 
• Resources of people and money 
• R&D spending for new product development 
• High-quality new product project teams 
• Senior management committed to, and involved in, new products 
• Innovative climate and culture 
• Use of cross-functional project teams 
• Senior management accountability for new product results. 
Verona and 
Ravasi 2003 
• Systems and structure: Innovation infrastructure (“loosely coupled based on the 
absence of permanent formal structures”, p. 598) with continuous collection and 
evaluation of proposals, free allocation of time and skills and centralised 
allocation of financial resources 
• Culture: Open and informal culture characterised by openness to individual 
proposals and creativity 
• Actors: Contributive and motivated employees 
• Physical resources: Flexible workplace design 
Pavlou and El 
Sawy 2006 
• Sensing the environment - identifying consumer needs and new market 
opportunities - captured by market orientation 
• learning which builds new thinking, generates new knowledge and enhances 
existing resources – captured by absorptive capacity 
• co-ordinating activities - resource allocation, task assignment and activity 
synchronisation – captured by co-ordination capability and 
• integrating resources captured by collective mind (p. 8) 
Blum 2004 • Effective cross functional teams 
• Experimentation and Exploit and explore orientation 
• Integration, learning and reconfiguring routines 
• Streams of new products (p.159) 
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Author Innovation Dimensions 
Weerawardena 
2003 
• Market-focused learning capability 
• Organisational Innovation Intensity 
• Entrepreneurial capability 
Van der Panne 
et al., 2003 
• Culture oriented towards innovation and an awareness of the collective nature 
of innovation 
• Prior experience with innovation projects (learning-by-doing) 
• Multi-disciplinary R and D team 
• Clearly articulated innovation strategy and aligned management style 
• Project compatibility with firm competencies 
• Innovation product has relative quality and price advantage and good market 
timing (page 327) 
de Waal, Maritz 
and Shieh 2010 
• Formulation of an innovation strategy 
• Having an innovation supportive organisation 
• Collaborating with innovation partners (external linkages) 
• The identification of appropriate innovation metrics and subsequent and 
continued measurement 
• Developing and implementing suitable innovation processes 
• Making use of appropriate innovation tools 
• Providing innovative leadership (page 43) 
 
An organisation’s market-focused learning capability is a measure of its ability to 
learn from market changes (both customer preferences and competitor actions) and 
has been consistently included in previous conceptualisations of an OIC.  
Organisational innovation intensity reflects the extent of the firm’s innovations across 
its products, processes, management and marketing focus, and the ability to learn 
about what customer’s value, how competitors are adjusting their value propositions, 
how competitor’s success in innovation is changing and what are the drivers of those 
changes in innovation success. 
 
Recent research developed and refined comprehensive measures of market-focused 
learning capability and organisational innovation intensity (Weerawardeena 2003) 
and also identified the importance of innovation infrastructure renewal (Gold et al., 
2001).  Weerawardena found that market-focused learning capability and 
organisational innovation intensity are interrelated as the learning enables firms to 
“pursue both technological (product and process) and non-technological (marketing 
and organisational systems) innovations” (Weerawardeena 2003, p. 419).  In addition, 
market-focused learning will influence innovation infrastructure renewal as new ideas 
and approaches to innovation management are learned from the environment. 
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Infrastructure renewal may in turn influence the extent and nature of market-focused 
activity and the intensity of innovation pursued. 
 
The OIC is depicted in Figure 2.2.  The framework comprises two preconditions - 
organisational learning and entrepreneurial intensity - and the three interdependent 
components - organisational innovation intensity, innovation infrastructure capability 
renewal, market-focused learning capability. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Organisational Innovation Framework 
2.6.2 Organisational Preconditions supporting an OIC 
2.6.2.1 Importance of Preconditions 
The structure of the OIC is consistent with management literature which identifies 
capabilities or leadership behaviours which facilitate capability development.  Gold et 
al. support the existence and importance of preconditions and their characterisation as 
capabilities in the following quotation: 
Importantly, organizations may not be equally predisposed for successful 
launch and maintenance of knowledge management initiatives. Therefore, a key 
to understanding the success and failure of knowledge management within 
organizations is the identification and assessment of preconditions that are 
necessary for the effort to flourish.  These preconditions are described broadly 
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as "capabilities" or "resources" within the organizational behavior 
literature…(2001, p. 186, emphasis added). 
 
The hierarchical nature of capabilities and the relevance of preconditions to 
innovation is also encapsulated by Baker and Sinkula when they identify five levels 
of organisational learning (2002, p. 10).  Based on this hierarchy they define three 
types of marketing firms.  These firms are defined “by the strength of their market 
orientation and learning orientation and are characterised by different learning 
approaches, which determine their innovation capabilities” (ibid., emphasis added).  
Jarratt and O’Neill (2002) support the hierarchical nature of capabilities when they 
state “that cultural dimensions such as flexibility and consultation are organisational 
preconditions or values that support relational behaviour.  Similarly, Jarratt argues 
that “it has also been established that a firm’s learning is facilitated by structures that 
encourage interaction between all organizational members irrespective of their status 
or expertise (Hedlund, 1994)” (Jarratt 2009, p. 367).  Ireland et al. provide further 
support for the hierarchical approach by their identification of the antecedents to 
corporate entrepreneurship strategy (2009, p. 26).  As a consequence of the 
hierarchical nature of capabilities, if an organisation has, for instance, limited 
learning capabilities, it follows that its innovation capability, as well as its ability to 
renew that capability, will be constrained. 
 
The RA Theory as an evolutionary, process theory of competition provided the 
compulsion for the need for preconditions to facilitate innovation capability renewal 
as it placed significant emphasis on proactive and reactive innovation (Hunt and 
Davis 2008, p. 14).  Proactive innovation arises, not from competitive pressures, but 
from the initiative of the firm’s entrepreneurial management in expectation of 
superior financial performance.  The absence of entrepreneurial management action 
results in disadvantage in efficiency and effectiveness (ibid., p. 13).  Reactive 
innovation is dependent upon organisational learning.  Through the ongoing process 
of disequilibrating competition, organisations learn as the result of the continued 
feedback from relative financial performance which provided signals of the firm’s 
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relative market position and resource advantage or disadvantage (ibid., p. 14), and 
this learning prompted an innovation response. 
 
As organisational learning and entrepreneurial management are endogenous to the 
RA Theory it is imperative that these attributes be included as preconditions for an 
innovation capability framework.  Without these preconditions, a firm will lack the 
will and innovation capacity (O’Connor et al., 2007, p. 551) to engage in proactive 
innovation and the antecedents for success. 
2.6.2.2 Entrepreneurial Intensity 
The firm’s entrepreneurial intensity is a key factor in determining its capability 
building activity (Weerawardena 2003, p. 410) as “the managerial competence of a 
firm is to a large extent a function of the quality of the entrepreneurial services 
available to it” (Penrose 1995, p. 32).  Teece states that “enterprises with good 
dynamic capabilities will have entrepreneurial management that is strategic in nature 
and achieves the value-enhancing orchestration  of assets inside, between, and 
amongst enterprises and other institutions within the business ecosystem” (2007,      
p. 1344). 
 
This capability is demonstrated by the innovative, proactive and risk seeking 
propensity of its strategic leaders and infuses through the organisational environment 
(Deshpande and Webster 1992).  Penrose characterised a growing enterprise as 
having “a psychological predisposition on the part of individuals to take a chance in 
the hope of gain, and, in particular, to commit effort and resources to speculative 
activity with the success of the firm being a function of the entrepreneurial services 
available to it” (1995, pp. 30, 32).  Other supporting elements include the firm’s 
acceptance of risk as an inherent part of innovation (Rothwell 1992, p. 227), a no 
blame culture with no punishment for failure (Cooper, Edgett and Kleinschmidt 2004, 
p. 37), good internal and external communication with an open communication 
culture (Rothwell 1992, p. 223; Cooper, Edgett and Kleinschmidt 2004, p. 37) and the 
capacity for innovation as a corporate-wide task (Rothwell 1992, p. 223, 224).  
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Associated with innovation behavioural orientation is recognition by senior 
management of the “people-centeredness” of the innovation process (ibid., p. 224), 
the requirement of senior management commitment to and visible support for 
innovation (Cooper 2004; Connell, Edgar et al., 2001, p. 36; Van der Panne, van 
Beers and Kleinknecht 2003, p. 321; Rothwell 1992, p. 227), as well as the 
organisation’s commitment to the development of human capital and its ability to 
attract and retain dynamic, open-minded managers (ibid., p. 224).  Thus, 
organisational entrepreneurial intensity appears in Figure 2.2 as an organisational 
precondition that will define the extent and nature of the organisational innovation 
intensity and innovation infrastructure renewal dimensions of an OIC. 
2.6.2.3 Organisational Learning Capability 
Dynamic capabilities which provide superior financial performance are inimitable 
and rare (Teece et al., 1997, p. 516).  The RA Theory recognises organisational 
learning as one of a number of competitive advantage driving resources (Hunt and 
Morgan 1996, p. 108).  Dickson goes so far as to say that higher-order learning is the 
fundamental construct surpassing comparative advantage in product value as it gives 
a firm a comparative advantage in learning, and, consequently, in innovation (1996, 
p. 104, emphasis added).   
 
Organisational learning is widely regarded as imperative to achieving competitive 
advantage, superior financial performance (Hult et al., 2000; Hunt and Morgan 1996, 
p. 108; Dickson 1996, p. 104; Baker and Sinkula 1999a) and capability renewal, 
particularly as it cannot be copied (ibid., p. 411).  Learning is considered to be the 
principal process by which management innovation occurs with Stata arguing that 
“the rate at which individuals and organisations learn may be the only sustainable 
competitive advantage, especially in knowledge-intensive industries” (1989, p. 64). 
 
As capabilities are complex bundles of skills, collective learning and accumulated 
knowledge, the learning dimension of the OIC is of paramount importance (Day 
1994, p. 38).  Learning enables organisations to link organisational memory to 
knowledge, products, processes and technologies as well as mainstream capabilities 
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(Lawson and Samson 2001, p. 382).  The organisational learning capability, i.e. the 
learning culture of an organisation, has been confirmed as a dimension of an 
organisation’s environment supporting a market orientation (Baker and Sinkula 
1999a) and, therefore, is positioned in Figure 2.2 as an organisational precondition 
supporting an OIC.  Consistent with the findings of Baker and Sinkula, it is argued 
that the ability of an organisation to glean ideas for innovation from its market, 
identify new processes that will advance the innovation potential of the organisation 
and understand how new technology might re-shape value creation for the market 
will be bounded by the learning culture of the organisation. 
 
Edmonson and Moingeon’s definition encapsulates organisational learning’s iterative 
nature: 
Organisation learning is a process in which organisation’s members actively use 
data to guide behaviour in such a way as to promote the ongoing adaptation of the 
organisation…It is a process of acting, assessing, and acting again – an ongoing 
cycle of reflection and action that cannot be taken for granted in organisations 
noted for their adherence to routine (1998, p. 12). 
 
Companies that wish to compete on the basis of their knowledge need to follow the 
Japanese holistic approach to knowledge creation which recognises that the company 
is a living organism, not a machine (Nonaka 1991, p.97).  The critical factor that 
stimulates continuous innovation and self-renewal is the recognition that “the 
knowledge-creating company is as much about ideals as it is about ideas” (ibid.).  “To 
create new knowledge means quite literally to re-create the company and everyone in 
it in a non-stop process of personal and organisational self-renewal.  In a firm with 
these knowledge-creating capabilities inventing new knowledge is not a specialised 
activity…It is a way of behaving, indeed a way of being, in which everyone is a 
knowledge worker – that is to say, even an entrepreneur” (ibid.).  The focus on ideals 
rather than ideas is consistent with academic literature on organisational learning 
levels as the challenge to ideals parallels the challenge to governing variables in 
generative learning as with generative learning “managers must challenge employees 
to re-examine what they take for granted” (ibid., p. 102). 
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Organisational learning takes place with distinct systemic styles (levels) ranging from 
zero (not learning), to single (called adaptive learning by Senge 1990 and error 
correction by Wijnhoven 2001), double (“generative learning” by Senge 1990 and 
“innovation” by Wijnhoven 2001, p. 183) and triple loop learning (also called deutero 
learning) (Argyris 1999, p. 67ff; Senge 1990, p. 8; Snell and Chak 1998, pp. 339ff; 
Wijnhoven 2001, p. 182; Ortenblad, 2004, p. 133).  For Wijnhoven, the action-
outcome approach is affected by the environmental complexity (increasing 
complexity leads to the addition of more factors to understand what is occurring) as 
well as the level of dynamism in the environment (increasing dynamism is 
demonstrated by the frequency of changes in the factors) (2001, p. 183). 
 
As it reflects the degree to which values influence the propensity of the organisation 
to “proactively question whether their existing beliefs and practices actually 
maximise organisational performance (Argyris and Schon 1978)” (Baker and Sinkula 
2002, p. 8), learning orientation occurs along a continuum with adaptive learning 
(single loop learning) towards the beginning and generative learning (double loop 
learning) and triple loop learning towards the other end of the continuum (Osterberg, 
2004, pp. 145, 146).  Organisations have the capacity to increase or decrease the level 
of their orientation (Sinkula, Baker and Noordewier 1997, p. 309) and, in doing so, 
can select from the above range of learning orientations with their choice influencing 
both learning and the effectiveness of the organisation’s performance (Osterberg, 
2004, p. 145).  While this continuum is adopted it is not suggest that adaptive, 
generative and triple loop learning are mutually exclusive but that additional learning 
capabilities are added in moving from left to right along the continuum (DiBella, 
Nevis and Gould 1996, p. 374; see also Loverde 2005). 
 
The IT solutions context has implications for the entrepreneurial, organisational 
learning and market focused leaning capabilities.  Typically, highly technologically 
turbulent environments are characterised by a short cycle of technological innovation 
and obsolescence (Song et al., 2005, p. 263) and so it is imperative that the 
entrepreneurial management of these firms take proactive action to put in place 
organisational processes to capture new technical information, tap developments in 
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exogenous science, monitor customer needs and competitor activity, and shape new 
products and processes (Teece 2007, p. 1323).  Teece argues that the new knowledge 
acquired must be filtered and must flow, guided by appropriate innovation 
infrastructure, to those capable of making sense of it (ibid.). 
 
Proactive technology search activities include research and development but the 
search needs to include the core as well as to the periphery of a firm’s business 
ecosystem with knowledge sought from potential collaborators such as customers and 
suppliers that are active in complementary innovation activities (ibid., p. 1324). 
2.6.3 Construct of an OIC  
In this research, explanation will be sought of how an OIC can be conceptualised in 
an information technology solutions context, and the role of learning in OIC renewal.  
It will identify and capture the synergy between the key dynamic elements of Hunt 
and Arnett’s conceptualisation of the RA Theory (2003), proactive and reactive 
innovation, and Weerawardena’s comprehensive innovation measures (2003). 
 
The OIC framework that has been developed to ensure a comprehensive set of 
dimensions, has primarily been adapted from constructs contained in research 
undertaken by Weerawardena 2003 and Gold et al. (2001), i.e innovation 
infrastructure renewal, organisational innovation intensity, and market-focused 
learning capability.  The inclusion of organisational environmental dimensions of 
entrepreneurial capability or intensity (Weerawardena 2003) and organisational 
learning capability (described by Slater and Narver 1995 and Stata 1989) will 
provide important insight as to why an OIC is successful in achieving sustainable 
competitive advantage in some businesses and unsuccessful in others. 
 
These constructs have been selected as sustaining continuous innovation requires an 
organisation to “create a context that spurs creativity from all parts of the organisation 
at any time” (Verona and Ravasi 2003, p. 599, emphasis added).  The research focus 
is on the key role of strategic management in the integration, adaptation and 
reconfiguration of organisational innovation resources (Teece et al., 1997, p. 515) and 
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the need to create an ambidextrous organisation (O’Reilly and Tushman 2004, p. 74).  
The ambidextrous organisation must be able to host “multiple, internally inconsistent 
architectures, competencies and cultures, with built-in capabilities for efficiency, 
consistency and reliability on the one hand (for reactive innovation prompted by the 
market focused learning capability) and experimentation, improvisation and luck on 
the other (for proactive innovation prompted by the entrepreneurial capability)” 
(Tushman and O’Reilly 1999, p. 20; italicised words in parentheses added).  It must 
exhibit both the flawless execution of sustaining innovations while the organisation 
rigorously pursues the foundations of its next growth business through disruptive 
innovation (Anthony and Christensen 2005, p. 3). 
 
The importance of innovation infrastructure capability renewal also flows from the 
requirement for organisational ambidexterity.  “Different kinds of innovation require 
different organisational hardware – structures, systems and rewards - and different 
kinds of software – human resources, networks and culture” (Tushman and O’Reilly 
1999, p. 20) so that the innovation infrastructure arises not from a predetermined plan 
or design but from innovation imperatives as they emerge from time to time (Verona 
and Ravasi 2003, p. 601).  These “semistructures” balance order and disorder and 
enable the organisation to “rest on a loosely coupled arrangement as the distribution 
of tasks and resources is not strictly regulated by the designed structure” (Verona and 
Ravasi 2003, p. 600; Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, p. 3).  People at all levels have 
extensive interactions and are empowered to identify key innovation resources and 
integrate and reconfigure them in new ways, and redesign organisational roles, tasks 
and responsibilities depending on the current needs and needs that emerge through 
the innovation process (Verona and Ravasi 2003, p. 600; Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, 
p. 3).  They have freedom to improvise existing products, explore the future with 
extensive low cost probes and “link products together over time through rhythmic 
transition processes from present projects to future ones, creating a relentless pace of 
change” (ibid.). 
 
Organisational innovation intensity provides an understanding of the organisation’s 
commitment through the orientation of its resources towards innovation concentration 
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and/or diversity.  A firm with a high intensity indicates that the organisation has 
introduced radical innovations in each of the four value-creating categories - 
products, processes, management and marketing (Weerawardena 2003, p. 415).  The 
importance of this construct is in deciphering the contradiction of operating both for 
today and tomorrow, balancing conflict and dissent among organisational business 
units and implementing management strategies to develop streams of innovation 
(Tushman and O’Reilly 1999, p. 21). 
 
Innovation infrastructure is crucial in an IT solutions environment as its set of 
resources, and the flexibility of those resources, make feasible both innovation and 
the continuous renewal of IT systems (used within the firm for knowledge capture, 
memory storage and knowledge dissemination) and this, in turn, may lead to 
sustainable competitive advantage (Bharadwa 2000, p. 173).  The nature of the 
infrastructure affects the innovator's costs and development time and so flexible 
infrastructure reduces the time for imitation (reactive innovation), and may reduce the 
cost of innovation and enhance a firm’s strategic options (Duncan 1995, p. 44).  
Implicitly, the breadth and degree of integration of the use of IT within a firm should 
be an additional factor which facilities product, process and managerial innovation 
within the firm. 
 
As capabilities are developed gradually through human exchange the dedicated 
investment in continuous learning is an organisational imperative (Fuchs, Mifflin, 
Miller and Whitney 2000, p. 119) as a “superior learning environment will leverage 
the use of all resources…” (Baker and Sinkula 1999a, p. 411).  Learning enables 
organisations to link organisational memory to knowledge, products, processes and 
technologies as well as mainstream capabilities (Lawson and Samson 2001, p. 382).  
Only those organisations with the best learning capability and the greatest capacity 
for absorbing external knowledge will survive (Zack 1999, p. 141).  Failure to 
acknowledge and practice the importance of continuous organisational learning will 
result in core capabilities becoming core rigidities (Leonard Barton 1998, p. 30), 
specifically dampening the ability of a firm’s OIC to deliver appropriate and timely 
innovation outcomes. 
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As learning is endogenous to capability renewal a construct depicting the dynamic 
components of an OIC must include mechanisms that support both proactive and 
reactive learning (Jarratt 2004).  Organisational ambidexterity is demonstrated in two 
second order factors which facilitate both the exploration of new opportunities while 
diligently exploiting existing capabilities (O’Reilly and Tushman 2004, p. 74).  The 
central dimension of innovation infrastructure capability renewal incorporates the 
notion of a dynamic capability in that it places both the elements of innovation 
infrastructure and the process of renewing that infrastructure at the core of an OIC.  
Market-focused learning capability will capture the firm’s propensity to learn from 
customer, market and environmental changes (Weerawardena 2003, p. 415).  A 
firm’s entrepreneurial capability will identify the extent to which the organisation’s 
leaders are “genuinely entrepreneurial” by being innovative, proactive and risk 
seeking unprompted by competitive pressures (Hunt and Arnetts 2003, p. 7; 
Weerawardena 2003, p. 414). 
 
As the dynamic capabilities approach was developed to explain firm-level success 
and failure (Teece et al., 1997, p. 509), the common unit of analysis is the firm 
(Jarratt 2004, 2005; Gold, et al., 2001; Protorerou, Caloghirou and Lioukas 2005; 
Lawson and Samson 2001; Rosenbloom 2000; Hilliard 2004 and Matcher and 
Mowery 2004).  While there is focus on firm-level analysis the “firm” has not been 
defined with the term appearing to encompass organisations with a single product to 
multi-divisional corporations with a wide variety of business foci.  The breath of the 
term, “the firm”, creates a dilemma as dynamic capabilities research should be 
situational as business opportunities flow from a firm’s unique paths, processes and 
positions (Teece et al., 1997, p. 509).  This research contributes to the concept of 
dynamic capabilities by examining for the first time, the conceptualisation of an OIC 
within multiple business units of the same firm3.  The research will examine whether 
an OIC exists for the entire organisation or whether the dynamics of the OIC differ 
depending on the entrepreneurial capability and organisational learning capability 
                                                 
 
3 Brown and Eisenhardt 1997 examined 9 business units but these were in 9 firms 
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that are evident within the business unit.  The impact of the OIC will be examined to 
ascertain its contribution to sustainable competitive advantage and how it can be 
understood and achieved. 
2.6.4 Linkages between OIC Preconditions and Components 
As capabilities are built and nurtured by the entrepreneurial key decision makers of 
the firm (Teece 1997; 2007, p. 1344), Weerawardena argued that entrepreneurship is 
the “key factor determining the capability building activity of the firm” (2003,          
p. 410).  The importance of entrepreneurship is reinforced by the RA Theory as 
proactive innovation is “genuinely entrepreneurial” (Hunt and Davis 2008, p. 14).  In 
the RA Theory organisational learning and innovation are endogenous to the firm 
with reactive learning highly dependent upon the effectiveness of the firm’s ability to 
learn from its financial performance and its relative competitive effectiveness and 
efficiency.  The importance and relationship of the entrepreneurial intensity and 
organisational leaning capability has been established in section 2.6.2.1. 
 
The linkage between market-focused learning capability and entrepreneurial and 
organisational leaning capability arises from the reactive innovation which is an 
inherent part of the process of competition.  Learning can originate from formal 
market research, competitive intelligence, dissecting competitor’s products or 
benchmarking and test marketing, and generally this learning is activated by the 
competitive process (Hunt and Davis 2008, p. 14).  This linkage is also supported by 
Weerawardena’s findings that entrepreneurial firms pursuing organisational 
innovation-based competitive strategy build and nurture distinctive market-focused 
learning capabilities (2003, p. 419). 
 
While entrepreneurial intensity is demonstrated by the innovative, proactive and risk 
taking propensity of a firm’s strategic managers, organisational innovation intensity 
captures the breadth of its commitment to innovation.  The entrepreneurial firm’s 
market-focused learning capability influences its organisational innovation intensity 
as those firms which “have excellent market sensing skills are more likely to develop 
radical changes to products, processes, marketing methods and managerial systems” 
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(ibid., pp. 417, 418).  The linkage to organisational learning is explicit is respect of 
market-focused learning but implicit in respect to the other elements of innovation 
intensity. 
 
The firm’s capacity to reconfigure and transform itself, i.e. renewal, is a learned 
organisational skill (Teece et al., 1997, p. 521).  Through generative and double loop 
learning the firm is able to “challenge old assumptions” and “change its view of the 
world” in order to continually renew its systems and procedures to meet changing 
market and environmental conditions (Baker and Sinkula 1999a, p. 412; Dickson 
1996, p. 104).  Accordingly, innovation infrastructure capability renewal is dependent 
on organisational learning with the firm that develops and sustains superior, higher 
order learning processes being able to achieve a long-term sustainable competitive 
advantage (Dickson 1996, p. 104).  The proactive component of the entrepreneurial 
capability initiates pre-emptive changes to its innovation infrastructure to support its 
proactive innovation. 
2.7 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter began with the identification of organisational innovation barriers 
identified in the literature.  After a review of the extant dynamic capabilities research 
and the theoretical foundations upon which this framework is based, prior research on 
components of an OIC were organised, analysed, synthesised and arguments 
presented regarding the key dimensions of a well balanced, highly performing OIC.  
The literature derived OIC comprised two preconditions – organisational learning 
capability and entrepreneurial intensity – and three components - innovation 
infrastructure renewal, organisational innovation intensity, and market-focused 
learning capability.  The conceptual model of the OIC is depicted diagrammatically 
in Figure 2.2 in section 2.6.1. It demonstrates the hierarchical nature of capabilities 
and the importance of preconditions as determinants of the capabilities as well as the 
relationships between the preconditions and components of the OIC. The purpose of 
the literature derived OIC was to provide a framework for comparison with the OIC 
derived from the case analysis in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology (case study research) used to address the 
research question - “How can an Organisational Innovation Capability be 
conceptualised in an information technology solutions context, and what is the role of 
learning in organisational innovation capability renewal”.  It begins with the 
identification of the research paradigm (postpositivism) and follows with the 
justification of the research approach.  The procedure for the selection of the case is 
then described followed by the interactive data management strategy applied. 
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Chapter Three 
3RESEARCH APPROACH AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
The research question posed in section 1.3 is “How can an Organisational 
Innovation Capability be conceptualised in an information technology solutions 
context, and what is the role of learning in organisational innovation capability 
renewal”.  The objective of this research question is to build on the academic 
research in innovation management dynamic capabilities by opening the “black box” 
and providing evidence supporting the conceptualisation of an organisational 
innovation capability. 
 
While some consider that the failure of organisations to achieve consistent innovation 
simply requires “more commitment and more innovative approaches to the process of 
innovation” (Booz Allen 2005, p. 4, emphasis added), here the importance of 
developing an organisational innovation capability is emphasised.  The research 
question will be considered in the theoretical framework of dynamic capabilities 
linked to an IT solutions context and developed for this research.  This approach 
provides a framework for examining how the firm can integrate, adapt and 
reconfigure its endowed assets and resources to create “renewal capabilities” which 
lead to comparative and/or competitive advantage, sustainable competitive advantage 
and “superior financial performance” in a market or a segment of a market (Hunt and 
Morgan 1995, p. 6).  Utilising this theoretical framework, the substantive research 
provides a definitional context for evaluating key organisational capabilities that 
directly impact an organisation’s drive towards efficient, effective and sustainable 
innovation.  
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Dynamic capabilities are particular relevant in this “Schumpeterian world of 
innovation-based competition, price/performance rivalry, increasing returns, and the 
‘creative destruction’ of existing competencies”, the uncertainty of the nature of 
future competition and markets and the consequent focus on time-to-market 
responses for new products and services (Teece et al., 1997, pp. 509, 515; Teece 
2007, p. 1341). 
 
Chapter 2 provided a theoretical foundation for the development of an OIC which has 
the capability to sustain and adapt organisational resources and competencies in 
fulfillment of long term strategies notwithstanding volatile competitive conditions, 
altered strategies and the loss of key employees, typical of the research context 
(Nadler and Tushman, 1997, p. 5).  This chapter describes the research paradigm and 
justification for the selection of the case study methodology as the research approach.  
It then continues with a description of the research procedures, including the case 
study selection and design, the data collection and analysis processes, before 
concluding with a discussion regarding validity and reliability. 
3.2 The Research Paradigm 
The identification of the research paradigm makes explicit the fundamental 
assumptions of the research perspective and provides a rationale for the positioning of 
the scholarly work (Yin 2009, p. 26; Guba and Lincoln 1994, p. 112; Maxwell 1996, 
p. 4;).  The postpositivist paradigm has been selected as from an ontological 
perspective, the postpositivist acknowledges the existence of an objective or “real 
reality” which can only be “imperfectly apprehendable because of basically flawed 
human intellectual mechanisms and the fundamentally intractable nature of the 
phenomena” (Guba and Lincoln 1994, pp. 109, 110). 
 
The postpositivist epistemological view largely abandons the positivist’s assumption 
that the researcher and the investigated object are independent entities as it is 
impossible for the former to be purely objective (Toma 1997, p. 683).  However, 
research objectivity is considered to be a “regulatory ideal” with considerable 
emphasis placed on ensuring that “external guardians of objectivity” such as critical 
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traditions applied and the critical community engaged (Guba and Lincoln 1994,        
p. 110).  According to Crotty, postpositivism is concerned with “probability rather 
than certainty”, a level of objectivity rather than absolute objectivity, and the desire to 
“approximate the truth rather than aspiring to grasp it in its totality or essence” (1998, 
p. 29). 
 
Epistemologically, the postpositivist acknowledges that the researcher cannot be 
purely objective (Toma 1997, p. 683).  This perspective has been labelled critical 
realism as the apprehended reality must be subject to the widest possible scrutiny to 
ensure that it is a close as possible to, although it never achieves, perfect reality 
(Guba and Lincoln 2005, p. 193). 
 
Methodologically, postpositivism emphasises “critical multiplism” as a means of 
falsifying rather than verifying hypotheses (Guba and Lincoln 2005, p. 193).  
Postpositivist research is conducted in more natural settings, with greater reliance on 
the collection of more contextual information, the reinforcement of discovery as an 
element in inquiry, and the solicitation of emic perspectives to provide an 
understanding of the meanings and purposes that individuals ascribe to their actions 
(Guba and Lincoln 1994, p. 110).  This perspective focuses on “people as data 
collection instruments, qualitative methods, use of tacit knowledge, grounded theory 
inductive analysis, purposeful rather than random sampling, idiographic 
interpretation, and the case study reporting mode” (McKelvey 2003, p. 7), and, 
therefore has a “closer, richer, thicker, more subjective view of organisational 
phenomena coming to appreciate its fundamentally complex, idiosyncratic, and, multi 
and mutually causal nature” (McKelvey 2003, p. 6). 
 
Empirical research on the organisational innovation dynamic capability is a relatively 
new area of management research.  While the dynamic capabilities approach has been 
applied to many capabilities, little research has been directed to developing a holistic 
organisational innovation capability (Lawson and Samson 2001, p. 388).  
 
 
64 
 
Organisational capabilities are built over time and are “the result of complex 
processes comprising the accumulation of small decisions and actions undertaken 
over many years in a situation of great uncertainty” (Katzy et al., 2003, p. 4).  
Accordingly, as quantitative research is unlikely to be able to identify and explore the 
nature of the dynamic capabilities, qualitative research is the preferred, although not 
necessarily exclusive, research approach.  Another reason is that while the key 
informant technique, used in data collection by many dynamic capabilities 
researchers, is an efficient method for data collection, when used for collecting 
survey and questionnaire data it generally suffers from an inability to capture tacit 
knowledge or assumptions, as these may not have been articulated. 
3.3 Justification of Research Approach 
Five major research strategies are identified for conducting social science research.  
The question of when to use each strategy – case study method, experiments, surveys, 
histories and the analysis of archival information - depends on the answers to three 
questions:  firstly, the type of research question posed, secondly, the extent of control 
an investigator has over actual behavioural events, and finally, the degree of focus on 
contemporary as opposed to historical events (Yin 2009, p. 8). 
 
Yin defines case study research as an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context and when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (ibid., p.18).  The remainder 
of this section will apply Yin’s three questions as a basis for justifying the selection 
of the case study method. 
 
After an examination of 14 academic papers and dissertations with a focus on 
dynamic capabilities (Lawson and Samson 2001; Hilliard 2004; Ethiraj et al., 2000; 
Gold et al., 2001; Protorerou et al., 2005; Pavlou and El Sawy 2005, 2006; Katzy 
2003; Jarratt 2004, 2005; Macher and Mowery 2009; Rosenbloom 2000; Choudrie 
and Dwivedi 2005; Ambrosini and Bowman 2009), and the book, Dynamic 
Capabilities: Understanding Strategic Change in Organisations (Helfat et al., 2007), it 
was concluded that the case study is the preferred primary strategy to investigate a 
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phenomenon “in its natural context” (Benbasat et al., 1987; Yin, 1994, p. 13) and to 
answer the “‘how’ or ‘why’ questions being posed”, whilst retaining “the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real-life events”, such as dynamic capability life cycles 
and managerial processes and routines (Yin 2009, p. 4).  With these phenomenon-
driven research questions, case studies give the researcher the flexibility to define the 
research question broadly (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, p. 26). 
 
The nature of the research question in relation to an OIC requires an explanatory 
response as this “how question” deals with present-day operational links with sticky, 
practice based routines which need to be traced over time, rather than a single 
occurrence or incidence (Yin 2009, p. 9).  Case study research is also the most 
appropriate research methodology as it emphasises research in dynamic naturalistic 
settings and the importance of contexts to generate explanations for observed 
attitudes and behaviours (Clegg, Kemp and Legge, 1986, p. 8; Benbaset et al., 1987, 
p. 371).  Consistent with this view, Eisenhardt and Graebner argue that case studies 
are relevant for theory building and are one of the best, if not the best, of the bridges 
from rich qualitative evidence to mainstream deductive research (2007, p. 25). 
 
By using a qualitative/postpositist perspective for the case study inquiry, the 
researcher attempts to interpret how an OIC is operationalised in search for 
explanation and theory.  Ambrosini and Bowman argue that “qualitative smaller 
sample studies are likely to be more appropriate for understanding the subtlety of 
resource creation and regeneration processes” and call for “fine-grained case studies” 
to provide a strategy-as-practice perspective (2009, p. 37, 46). 
 
Case study research is “a search for explanation and theory rather than just a report 
on an empirical research” (Kanter, 1977, p. 291) and is considered to be the most 
appropriate research methodology as the “research and theory are at their early, 
formative stages” (Benbasat et al., 1987; p.369; Darke et al., 1998, p. 279).  As the 
broad approach to the research question is to gain a better understanding of the 
interplay between people, organisational strategy as well as the organisation itself, the 
selection of case study research as a new methodology is appropriate. 
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Darke et al. (1998, p. 279) specifically point to case study research as applicable 
where a phenomenon is dynamic and not yet matured or settled.  While their 
observation relates to information systems research, they extend its scope to 
“business strategy concerned with use of the Internet, or where terminology and a 
common business language and a set of definitions are not yet clearly widely 
accepted”.  An investigation into innovation management capability would fall within 
the reach of their comments.  
 
The use of the case study methodology for information technology and systems 
research is well established (Dube and Pare 2003; Benbasat et al., 1987; Darke et al., 
1998).  Reasons for its validity as a viable research strategy are firstly, it allows the 
researcher to conduct research in its “natural setting, learn about the state of the art, 
and generate theories from practice”, particularly as the focus has shifted from 
technical to organisational issues; secondly, it allows the researcher to answer “how” 
and “why” questions by understanding the nature and complexity of its IT solution 
development processes; thirdly, the approach is highly relevant to areas where there 
is rapid change of pace in the information systems area and where few case studies 
have previously been carried out (Benbasat et al., 1987, p. 370) as it opens “the way 
to new ideas and new lines of reasoning and pinpoints the opportunities, challenges 
and issues facing IT specialists and managers” (Dube and Pare 2003, p. 598); and 
finally, the holistic investigation inherent in case study research suits the “need to 
understand the complex and ubiquitous interactions among organisations, 
technologies and people” (ibid.). 
3.4 Research Procedures 
3.4.1 Case Study Selection 
In conducting case study research for developing constructs and theory “nothing is 
more important than making a proper selection of cases” (Stake, 1994, p. 243).  
Eisenhardt also emphasised the importance of case selection arguing that the concept 
of population is also applicable in this context (1989, p. 537).  This concept is crucial 
for two reasons: firstly, because it defines the set of cases from which the research 
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sample is selected, and, secondly, because it controls extraneous variation and helps 
to define limits for generalisation of the findings (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 537).  
However, Yin calls it a misconception to believe that case studies are to represent a 
formal “sample” from some larger universe as generalising from case study research 
does not depend on statistical inference (statistical generalisation) but on the making 
of logical inferences (analytic generalisation) (Yin 2004, p. 7). 
 
A critical issue in case study research is the selection of the number of case studies 
undertaken by a researcher.  It is widely acknowledged that there is no ideal number 
of cases and that single-case or multi-case design can lead to successful research 
outcomes (Darke 1998 et al., p. 281; Yin 2009, p. 58).  A single case may be 
appropriate where it represents a critical case in testing a well-formulated theory or 
where exploratory research is undertaken, a single case may provide the foundation 
for developing explanations of why a phenomenon occurs with the opportunity for 
these explanations to be subject to discussion and application in other contexts (Darke 
et al., 1998, pp. 277, 281; Yin 2004, p. 7).  Other rationales for a single case include 
an extreme or unique case, a representative or typical case, or a revelatory case (Yin 
2009, pp. 60-62). 
 
Multi-case designs allow both literal and theoretical replication and cross-case 
comparison with this approach also capable of adoption for exploratory research 
(Darke et al., 1998, p. 281).  Multiple-case designs have important advantages.  
Firstly, they provides a platform to respond to a common criticism of single-case 
studies that they are unique and idiosyncratic and, therefore, have limited value 
beyond the circumstances of the single case.  Secondly, the researcher will collect an 
amount of comparative data which will assist in analysing the findings (Yin 2004,    
p. 8).  Another key consideration in the selection of the number of cases to be studied 
is that there is a trade-off between a “deep understanding of a particular social setting 
and the benefits of comparative insights” with the greater the number of contexts a 
researcher investigates, the less contextual insights he can communicate (Dyer and 
Wilkins 1991, p. 614).  Negative cases can also provide a rich source of analytic 
thinking (Bazeley 2009, p. 6). 
 
68 
 
Four basic types of case designs are identified by Yin (depicted in Figure 3.1) 
depending upon whether the case is single or multiple and whether or not multiple 
units of analysis are involved (2009, p. 46).  The application of this matrix results in 
single-case (holistic) designs (Type 1), single-case (embedded) designs (Type 2), 
multiple-case (holistic) designs (Type 3), and multiple-case (embedded) designs 
(Type 4) (ibid.). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1  Case Study Design 
 
The design format used in this research is Yin’s Type 2 single embedded case with 
multiple units of analysis.  While the researcher was employed by the CO, the CO 
was selected on the basis that it provided the highest “opportunity to learn” (Stake, 
1994, p. 243) for the CO and the researcher, as at the time that the research was 
conducted, the CO was undergoing significant change as it endeavoured to capitalise 
on its acquisitions, expand into new markets and increase the success rate of its 
innovation and the speed of commercialisation.  It was also adapting from a single 
project GHLSS technology contractor to a broader supplier of products and services 
to both the high level security sector and the commercial sector.  These transitions 
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emphasised the CO’s inherited and embedded path dependencies and provided 
opportunities to examine how various business units addressed these challenges in 
their quest for organisational innovation. 
 
As the CO had operated in the GHLSS and was also a private company there was, 
apart from public speeches and an interview with a national business magazine, 
limited public information available about its innovation processes, particularly at the 
business unit level.  While publically there was a strong management commitment to 
innovation as an organisation-wide practice there appeared to be a gap between the 
espoused innovation approach and actual practice.  The employment of the researcher 
by the CO provided the opportunity for interviewees who were passionate about 
innovation, but frustrated by the CO’s approach, the opportunity to speak opening 
and frankly about their innovation experience.  It also provided access to sensitive 
strategic and operational documents which would not have been made available to an 
outsider.  The CO was also selected as it met one research challenges of Ireland et al. 
- the difficulty in “identifying firms exhibiting highly entrepreneurial (corporate 
entrepreneurship) strategies” as these firms “may be few in number” (2009, p. 40). 
 
While this case study focuses on a single case organisation in a single corporate 
setting, it does not constitute a single case as it is involves the study of multiple 
business units of the CO, each with different processes, paths and positions 
(Eisenhardt 1991, p. 623; Teece et al., 1997, pp. 518-524).  Therefore, the CO 
comprises multiple subunits within the one organisation and this availability provides 
significant opportunity for multiple and extensive levels of analysis within the CO, 
thus enhancing the insights into the single case (Yin 2009, p. 46).  While a study of 
this nature has compelling benefits, Yin warns against the possibility of the 
researcher becoming so absorbed with the subunits that the holistic case begins to be 
ignored with the result that the orientation of the case shifts from its original design. 
An examination will be conducted of how an OIC can be conceptualised in the CO 
and within three business units to test the proposition that the value of dynamic 
capabilities must be evaluated in the market context within which the business unit 
operates (Barney et al., 2001, p. 631).  In the CO, the OIC will be studied in each of 
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three business units to understand its emergence, renewal and continued 
development. 
3.4.2 Data Collection  
An OIC was studied in three business units in the case organisation (CO) as an 
anticipatory data reduction strategy to limit the data collected (Miles and Huberman 
1994, p. 10).  No explicit confidentiality agreement was entered into between the CO 
and the researcher.  However, it was an agreed understanding, based on a high level 
of trust in the researcher that the name of the case organisation would not be 
disclosed and that steps would be taken to limit identification without impacting upon 
the integrity of the case study and analysis. 
 
The focus of the research was to examine in the CO if one OIC model applied or 
whether different OIC models applied in different business units depending on the 
organisational and market context.  Multiple data collection methods were combined 
with the triangulation of the resultant data (converging lines of inquiry) from those 
sources as this led to stronger substantiation of constructs and hypotheses and greater 
confidence about what is concluded than if only one data source was used (Eisenhardt 
1989, pp. 537, 538; Yin 2009, p. 15; Yin 2004, p. 9; Pare 2002). 
 
The primary focus was on qualitative research as the examination of a dynamic OIC 
within the CO was exploratory and the fundamental variables of the construct were 
uncertain as capabilities flow from a firm’s unique processes (Cresswell 2002, p. 22) 
and its “fully firm-specific resources, their context, and how they were created or 
renewed” (Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, p. 37).   
 
Qualitative data techniques included interviews, archival records and observation.  
Qualitative data was primarily collected through interviews based on a semi-
structured instrument (copy included in the Appendix) to guide, but not confine, the 
boundaries of the conversation.  The semi-structured instrument began by asking 
details of the interviewee’s work experience both generally and within the CO.  It 
then proceeded to ask questions about innovation success and failure within the 
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business unit in which the interviewee was employed.  The interviewee was then 
asked to identify the reasons for and barriers to innovation success as well as describe 
any innovation processes in their business unit and changes over time to those 
processes.  To conclude the interview, questions were raised in respect of the 
business unit’s structure and culture and the impact of these dimensions on 
innovation. 
 
Individuals within the selected business units who had expertise and experience, and 
were involved in the innovation management process were invited to participate.  
These names were identified by speaking to staff involved in innovation within each 
business unit or innovation champions within the CO.  In addition, one interview was 
conducted with the Chief Technology Officer of the CO as he played an important 
and wide-ranging role in regard to innovation.  The number of interviews conducted 
in each business unit and the CO are listed in Table 3.1 below.  All but one of the 
interviews were conducted in the period September to December 2006.  One 
clarifying interview was conducted in December 2008. 
 
Organisation Interviews 
First Business Unit 6 
Second Business Unit 7 
Third Business Unit 5 
Case organisation 3 
 
Table 3.1 Table of Interviews 
 
Consideration was also given to balancing the different professional disciplines and 
different levels of responsibility and seniority to ensure that a diversity of 
perspectives was analysed (Verona and Ravasi 2003, p. 582; Brown and Eisenhardt 
1997, p. 4) and to minimise the impact of interviewee bias (Eisenhardt and Graebner 
2007, p. 30).  Interviewees included research and development managers, 
commercialisation managers, those primarily involved in knowledge creation and 
those who report to them.  These interviews enabled the data to be collected in “close 
proximity to the specific situation”, provide “richness and holism, with a strong 
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potential for revealing complexity” as well as “‘thick descriptions’ that are vivid, 
nested in a real context, and have a ring of truth” (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 10). 
 
The focus of the interviews was on the personal innovation experience of the 
interviewee within their business unit.  Interviews were conducted either in person or 
by phone by the researcher and lasted from 60 to 90 minutes.  To ensure validity, all 
interviews were recorded with the permission of the interviewee.  One interviewee in 
the First Business Unit (COFBU) was interviewed twice to gain richer detail and to 
clarify key ideas which emerged from the initial interview. 
 
The purpose of the interviews was to gain a picture of the situation in which an OIC 
was built.  This included determining the presence of organisational preconditions for 
innovation such as knowledge management, learning orientation and organisational 
culture as well as the key activities, processes and behaviours that represent these 
constructs and the presence, nature and strength of the barriers to innovation.  This 
qualitative research also covered strategies implemented by the organisation to 
strengthen the innovation preconditions as well as those that contained, removed or 
reduced the strength of the innovation barriers. 
 
Some archival records and written documentation were also used in the data analysis 
process as these provided a valuable source of qualitative data (Miles and Huberman 
1994, p. 9).  The documents included speeches on innovation by the General Manager 
of the SBU and the Group General Manager of the CO, the SBU’s Strategic 
Technology Roadmap and reports, policies, business and product development 
strategies.  The most important use of these documents was to corroborate and 
augment evidence from other sources (Yin 2009, p. 18) as well as confirm the 
business unit’s commitment to particular path.  In this case the analysis of documents 
provided the essential preliminary analysis of the CO’s position, processes and path 
dependencies (Teece et al., 1997, p. 522). 
 
Observation of innovation activities such as the annual engineering conference, 
research and development, and commercialisation meetings, provided the opportunity 
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to monitor relevant behaviour or environmental conditions and gain impressions and 
insights rather than relying solely on the opinions of interviewees (Yin 2009, p. 106).  
These observed activities were not recorded and provided a general background to the 
primary data collection methods. 
 
A key feature emphasised for theory building from case studies is the frequent 
overlap between data collection and data analysis (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 538; Miles and 
Huberman 1994, p. 10ff).  Overlapping analysis with data collection gives the 
researcher a head start in analysis, as well as allowing the researchers to take 
advantage of flexible data collection (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 538).  This flexibility 
enables the researcher to make adjustments during the data collection process to 
probe new research themes that emerge, to data collection instruments or data 
sources.  While this flexibility is legitimate as researchers endeavor to understand 
each case in as much depth as is feasible, it is not a license to be unsystematic 
(Eisenhardt 1989, p. 539). 
 
Data reduction was essential due to the volume of data collected from the multiple 
data collection methods (Miles and Hubermann 1994).  Data was reduced in an 
anticipatory way by the research paradigm and design strategies selected.  The 
strategies include preparation of data summaries, data coding, theme identification 
and clustering (Huberman and Miles 1994, p. 429). 
3.4.3 Data Analysis 
While data analysis is the heart of building theory from case study research, it is also 
the most difficult and least codified part of the research process (Eisenhardt 1989,    
p. 539).  The complexities of data analysis often lead to “false expectations that the 
data will somehow speak for themselves” (Yin 2004, p. 15). 
 
Miles and Huberman define data analysis in terms of three linked sub-processes: data 
reduction, data display and conclusion drawing/verification with the links and 
relationships between the sub-processes depicted in Figure 3.2 below (1994, p. 429).  
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Figure 3.2  Interactive Data Management 
 
It was important to recognise that “these processes occur before data collection, 
during study design and planning; during data collection as interim and early analyses 
are carried out; and after data collection as final products are approached and 
completed” (1994, p. 429). 
 
Data reduction was essential due to the volume of data collected from the multiple 
data collection methods.  It was reduced in an anticipatory way by the research 
paradigm and design strategies selected.  Data reduction strategies include 
preparation of data summaries, data coding, theme identification and clustering 
(Huberman and Miles 1994, p. 429).  Data display is defined as an organised, 
compressed assembly of information that facilitates the drawing of meaning and 
promotes action taking (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 429).  The third sub-process, 
conclusion drawing and verification, involved drawing meaning from the data with 
strategies including comparison/contrast, pattern and theme identification, clustering 
and checking results with respondents (Huberman and Miles 1994, p. 429). 
 
An analytic strategy was applied to “treat the evidence fairly, produce compelling 
analytic conclusions, and rule out alternative interpretations” (Yin 2009, p. 130).  
Following Yin’s first and preferred strategy, the theoretical propositions guided the 
case study, shaped the data collection process and gave priority to particular analytic 
Data 
Collection 
Data Reduction 
Conclusions: 
drawing/verifying 
Data 
Display 
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strategies by focusing attention on certain data and ignoring other data (2003, pp. 
111, 112). 
 
Data analysis began with building individual case studies to facilitate intimacy with 
each case as a stand-alone entity and to allow the embedded unit’s unique patterns to 
emerge (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 540).  Cross-embedded unit pattern analysis was 
implemented to develop conceptual insights, refine the unique aspects of each case 
and to promote divergent ways of analysing the data such as by selecting categories 
or dimensions and then looking for within-group similarities coupled with intergroup 
differences or by selecting pairs of cases and then listing similarities and differences 
between each pair (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 540; Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, p. 6).  By 
writing up each embedded unit in detail as well as developing individual reflective 
remarks, coding and other tools, and then undertaking cross-embedded unit 
comparison, a rich familiarity with the case emerged (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 540).   
 
Effective cross-case analysis promotes deeper understanding and explanation (Miles 
and Huberman 1994, p. 173).  Cross-case pattern analysis was essential to minimise 
the researcher’s limited processing skills as researchers “leap to conclusions based on 
limited data, (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973), they are overly influenced by the 
vividness (Nisbett and Ross, 1980) or they sometimes inadvertently drop 
disconfirming evidence (Nissbet, and Ross, 1980)” (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 540).  Cross-
case pattern analysis counteracted these tendencies by promoting divergent ways of 
analysing the data such as by selecting categories or dimensions and then looking for 
within-group similarities coupled with intergroup differences or by selecting pairs of 
cases and then listing similarities and differences between each pair (Eisenhardt 1989, 
p. 540). 
 
The interviews were transcribed and the transcripts compared to the recorded 
interviews.  Initially, the data transcripts were analysed manually (highlighting key 
passages, identifying themes, repeated concepts and narratives) to determine if it was 
necessary to use a software package for the data analysis process.  Following this 
preliminary analysis, it was decided that, with the quantity of data and the emerging 
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nature of the concepts, a qualitative data analysis software would add structure to the 
process.  NVivo v8 was selected based on its data management capabilities and 
because it addressed some of the limitations of other packages. 
 
All of the interview transcripts were imported into NVivo.  The transcripts were then 
open coded to Free Nodes which were developed based on the initial data analysis 
and the emerging theoretical properties of the category (Glaser and Strauss 1967,      
p. 106).  After further analysis and prolonged engagement with the data and nodes, 
Tree Nodes were created to enable common elements to be grouped with each Tree 
Node “internally consistent but distinct from one another” (Marshall and Rossman 
2010, p. 215).  During the further analysis there was a continual adjustment of the 
Tree Nodes to provide additional richness to the analysis (Yin 2009, p. 128).  The 
initial characterisation of the Tree Nodes differed significantly from the final Tree 
architecture.  Some of the Tree Nodes identified included Innovation Factors, 
Innovation Facilitators, Innovation Barriers and Narratives.  With the Tree Node 
Innovation Factors there were sub-nodes such as Challenging environment, Cross-
Functional Team, Flexibility and Relationships.  The underlying purpose of the 
analysis was to allow the data to speak for itself. 
3.5 Validity and Reliability 
In order to continually maintain the quality of the case study design, four 
conventional benchmarks were applied: construct validity, internal validity 
(isomorphism of findings with reality), external validity (generalisability) and 
reliability (in the sense of stability) (Yin 2009, p. 40; Guba and Lincoln 2005,           
p. 205).  These tests were applied throughout the design phase, as well as during the 
data collection, data analysis and the reporting processes to increase the quality of the 
case study and overcome traditional criticisms of the weakness of case study research 
(Yin, 2003, p. 35). 
 
To address construct validity, multiple sources of evidence were used during data 
collection to promote convergent lines of inquiry and establish a chain of the 
evidence collected (Yin 2009, p. 42).  For this research at least five respondents in 
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each business unit were interviewed to ensure that the observations associated with a 
single informant were minimised and to provide greater confidence in the evidence 
collected.  Internal validity is important for explanatory studies as it confirms causal 
relationship.  Key internal validity analytic tactics included pattern matching across 
cases and explanation building, particularly where the explanations reflected some 
theoretically significant propositions (Yin 2009, p. 42).  External validity was 
achieved by applying replication logic across multiple cases (embedded business 
units) to achieve analytic generalisation (Yin 2009, p. 43) as if “two or more cases are 
shown to support the same theory, replication may be claimed” (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner 2007, pp. 38, 39).  In case study research, reliability refers to the stability, 
accuracy, and precision of measurement (Treloar 2001).  To minimise error and bias 
a case study protocol was developed thereby ensuring that the procedures were well 
documented and can be repeated with the same results.  Procedures for this research 
involved the preparation of semi-structured interview instruments with the same data 
collection process followed consistently for each interviewee.   
 
The Table below (Table 3.2) summarises the eleven key recommended tactics 
covering the four conventional quality tests and also indicates the ways in which the 
research design and conduct for this case study responded to the recommendations. 
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Tests Case Study Tactic 
Research Phase 
in which tactic 
occurs 
Action taken in this research 
Construct 
validity  
 
Use multiple sources 
of evidence Data collection 
Use of interviews, documentary evidence and 
physical artifacts 
Establish chain of 
evidence Data collection 
Interview data both taped and transcribed in real 
time; multiple evidence sources entered into 
customised object-oriented database 
Have key informants 
review draft case study 
report 
Composition 
It was intended that the case studies would be 
reviewed by key informants before publication.  
However, as the three business units had been 
sold at the time of completion of this research 
this tactic was not implemented. 
Internal 
validity 
Do pattern matching Data analysis Patterns identified across cases 
Do explanation 
building Data analysis Some causal links identified 
Do time series analysis Data analysis Not to be performed in this research,  
Do logic models Data analysis Not performed- requires time series data 
External 
validity  
  
Use rival theories 
within single cases Research design 
Not used because of exploratory nature of 
research and lack of existing competing theories 
Use replication logic in 
multiple-case studies Research design 
Multiple cases investigated using replication 
logic 
Reliability Use case study protocol Data collection 
Same data collection procedure followed for 
each case; consistent set of initial semi 
structured questions used in each interview 
 Develop case study database Data collection 
Interview transcripts, documents, other notes 
and links to physical artifacts entered into 
research database 
Table 3.2  Case Study Tactics 
Source: based on Treloar 2001 
3.6 Conclusion 
The case study method was selected as the research approach for the study of the 
research question as this method is an empirical inquiry which investigates 
contemporary phenomena in the organisation’s real-life context.  This approach was 
appropriate for an investigation of an innovation management dynamic capability 
where theory and understanding are in their formative years (Darke et al., 1998,        
p. 279).  In addition, the answer to the “how” question was likely to be from the 
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identification and analysis of practice-based routines with embedded and sticky 
knowledge which cannot be analysed effectively except within its naturalistic context 
(Yin 2009, pp. 8, 11). 
 
The objective of Chapter 4 is to provide an understanding of the case study data 
collected, identify the key themes and patterns in the data and to understand the key 
innovation capability dimensions in each case study.  The Chapter begins with an 
introduction to the CO and follows with the analysis of the three embedded business 
units in order to identify whether the case data supported the propositions generated 
through the literature.   
 
A cross-case analysis highlights the similarities and differences in approaches in the 
formation of an innovation capability.  The case-derived OIC is then described. 
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Chapter Four 
4CASE ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
This research is focused on examining the development of an innovation capability in 
three embedded business units with an IT solutions business focus within the case 
organisation (CO).  These business units displayed varying levels of innovation 
performance, and the case analysis will reveal the different innovation capability 
foundations and approaches to innovation capability reconfiguration to align with 
changing business environments.  
 
The objectives of Chapter Four are to present the findings of the data analysis, 
identify key themes and patterns in the data and to present the key innovation 
capability dimensions within three business units of the CO.  This Chapter begins 
with an introduction to the CO and a discussion of how “history matters” and the 
paths and positions which defined it.  The case analysis continues by exploring the 
embedded and inherited path dependencies of the three business units to establish 
how their current innovation approach emerged.  The process of analysis involved 
building concepts from the data and seeking evidence to support linkages between 
those concepts.  Emphasis was placed on routines as the fundamental units of 
capability operation and drivers of change.  In addition, the analysis revealed how the 
path dependencies have affected each of the business units in their response to 
internal and/or external environmental pressures and how they embraced change in 
their approach to innovation. 
 
The data was interrogated to identify evidence that confirmed the presence of 
dimensions evident in the literature as contributing to an OIC and clarified the 
constructs that defined them. Evidence was sought to support or reject the research 
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framework generated through the literature which captured the interrelationships 
between the components.  The data was examined to establish the presence of 
additional dimensions, interrelationships and constructs that were not evident in prior 
literature. 
 
A cross-case analysis was then undertaken to highlight similarities and differences in 
approaches in the formation of the innovation capabilities and to inform the 
innovation dynamic capability framework which emerged from the data.  In Chapter 
5 the framework is compared to that derived from the literature, seeking explanations 
of differences in dimensions, constructs and linkages. 
4.2 The Case Organisation – Inherited and Embedded Path 
Dependencies 
4.2.1 Introduction 
It is well established that the paths that a firm has travelled shape, guide and constrain 
the available and viable paths for its future (Helfat et al., 2007, p. 100; Teece et al., 
1997, p. 522).  This section provides a brief perspective of the inherited and 
embedded path dependencies of the CO which will inform the analysis of the three 
business units.  An analysis of the CO’s paths, resources and processes provides 
valuable insight into the path dependencies of those business units and how those 
dependencies, resources and processes impacted upon each business unit’s innovation 
capability in the changing business environments that each faced. 
 
The CO commenced operations in the mid 1990’s when it split from its parent 
organisation.  The parent organisation’s heritage extended to the mid 1950’s.  In the 
second half of the 20th century it had a reputation as a highly regarded contractor in 
major engineering projects and, later, the government high level security sector 
(GHLSS).  After the split, the CO was primarily a single project GHLSS technology 
contractor.  Through a process of strategic diversification it acquired complementary 
and expansionary resources and grew to become one of Australia’s largest privately 
owned diversified companies, delivering products and services to government and 
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commercial markets in Australia, the United States, the Pacific and Europe (CO 
website).  
 
The CO had, at the time of the research, total assets of approximately A$1 billion, 
annual revenues of over A$1 billion and employed 3,500 people (CO Innovation 
Speech by Group Managing Director, 2005).  It aimed to build a culture of 
innovation: a culture which listened to customers; looked for opportunities; invested 
in research and development; encouraged initiative and capitalised on new ideas.  It 
also claimed to be driven by the challenge of delivering innovative solutions that its 
customers valued highly. 
4.2.2 Path Dependency Challenges 
A “risk averse”, narrowly defined customer driven innovation culture 
When the CO was formed it was a major GHLSS contractor with a long term contract 
for the delivery of successive shipping infrastructure projects.  The tight control of a 
second generation unlisted family owned company with a single GHLSS project 
posed significant innovation management challenges.  While a desire to devolve 
management responsibility to the business unit level was evident, “every time 
something slightly goes out of wack they revert to form and want to control 
everything” (FBU4). 
 
These path dependency challenges were encapsulated in the following quotation: 
(the CO) has had one major customer being the government and in particular, 
the (GHLSS) …(P)laying to that customer’s needs… sets a certain culture..., a 
narrow mindedness all of which typically is not the sort of characteristics you 
are going to look for in encouraging innovation.  The (GHLSS)…tends to be 
hugely conservative, averse to risk.…(O)ur people tend to be therefore 
conservative and averse to risk, both of which mitigate against having highly 
creative, innovative minds and highly creative innovative solutions (Cor1). 
 
Knowledge and resource constrained innovation  
The CO’s key capabilities (project management and system integration for major 
GHLSS infrastructure projects) were embedded in the management of major long 
term and highly technical and technology intensive projects, primarily for the 
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GHLSS.  These capabilities led to the organisation having a reputation for completing 
projects on-time and on-budget (FBU5, SBU6, SBU2, Cor1).  The financial 
imperatives from these projects resulted in a focus on a trilogy of fiscal measures 
(profit, cashflow and economic value add) without significant recognition of the 
value of intangible assets, and in particular, knowledge and intellectual property.  
Senior management in the CO regarded key issues pertaining to innovation, such as 
knowledge capture and sharing, as “overhead intensive activities” and so relegated 
them in importance (FBU5, Cor1, Cor6, Report on Knowledge Sharing, Expertise 
Location and Technology Transfer in the CO, 2005).  Staff were required to “stay 
focused on the hole in front of them” and “were not permitted to look outside of the 
project to see and react to what (was) on the horizon or even to help and learn from 
people in adjacent trenches” (Cor1).  Activities which might be innovative and could 
result in cheaper, superior or more expeditious client outcomes were generally 
ignored (FBU5). 
 
The CO had wide ranging technical skills (engineering for a broad variety of major 
GHLSS infrastructure projects, system design, software design and implementation, 
IT security) which enabled it to win GHLSS and Government infrastructure contracts 
for technology and technical products.  As a high proportion of its staff were highly 
skilled engineers developing technical solutions, they played a dominant role in 
ensuring that the technical paradigm was the lens through which the world was 
viewed.  While a technical mindset was essential for innovation, it provided a filter 
which either excluded or minimised the importance of other relevant information 
(Cor1, TBU3, TBU4).  Knowledge sharing within the CO was not a cultural norm 
with knowledge lost because “people won’t share it”.  The attitude was “I can’t tell 
you that because you’ll know as much as I do” induced by the “fear that knowledge 
sharing will put them out of a job” (Report on Knowledge Sharing, Expertise 
Location and Technology Transfer in the CO, 2005).  In an audit of its knowledge 
management practices the CO was described as a “knowledge intensive organisation 
which lack(ed) the culture, process and infrastructure to satisfy its knowledge needs” 
(Knowledge Management Institute 2002).  Where knowledge sharing did take place, 
it was carried out by passionate knowledge workers “as subversive activities in spite 
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of management” (Report on Knowledge Sharing, Expertise Location and Technology 
Transfer in the CO, 2005). 
 
Organisational knowledge generated by projects was primarily technical or 
engineering based.  Knowledge was regarded as project related and not maintained at 
business unit or organisational level.  It was constrained in project silos within 
business units with the resultant “reinvention of the wheel” within different silos, 
“group think” and lost opportunities for collaboration and creativity, and, therefore, 
innovation (ibid., Cor4).  This in turn led to substantial rework to develop processes 
and practices and to recreate engineering knowledge that existed elsewhere in the 
organisation but which could not readily be discovered in a timely manner (Cor6).  
Knowledge was also lost because of the culture of blame which resulted in high staff 
turnover in critical knowledge areas.   
 
Blame oriented, silo thinking mindset  
The CO’s culture had three layers which originated in the CO’s predecessor: firstly, 
an operationalisation culture responsible for the delivery and production of key 
assets; secondly, an engineering culture responsible for the engineering design of 
infrastructure assets; and thirdly, an executive culture (FBU4, FBU6, TBU1, SBU1).  
The engineering culture was characterised by “problem oriented knowledge 
workers…focused on delivering acceptable products to their customers” with those in 
executive management preoccupied with “increasing short term shareholder-added 
value” (Cor4) at the expense of longer term objectives such as innovation. 
 
The tight management style resulted in a high turnover of line managers.  
Unsuccessful innovation attracted the “blame game” with “(h)uge recriminations, 
beating of chests” (FBU2/FBU5).  “Line managers were generally hired from outside 
the organisation, often without (GHLSS) experience but rarely given an opportunity 
to learn from their mistakes - one strike and they were out” (Cor4).  This blame 
orientation fostered a conservative, compliant, risk averse culture which discouraged 
innovation within the CO and innovation collaboration between business units. 
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With the acquisition and development of new business units came a silo mentality.  
Business units had different cultures (Cor1), competing business objectives and 
sometimes, unknowingly, competed for the same tender with different alliance 
partners (FBU1, TBU4, SBU5).  Most of the business units wanted “to stick with 
business within their own units and this resulted in conventional and conforming 
behaviour.  The people who tried and go cross business units were not in the main 
encouraged” (Cor1).  In addition, there were structural impediments to cross-business 
unit collaboration and innovation. 
 
The impact of this silo thinking mentality was expressed as follows: 
(W)e don’t encourage people to cross over boundaries.  We love the idea of 
innovation… but we don’t build up a structure that really respects it or 
encourages it, because all of our economic responses for satisfactory 
completion are related to our stove pipes and as an organisation, until we can 
break that barrier, we’re not going to have significant successes and innovation 
outside a single division (FBU1). 
4.2.3 Organisational Resources 
A strong financial position was one of the CO’s key resources.  As one of Australia’s 
top 25 privately owned companies it had a low level of gearing.  This balance sheet 
strength enabled it to diversify its operations from a single GHLSS focused business 
unit to eight business units in related and unrelated industries without external 
funding or concerns about shareholder reaction or stock market scrutiny (Interview 
by national business magazine with the Group Managing Director).  The CO was 
highly skilled at sourcing resources externally through the acquisition of firms with 
complementary or targeted capabilities.  Both the First Business Unit (COFBU) and 
the Second Business Unit (COSBU) were identified as complementary businesses 
and these acquisitions added learning and experience in dealing with GHLSS and 
related markets.  While the CO successfully acquired complementary business 
entities with appropriate resources, it was less successful in integrating the acquired 
resources to maximise their impact within the CO (ibid., FBU1). 
 
Through the technical strength of its workforce and its history of success either on its 
own behalf or through its acquired entities, the CO also had a strong partnership with 
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the GHLSS Research Organisation (RO).  This partnership provided the opportunity 
to commercialise technology that either it had developed or had been developed by 
others, to develop new GHLSS capabilities and enhance to its innovation capability. 
4.2.4 Processes 
The CO’s innovation processes were built in a major GHLSS project environment 
dominated by a private company command and control executive management 
culture.  Its associated engineering culture was also developed in this narrow and 
highly constrained world.  With its diversification into both GHLSS and non GHLSS 
arenas the CO became an amalgam of originally independent business units.  
Consequently, innovation was inhibited as there was little commonality of 
engineering documentation, technologies, systems or processes, even where the 
systems or processes were meeting similar business requirements (Cor1, FBU4).   
 
Innovation management processes 
In an innovation presentation the Managing Director stated that “innovation is 
integral to our approach to business, our organisational goals, our passion, our culture 
and is viewed as our fundamental means of differentiation from our competitors” (CO 
Innovation Speech by Group Managing Director, 2005).  However, he recognised that 
there was a “gap between understanding innovation, and actually identifying it and 
turning it into a business proposition”.  While there was a strong management 
commitment to innovation as an organisation-wide practice there was a significant 
disconnect between what was espoused and actual practice.  The CO had no 
innovation strategy and “no processes or platforms for employees to share knowledge 
across (business unit) silos” or geographic locations within the same business unit 
(Report on Knowledge Sharing, Expertise Location and Technology Transfer in the 
CO, 2005).  In addition, the level of control and micro management impacted on the 
organisation’s innovation propensity by constraining freedom of thought, freedom of 
interaction across the business and freedom of action (Cor1). 
 
The Managing Director also recognised that “innovation is driven by culture, and the 
ability to implement” and that this could be achieved by harnessing the creative 
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power of its people and encouraging them to be “opportunistic entrepreneurs who are 
constantly looking for new ways of doing business” (CO Innovation Speech by 
Group Managing Director, 2005).  Despite the General Manager’s own warning that 
corporate leadership should “ever be on guard to ensure that this corporation itself 
does not become one of the biggest barriers to innovative thought and action” (ibid.), 
there was, amongst the interviewees, an overwhelming sense of frustration of the 
unrealised innovation potential of the firm due to the ubiquitous knowledge, 
structural and business barriers (Cor1, Cor4, FBU5, SBU4, TBU1). 
 
Myopic customer understanding 
The single GHLSS client orientation led to the CO having a limited understanding of 
customer relationship management and of customer value drivers.  One major bid 
was lost because the CO “told the customer what it considered they should have, 
rather than bidding on what the customer asked for” (Cor4).  Many bids were 
impaired because “of inefficiencies resulting from the failure of the command and 
control culture to understand time-savings and other benefits to be gained from 
effective content management technologies and wouldn't listen when these were 
offered. The resultant effect, in responding to tenders, was crisis management rather 
than knowledge management” (Cor4).  This distance from customers focused the 
CO’s initial innovation attempts on technology innovation due to the absence of an 
intimate knowledge of customer drivers. 
4.2.5 Conclusion 
While the CO exercised its leveraging capabilities through the acquisition of many 
companies, it did not develop an effective integration capability.  There was little 
recognition of where the congruencies and complementarities existed across the firm 
and limited encouragement for business units to pool their skills and resources with 
those of other business units or encouragement of cross-divisional linkages or 
interactions with clients to address existing problems or enhance innovation 
throughout the organisation. 
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The innovation capability will now be analysed within three business units of the CO 
to identify the existence of organisational preconditions supporting the innovation 
capability.  The analysis will initially be based on the framework that emerged from 
the literature review.  Evidence of other components and interrelationships will also 
be sought.  Emphasis in the analysis will be placed on routines as fundamental units 
of capabilities and drivers for change.  The framework emerging from the data will be 
compared to that emerging from the literature to understand the dynamism that 
underpins an innovation capability and the factors which enable or inhibit that 
dynamism. 
4.3 The First Business Unit (COFBU) 
4.3.1 Introduction4 
Through its predecessors, the CO had an unbroken chain of experience in the 
Australian aviation industry spanning eight decades.  The history of the COFBU can 
be traced to a pioneering aircraft manufacturing organisation. It was purchased by the 
CO in the late 1990’s as part of its strategy to broaden its high level security sector 
capabilities into related high technology areas and to provide a support capability for 
the Australian aviation programs. 
 
The COFBU did not have an innovation strategy or a disciplined repeatable 
innovation process (FBU1-5) with innovation being described as ad hoc or happening 
unofficially (FBU1, FBU5).  The innovation which transpired occurred “because 
individuals (found ways) to carry out innovation” (FBU1) or because “(w)e’re 
innovative by definition – we’re engineers” (FBU5).  Despite the absence of an 
innovation strategy, the COFBU encouraged innovation indirectly with innovation 
solving specific problems within the context of a project (FBU4, FBU5). 
 
                                                 
 
4 The notes inserted in the text indicate where preconditions and components from the case have occurred.  The 
multiple notes supported the various linkages between preconditions and components in each OIC framework. 
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• Strategic entrepreneurship  
• Innovation culture – Innovation 
leadership 
• Innovation pervasiveness – Strategic 
innovation (new business model) 
In 2003 the COFBU’s financial performance was unacceptable as one of its acquired 
businesses had many poorly performing contracts and its business processes and 
procedures were inadequate to run the business effectively.  The COFBU’s 
performance was so poor that the CO’s management directed that it be closed.  
However, the COFBU’s management argued that it could be turned around by 
adopting a new strategic posture and business model (FBU4). 
 
The management of the COFBU recognised that while “history matters” it could not 
guarantee its survival and that unless substantive changes were made to the business 
focus (called the business model by the COFBU) the business could fail in the short 
term.  The following two subsections (4.3.2 and 4.3.3) outline the development of the 
OIC preconditions within the COFBU and the development of the dimensions of the 
capability supported by those preconditions. 
4.3.2 Development of the OIC Preconditions 
4.3.2.1 Transforming the Business Model through Strategic Entrepreneurship 
The COFBU management perceived that with rising manufacturing costs, aircraft 
would be purchased from overseas and then fitted to Australian requirements.  Its 
capabilities would, therefore, not be aligned with the new business environment and 
consequently market demand for its services would be low.  The strength of this 
threat resulted in a decision to retire its aircraft manufacturing capability and so the 
challenge which confronted the COFBU was how to maximise revenue from its 
capabilities within the Australian aerospace industry. 
 
To identify new opportunities the COFBU looked 
beyond its narrow path dependent search horizons 
and problem solving competencies.  After 
gathering and filtering market and competitive 
intelligence from inside the firm and across the world, it peered through the fog of 
uncertainty and adopted a strategy implemented by a national overseas technology 
firm (FBU4).  The focus of its new business model was on through-life support 
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• Strategic entrepreneurship – 
Business model design & 
ecosystem shaping  
• Alliance building capability – 
strategic alliance partner 
identification and assessment 
•  Alliance learning 
• Innovation pervasiveness – 
Strategic innovation – new 
business model 
  
• Innovation absorptive capacity 
contracts for the Australian GHLSS aerospace industry as these contracts generated 
10 to 20 times the revenue that could be achieved from manufacturing aircraft 
(FBU4).  For the COFBU, through-life support meant an integrated approach to 
ensuring that a major industry infrastructure program such as a fleet of aircraft or 
helicopters were supported during their operations5. 
 
The through-life support contracts would be 
secured through the capability acquired from partnering with original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) of aircrafts and aircraft systems without representation in 
Australia.  These OEMs were usually the suppliers of the major infrastructure to the 
GHLSS (FBU4).  While the customer would be the same, it would be offered a new 
and distinct suite of services. 
 
To achieve this vision, the COFBU proactively 
developed three strategies.  Firstly, it diverted from 
its aircraft manufacturer path and began to develop 
new capabilities such as the through-life support 
management capability, alliance building 
capability and partner specific learning capability.  
The General Manager said, “In our business, 
innovation is improvement in the business model itself.  Transforming the business 
from what it was before to what it is today” (FBU4).  To secure contracts, the 
COFBU developed strategic alliances which redefined its ecosystem, accelerated its 
capability development and differentiated it from its Australian competitors which 
were generally subsidiaries of overseas OEMs. 
 
Secondly, the COFBU became “an industry trend setter” and, building on its 
commitment to through-life support, positioned itself as a high level system integrator 
with the capacity to act as a project manager for system integration as well as manage 
                                                 
 
5 While major infrastructure projects include fleets of aircraft, fleets of helicopters or the like this dissertation will 
refer to fleets of aircraft for illustrative purposes. 
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• Strategic entrepreneurship – 
Proactiveness, Entrepreneurial 
intentionality 
• Innovation culture – Innovation 
leadership 
other lower level or specialist system integrators (FBU6).  The third strategic choice 
was building new aircraft industry capability.  Capability gaps were generally 
identified through industry analysis and engaging intimately with customers to 
identify their technical and business needs.  Once a capability gap was identified 
which aligned with the FBU’s strategy it sought to build that capability - “We like to 
develop capability.  We prefer to sell capability rather just ideas on paper.  Usually 
we have to say, ‘This is what we could do if we did this…’ but now we can say, ‘This 
is what we can do now’.  It’s a much more saleable product” (FBU2, emphasis 
added).  This emphasis on capability was essential to the decision to focus on 
through-life support and the development of strategic alliances with OEMs. 
4.3.2.2 Enhancing Learning and Knowledge through Boundary Spanning 
Addressing the silo mentality 
A major structural innovation within the COFBU 
was the introduction of domains6 to facilitate the 
transfer, and transformation of knowledge across 
silos.  In the aviation industry an aircraft 
manufacturer was required to comply with a regulatory framework for technical 
airworthiness management.  The regulatory framework required two distinct but 
related competencies: a competency to review aerospace work and a competency to 
approve the work (FBU1).  As a consequence, silos were created as divisions 
operated as their own fiefdoms.  The silo mentality within the COFBU was also a 
legacy from the CO as staff focused on their “own local or functional imperatives” 
and did not cross boundaries (FBU5).  The project centric structure reinforced 
narrowly defined responsibilities with staff focused on their own needs irrespective of 
the detriment to the COFBU or the CO.  
 
 
                                                 
 
6 For the COFBU the domain was a professional community based on a sphere of expert knowledge e. 
g. air vehicle structures and design, avionics, software and project engineering, human factors, or 
systems engineering.  The domain provided professional training, personal support and technical and 
academic stimulation (FBU2, FBU5). 
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• Knowledge sharing structures 
• Organisational learning capability - 
Commercially focused boundary 
behaviours (Generative learning, 
Unlearning) 
• Innovation culture - Increasing 
employee engagement, 
Collaboration 
• Knowledge sharing structures – 
Innovation experience/memory 
The management of the COFBU recognised that 
the silo mentality was affecting its organisational effectiveness and innovation 
potential so it redesigned its business structure, architecture and processes.  The open 
environment and the flat structure facilitated the flow of knowledge up and down the 
COFBU and helped minimise the impact of information decay.  In addition, the 
COFBU had engineering management and domain leader meetings that were 
designed to share challenges, problems and solutions which were then communicated 
to the domains (FBU2).  As a result, the language began to change with senior 
management speaking of the implications of activities to the COFBU rather than 
“engineering is doing something” or “commercial is doing its little bit in its own 
corner” (FBU5). 
 
As a further part of its strategy to promote 
boundary spanning behaviour the COFBU 
established “a domain structure as well as a project 
structure which (made) it very easy to be flexible 
with your manpower” (FBU2).  While domains had 
existed in an ad hoc manner, they were formalised as 
part of the COFBU structural re-design to stress their importance and to achieve its 
“fairly aggressive desire and ambition to bring in change to move to best business 
practice” (FBU5).  This strategy provided a matrix approach to resource management 
with the projects, the “vertical stove pipes”, and with the domains, the horizontal tier, 
providing the skill sets in engineering or technology (FBU2).  In the domains, 
engineers “have their Alma Marta within the organisation which looks after their 
training, professional development, fun time… along with professional development” 
(FBU2).  This resourcing strategy ensured that experience, excellence and expertise 
were spread across the COFBU rather than concentrated in a domain or project. 
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• Innovation culture - Increasing 
employee engagement, Collaboration 
• Organisational learning capability - 
Commercially focused boundary 
behaviours (Generative learning, 
Unlearning) 
The Human Factors Domain (HFD) – integrating knowledge and accelerating 
innovation 
When the COFBU management identified one 
capability gap within the Australian aerospace 
market it established the HFD.  The HFD had a defined approach to innovation, and, 
in particular, “quantum leap innovation” (FBU1), and developed its own innovation 
capability and innovation routines.  With increased complexity in the business 
environment, the HFD was established as a permanent team based on industrial 
democracy principles.  It became a “self organising organism” as staff were involved 
in setting the terms and conditions of their work and regularly participated in 
interdisciplinary work where the team members were empowered to contribute to 
defining the scope of their roles within the limit of what they, as individuals, 
considered comfortable.  There was also a focus on the empowerment of “individuals 
and the team substructures academically, intellectually and humanly” and this 
empowerment facilitated the flow and integration of knowledge (FBU6). 
 
As the COFBU was an engineering organisation, most of its professional staff were 
engineers.  However, the HFD team was comprised of people who were not, in most 
cases, “traditional engineers” and people “you wouldn’t necessarily put together” 
(FBU1).  The domain principal explained the unique combination of people and, in 
doing so, broadened the traditional definition of an engineer within the HFD: 
… there’s probably only one person who started off as an engineer.  All of us 
have Master’s and PhD’s in relevant areas and are really part of the engineering 
area.  If you take engineering, as anybody outside Australia would, to be a 
scientist who works in the real world and comes up with real world solutions, 
we’re all engineers.  But we include people who don’t have “traditional” 
engineering qualifications.  I was originally a medico: there are people who were 
originally psychologists, there are people who were originally working in 
kinestheseology, there are all sorts of people - one was a design engineer so on.  
And we put them all together, and they work together as a team (FBU1).  
 
Even though most team members were participating 
actively in one or more projects the HFD team met 
weekly where open discussion about methodologies, 
and project challenges and solutions took place.  These meeting were also dedicated 
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• Innovation absorptive capacity – 
Externally focused innovation 
learning structures and processes; 
Embedded resource sharing and 
external collaboration 
• Organisational learning capability – 
Commercially focused boundary 
spanning behaviours (Generative 
learning, Unlearning) 
• Innovation culture – Innovation 
leadership 
• Organisational learning capability – 
Commercially focused boundary 
spanning behaviours (Generative 
learning) 
• Knowledge sharing structures 
to learning new skills and processes.  This regular interaction continually challenged 
the status quo and encouraged effective problem solving, cross-fertilisation of ideas, 
knowledge sharing and innovation. 
 
The team operated as a pseudo-academic 
department to keep informed of the latest thinking.  
The challenging intellectual environment facilitated 
the integration and transformation of knowledge irrespective of its source.  Domain 
members built networks and social capital within the academic community and with 
complementary partners.  They actively participated in academic forums and made 
thought leadership presentations.  The team members respected each others’ 
intellectual capacities, conducted knowledge generating research projects and shared 
honours level literature reviews on pertinent research (FBU1).  This rigorous 
intellectual, yet practical, environment was the HFD approach to prepare “for our 
future where were developing our own toolkit of tools and techniques which we’re 
defining for ourselves” (FBU6). 
 
The driver for innovation in the HFD team was 
selecting team members on the basis of their ability 
to cross boundaries.  Innovation occurred “because 
boundaries have been crossed,…when you take 
ideas beyond where you’re starting from” (FBU1).  In the HFD team, crossing 
boundaries enabled staff to “take a systems approach to the world around them in a 
way that very few people actually know how to do” (FBU6) and this provided a 
broader view of what was salient to problem identification and resolution and avoided 
taking a simplistic view of causality. 
 
One of the key benefits of the HFD was “that often 
people learn something in a different domain, a 
different area, and apply it in a new way” (FBU1).  
In a typical project, the team comprised representatives from various functions.  If a 
problem arose the representative with the most appropriate functional expertise would 
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creation of idiosyncratic alliance 
resources and capabilities 
• Innovation absorptive capacity 
  
• Alliance building capability – 
Strategic alliance partner 
identification and assessment 
• Strategic entrepreneurship 
• Innovation pervasiveness - Strategic 
innovation (new business model) 
be asked to solve the problem irrespective of their capability to do so.  Under the 
HFD approach, the domain contact person would identify the most appropriate 
domain staff member to address the particular problem (FBU6), thus enhancing the 
innovation capability. 
4.3.2.3 Strategic Alliances – Rapid Capability Acquisition to support Innovation 
With the decision to focus on through-life support, 
it was essential that the COFBU develop strategic 
alliances with aircraft and aviation supplier OEMs 
(FBU4) and reach beyond its organisational 
boundaries to access new resources and develop new capabilities.  The aim was that 
within three years the COFBU would be different to its competitors because “we’ll 
have a much more diverse aerospace business with strong links back into those 
OEMs” (FBU4).  The development of alliances with aircraft manufacturers and 
suppliers would provide preferential access to expertise and intellectual property 
which would enable the COFBU to be a centre of excellence in the South Pacific 
Region for an OEM.   
 
The benefit of establishing strategic partnerships 
was that the COFBU would rapidly build 
capability and achieve heterogeneity in the 
technical fitness of its capabilities as most of its “aerospace competitors …(were) 
subsidiaries of overseas (OEMs) so their product portfolio (was) limited (to) …what 
their parent produces or deals in” (FBU4).  This capability heterogeneity and the 
barriers to imitation and substitution through multiple exclusive strategic partnerships 
enabled the COFBU to achieve a competitive advantage.  The COFBU established 
key relationships with OEMs from the inception of the new focus to the time of the 
research.  This enhanced its alliance building capability and, consequently, its 
innovation capability. 
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A strategic alliance was also formed by the CO with 
the RO which provided the COFBU with the 
opportunity to conduct contract research and 
development (FBU2).  While this approach provided 
the RO with valuable research, intellectual property and enhanced GHLSS capability, 
it was a mutually beneficial arrangement as it also enabled the COFBU to develop 
new or complementary competencies and deep partner-specific learning.  Through the 
strength of relationships developed and innovation demonstrated by the HFD, the 
COFBU positioned itself strategically as a trusted adviser and source of problem 
solving expertise for the RO (FBU4) so that “when the government has a question 
they ask (the RO), and when (the RO) can’t answer it they come to us” (FBU1). 
4.3.2.4 Capability Life Cycle 
The implications for the business model transformation are reflected in the capability 
lifecycle in Figure 4.1 below.  This diagram depicts the evolutionary path of the 
through-life support capability.  The COFBU’s trigger of change was the realisation 
that with the GHLSS’s move to acquire aircraft from overseas, its manufacturing 
capability would need to be retired.  The decision to change the business model is 
reflected in the development of the through-life support capability supported by the 
COFBU’s regenerative and renewing dynamic capabilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1  Capability Life Cycles within COFBU  
Through-life Support capability 
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4.3.3 Development of Dimensions of the OIC supported by the Preconditions 
4.3.3.1 Innovation Pervasiveness 
With the change in business model came the 
realisation that the COFBU would need to redesign 
its strategic architecture and that its integration and 
co-ordination routines would need to be 
transformed.  Four significant innovation themes 
were implemented.  Firstly, the COFBU developed new business process architecture 
within the context of external and self-imposed constraints (FBU5).  In addition, there 
was an emphasis on increasing innovation into the design process through elegant 
design and rapid prototyping (FBU2, see section 4.3.3.2).  The second innovation 
driver was the need to solve problems which arose within projects.  Through-life 
support contracts for aircraft fleets offered sporadic problem solving opportunities 
which had long run cost implications (FBU5).  The staff’s passionate problem solving 
propensity was encapsulated by the General Manager: 
The guys go off and say, “How are we going to solve this?”…They will not lie 
down and die.  We have some excellent people who say, “We can find a solution 
for this”.  Our guys are very good at it.  We have found solutions in some 
instances for some of our overseas partners where they just didn’t know what to 
do (FBU4). 
 
The COFBU recognised that “ad hoc problem 
solving” was not a capability.  Through the 
introduction of domains, embedded problem 
solving capabilities and cross-functional 
interaction, the COFBU focused on accelerating its managerial cognition capability 
by challenging the assumptions and mental models upon which prior path-dependent 
decisions had been made.  The third area of innovation activity was in research and 
development where activities were limited to those which directly aligned with the 
COFBU’s business objectives, met anticipated project needs or built new capability 
(FBU5).  Finally, innovation occurred through the reconfiguration of resources 
arising from the formal implementation of the domain/project matrix structure. 
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• Innovation pervasiveness - Multi 
innovation focus (Product, 
Managerial, Process) 
• Innovation Culture – Innovation 
leadership 
• Innovation pervasiveness – Multi 
innovation focus (process) 
With the absence of effective business processes and 
procedures impacting its performance, the COFBU 
mapped, streamlined and aligned its business process architecture to its new business 
model.  “Essentially it is our aim to completely re-do the entire set of process, 
policies and procedures of the organisation from top to bottom” to give the COFBU a 
business-wide view (FBU5).  One of the key initiatives was to implement the 
Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) to integrate its traditionally separate 
functions, to continually identify process improvement priorities, to provide guidance 
for quality processes and a point of reference for assessing the current processes 
(FBU4).  However, while the COFBU achieved CMMI level 2, its driver to achieve 
level 3 was meeting business and customer needs rather than simply process 
improvement (FBU5). 
4.3.3.2 Reconfiguration and Integration Capability to support Successful 
Innovation 
The change from manufacturer to through-life 
support business service provider and the delivery 
of capability required new business, operational and knowledge management models 
as the life cycle of an aircraft could extend over 30 years or more.  With objectives of 
continuous airworthiness and continuous process improvement, the COFBU needed 
an intimate understanding of its customer’s operational environment to ensure that 
aircraft fleet availability was maximised.  Accordingly, the management of 
knowledge within the COFBU was essential to deliver a through-life support program 
that satisfied customer expectations.  The effective capture, deployment and use of 
knowledge would lead to increased innovation resulting in improved airworthiness, 
safety and increased availability, profit and employee satisfaction. 
 
Removing obstacles to knowledge sharing and Lessons Learned 
Through proactive leadership the COFBU sought a 
business model outside of traditional aircraft 
manufacturing and its learning boundary (represented by arrow A in Figure 4.2 
below).  Its boundary spanning extended to functions within domains, within projects, 
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between domains, between projects, between business units of the case organisation 
and with external alliance partners.  Through its new behaviours it developed market 
orientation and relationship management dynamic capabilities which would improve 
its market sensing, market seizing and learning capabilities (vertical, horizontal, 
project and domain) as well as its alliance building capabilities.  The COFBU also put 
in place structures and processes to learn how to acquire, synthesise and act on 
market knowledge better and how to improve their ability to form and maintain 
relationships. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2  COFBU Boundary Spanning Behaviours 
 
Some subject matter experts were impediments to 
sharing expertise but they were replaced with 
“those generally younger and more amendable to 
change and sharing knowledge” (FBU4).  This has resulted in improved knowledge 
sharing and ideation for products and innovation.  Lunch and learn forums were held 
twice every month to facilitate the integration of internal and external knowledge.  
Information and learning were shared and ideas presented for discussion and 
refinement (FBU2, FBU5).  Even though these forums were “in your own time, bring 
your own lunch” style of meeting, the COFBU has “a never ending stream of people 
coming and attending” (FBU2). 
 
Aircraft Manufacturing Industry 
Case Organisation 
External Partners – 
Universities, Research 
Organisations,  
A 
COFBU’s learning 
boundary represented by the 
square with the darker outline 
Rows within the inner square 
represent domains 
Columns represent projects 
Dotted lines represents 
permeable boundaries 
Alliance Partner OEMs  
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Lessons from a legacy acquisition provided business 
clarity and managerial innovation resulting in the 
focus on through-life support contracts (FBU4).  However, at the project level the 
COFBU had a “minimalistic lessons learned process” (FBU5).  Lesson learned 
routines were carried out on a project basis with opportunities for improvement and 
the avoidance of project errors identified.  However, while lessons learned project 
reports were generated and shared with middle managers, lessons learned routines 
were inconsistently applied within the COFBU (FBU5). 
 
Problem solving and rule breaking as catalysts for innovation 
Problem solving, either of a specific challenge or a 
serendipitous project need, was a core capability of 
the COFBU.  While the entitlement culture encouraged conventional and conforming 
behaviour a new cultural paradigm was introduced which no longer accepted the 
status quo (FBU4).   
 
The COFBU problem solving capability was 
enhanced by staff who encouraged people to 
persistently ask questions and to critically examine 
what they did (FBU1, FBU2).  A young production manager in a south coast hangar 
facility was concerned with the efficiency of his work area.  His persistence in asking 
“why” questions led to a review of the procedures and the streamlining of the work 
practices.  His initiative and his unwillingness to accept the status quo led to a 
reduced turnaround time for the project, a much happier workforce and a delighted 
customer (FBU2). 
 
Elegant Design and Rapid Prototyping 
One of the key routines that the COFBU developed 
was called “elegant design”.  This process ensured 
that the object designed not only achieved what it was intended to do but also did it 
“efficiently and effectively” taking into account the environment in which the 
equipment would be used, the materials from which it would be manufactured and 
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how it would be maintained (FBU1, FBU2).  Because of its emphasis on the 
integration of multiple disciplines, elegant design required engineers to view the 
design brief holistically.  It required the ability to see relationships between 
seemingly unrelated fields, to detect patterns of activity and to achieve innovation by 
combining elements in new ways.  Accordingly, “when you start thinking about what 
elegant design is, then you’re going to actually deal with innovation in one way or 
another, be it sequential or be it quantum leap” (FBU1). 
 
The HFD team also established a rapid prototype 
routine to accelerate and reduce the cost of 
development.  Typically, most aerospace designs comprised highly developed and 
detailed plans and specification even though a prototype had not been developed to 
test the design.  The high workload and cost involved in developing the plans and 
specifications encouraged personal and economic attachments to the plans.  There 
was consequently a reluctance to change plans even though the change would have 
produced a superior outcome.  The importance of rapid prototyping to “getting it right 
the first time” (FBU4) is stated below: 
In a rapid prototype environment, what you’re doing is you’re actually 
developing and testing your prototypes, prior to putting them on paper.  You’re 
keeping a record, but the record isn’t a paper record, it’s an electronic and 
visual, and so we’re actually able to significantly evaluate the success of a 
product, in the lab, prior to it officially being designed.  And that of course 
means that we’re nearly there by the time we’ve actually put in down onto 
paper.  And we’re nearly there in a way that succeeds in engineering terms.  
(FBU1) 
4.3.3.3 Creating a Dynamic Innovation Culture 
The General Manager said “the biggest challenge” 
was to change the culture from an entitlement 
engineering culture with an orientation towards analysis, the centrality of technology 
and following institutional rules to a pragmatic performance based culture (FBU1, 
FBU4).  Many of its staff came from the GHLSS and had an expectation that they 
had a job for life.  Others from the predecessor organisation had the same expectation 
because of its entrenched hierarchical career path which emphasised “training and 
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developing people over 30 to 40 years” (FBU6).  The staff were accustomed to highly 
formalised rules with detailed procedures leaving little opportunity for initiative.  The 
narrowly defined job descriptions meant that there were low levels of responsibility 
resulting in staff only doing the minimum work.  People also tended to be risk averse 
with creativity and innovation sacrificed for security and consistency (FBU4). 
 
The culture was “keep working until you get the job 
done” irrespective of the contract requirement or 
commerciality of such an approach, and “all care, 
no responsibility” with a strong blame element (FBU4).  There was “a tendency with 
our engineers who like to be perfectionists to just keep doing things and we’ve found 
that we’ve moved completely away from the (contract) baseline…”.  “We had to 
change the culture to a ‘can do’ approach”, “a results oriented culture, rather than a 
hard work culture, where people are held accountable…”  The General Manager 
consistently built trust by demonstrating his own accountability: “If I’ve said “I’ll do 
this for you”, I’ve done it...That’s when people give you their trust” (FBU4). 
 
The need to ensure that the business not only survived but was well positioned for 
growth resulted in a new approach.  As the General Manager said, “we’ve been able 
to change that pace.  We operate as if there’s no tomorrow and operate as though 
we’re constantly in a recession” (FBU4).  The transition to a performance culture was 
achieved by ensuring that the staff of the organisation supported the corporate vision.  
“(I)f we found people who weren’t going to change we helped them to move on.  So 
we’ve brought in quite a new regime now.  It has been done quite intelligently as we 
didn’t just throw the baby out with the bath water” and “we captured intellectual 
property that those leaving held”.  In recruiting new employees, the COFBU targeted 
staff who had a record of achievement and who had a “can do” attitude, “Not people 
who just say, ‘We work bloody hard’” (FBU4). 
 
In the COFBU’s culture there was a lack of 
decision making capability and initiative, 
particularly in middle management, as the price of failure was blame and rejection.  
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In the new culture greater accountability was balanced by increased empowerment 
with staff being “given a fairly free hand to go off and do things within the 
constraints of our contractual obligations.  So no one’s stopped from doing things” as 
long as its “ethical and in the interests of the company and shareholder” (FBU4).  
Leadership training and the introduction of improved business systems provided 
better and increased information for decision making.  An incentive scheme, aligned 
to performance, was introduced for the management team with rewards for achieving 
agreed business results (FBU4). 
 
One of the other major changes to promote 
innovation was the acceptance of failure.  While 
the CO had a blame culture which had infected most of its business units, the COFBU 
recognised that “if you make a decision you are either right or wrong.  So we don’t 
punish those who make wrong decisions.  My view is that if you deliberately break 
the rules twice then that’s trouble.  I’m sure there’s an exception but we don’t want to 
make rules to control the minority, the 2%” (FBU4).  The capability extended to, 
where appropriate, abandoning existing rules and finding or developing an alternative 
practice or process which was better than the existing practices and processes 
(FBU1). 
 
Another factor which helped change in culture was 
the change of premises.  The previous “hard 
work/long hours” culture was aided by the availability of free parking.  The move to 
the new premises facilitated a “results oriented culture” as “people plan their work 
better and catch the train.  So if you walk down at 6.30 or 7.00 pm you can shoot a 
cannon and no one’s there.  But I think they have a better work/life balance” (FBU4). 
 
The former culture was characterised by a lack of vitality, energy and passion.  The 
General Manager stated that when he first toured the COFBU there were “just staring 
eyes and as you keep walking, they keep following you around.  When I told them 
these were the things we were going to do they just looked at you in disbelief”.  As a 
result of the changes, employee engagement rose from 25% to 44% (in an eighteen 
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month period) and there is a lot more life and energy as “people feel they can do a lot 
of things that they thought previously they couldn’t do” (FBU4, words in parenthesis 
added).  The new life that emerged in the COFBU stimulated innovation as staff were 
passionate about their work and encouraged “to practice their calling i.e. allowing 
engineers to engineer” (FBU2).  This understanding of the people-centeredness of 
organisational performance as well as innovation has borne results as customers can 
now see a visible change in the COFBU’s operations and this has, in turn, created 
stronger customer relationships (FBU4). 
4.3.3.4 Innovation Absorptive Capacity and Knowledge-sharing Structures 
As the new business model was based upon intimate engagement with overseas 
OEMs, the innovation absorptive capacity is inextricably linked to the externally 
focused boundary spanning behaviours which resulted in the acquisition of 
complementary knowledge and to the alliance building capability (see sections 
4.3.2.2 and 4.3.2.3).  The knowledge sharing structures (principally the 
domain/project matrix structure) have also been described at length in the former 
section. 
4.3.4 Conclusion 
With the GHLSS sourcing aircraft from overseas the COFBU changed the primary 
focus of its business model to seek leadership in through-life support for the 
Australian GHLSS aerospace industry.  In this major organisational shift, the COFBU 
recognised that it was not trapped by its history and that it could shape its business by 
investment choices and identifying and implementing new strategic priorities.  The 
key to the COFBU’s success was the ability of its entrepreneurial management to 
perceive the discontinuity between its former and new environments and the 
identification and development of appropriate dynamic capabilities to calibrate the 
new business model to the new environment.   
 
The three COFBU’s OIC preconditions – strategic entrepreneurship, organisational 
learning capability and alliance building capability – are depicted in Figure 4.3 
together with the underpinning constructs.  The preconditions were essential 
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antecedents for the formation of the COFBU’s OIC.  The framework demonstrates 
the centrality of strategic entrepreneurship as it provided the impetus for the 
organisational learning and alliance building capabilities as well as focusing the 
COFBU’s attention on acquiring relevant external knowledge.  These capabilities are 
dynamic as they support continual learning as well as changes in the processes, 
behaviours and structures that define them.  They facilitated multi-directional 
learning - vertical, horizontal, project and domain – and accelerated the development 
of absorptive capacity routines for the acquisition of alliance partner knowledge as 
well as enhancing the breadth and depth of firm and individual absorptive capacity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3  COFBU Preconditions and their Underpinning Constructs 
 
Strategic entrepreneurship is linked to the business unit’s organisational learning 
capability through the COFBU’s extensive search process to identify alternative 
business models and the dynamic learning in the iterative process of information 
gathering, information processing and further information search.  The primarily 
outward focus of the inquiry and its focus on strategic alliances provided the linkage 
to the alliance building capability and innovation absorptive capacity.  The business 
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model transformation involved strategic alliance partner identification, assessment 
and the subsequent creation of idiosyncratic alliance resources and learning 
capabilities.  The breadth of the business transformation created the need for 
proactive decisions in relation to innovation pervasiveness and the need for the 
development of knowledge sharing structures to ensure that acquired knowledge was 
shared, transformed and exploited. 
 
The external focus of the alliance building capability stimulates and supports the 
innovation absorptive capacity component through alliance learning.  Building 
innovation knowledge was the primary driver for the establishment of the 
relationship, and learning how to facilitate this knowledge flow fed back into 
reconfiguration of the business unit’s organisational learning capability.  The four 
components of the OIC framework - innovation absorptive capacity, innovation 
pervasiveness, knowledge-sharing structures and innovation culture – are depicted in 
Figure 4.4 (see page 107). 
 
Innovation within the COFBU was pervasive and this component is linked to all three 
preconditions.  Innovation was driven through strategic entrepreneurship and 
captured within the new business model.  As a consequence of a dynamically 
changing organisational learning capability, new business-wide process architectures 
were developed, and the project/domain matrix structure established to ensure that 
knowledge within the organisational memory was shared and developed.  Innovation 
pervasiveness also expanded as a consequence of increasing the number of external 
partners with whom it shared, acquired and developed complementary knowledge 
(i.e. its alliance building capability). 
 
Finally, components of the unit’s innovation absorptive capacity and knowledge-
sharing structures emerged as a consequence of the dynamic properties of the 
COFBU’s organisational learning capability. These dynamic changes were driven by 
the strategic objective to acquire external knowledge from alliance and other 
complementary knowledge owners, and to capture and reuse the innovation 
knowledge and experience to facilitate learning and optimise the sharing of that 
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knowledge.  Underpinning the organisational learning capability was the business 
unit’s innovation culture.  Through innovation leadership a performance-based 
collaborative culture was introduced, and this provided the impetus to challenge the 
status quo and for the acceptance of failure in innovation without blame. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4  Organisational Innovation Capability Framework as derived from 
the First Case Analysis 
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4.4 The Second Business Unit (COSBU) 
4.4.1 Introduction 
This embedded case study focuses on the transformation of the COSBU from an 
enterprise with primarily one large GHLSS client to a business which was 
diversifying its reach in clients and technologies.  This expansion into the commercial 
sector and other security-conscious Government organisations was accelerated by the 
increased emphasis on national security following the events of September 11.  The 
transformation from entrepreneurial adhocracy to strategic entrepreneurship ensured 
that innovation was at the forefront of the COSBU’s operations, and confirmed 
strategic entrepreneurship as a precondition driving innovation capability change. 
The following two subsections (4.4.2 and 4.4.3) will outline the development of the 
OIC preconditions within the second business unit and the development of the 
dimensions of the capability supported by those preconditions. 
4.4.2 Development of the Preconditions 
4.4.2.1 Transforming the Business Focus through Strategic Entrepreneurship 
With the changing focus of its major client to the 
engagement of overseas contractors, and with 
limited project and tender opportunities, the 
COSBU’s management reviewed its strategy and developed a Strategic Technology 
Roadmap (the Roadmap) to provide it with a new direction.  The COSBU’s 
leadership understood the impact of path dependencies by recognising that its 
position was the result of its formation as an entrepreneurial engineering firm (the 
original firm) with primarily a GHLSS client base and its subsequent purchase by the 
CO.  As the General Manager stated: “It was important for us not to let our past 
successes limit our future approach to innovation.  Don’t let the past get in your 
eyes!!” (SBU8).  The COSBU’s new strategies demonstrated that “history matters” 
and that changes were required to its organisational routines to ensure that the 
constraints of its history and the investments that its predecessors had made in its 
repertoire of routines did not impair its innovation capability. 
 
109 
 
• Strategic entrepreneurship - 
Entrepreneurial intentionality 
  
• Strategic entrepreneurship - 
Entrepreneurial discipline 
  
Following its scanning of the environment and the assessment of changing 
opportunities and competitors, the COSBU took definitive steps to broaden its 
historical path of selling primarily to the GHLSS.  It exercised its integration and co-
ordination capabilities to expand its focus to the sector of the (commercial high level 
security sector) CHLSS which had similar needs to the COSBU’s existing client base 
(SBU1).  
 
The new strategy had three planning horizons.  The 
major third horizon objective was for non GHLSS 
revenues to match revenues from GHLSS sources.  In the strategy, management 
recognised the need to place innovation at the forefront of its operations and, in doing 
so, provided a clear reference point for all decisions.  This common understanding 
facilitated better communication and strategic alignment across the lines of business, 
disparate teams and organisational boundaries.  The Roadmap identified key 
synergies within and across the lines of business, interdependencies in regard to 
technologies and capabilities, and gaps in COSBU capabilities and within the product 
and solution portfolio. 
 
The Strategic Technology Roadmap provided 
strategic innovation practices to move the COSBU 
from its ad hoc entrepreneurialism and its project oriented GHLSS dominated path 
dependency (SBU4).  The aim was to provide deep co-specialisation between parts of 
the COSBU innovation system and tight co-ordination across sub-systems.  These 
practices included a portfolio approach to product and capability development, a 
product pipeline framework with a Stage-Gate based process, management 
commitment to the provision of innovation resources and a cultural shift towards a 
product mindset.  The COSBU also implemented strategies to calibrate the strategic 
goals with the organisational structure and routines pertaining to idea capture and 
management and the personnel required to ensure the goals were achieved (SBU1). 
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4.4.2.2 Achieving Entrepreneurial Fitness through Strategic Entrepreneurship 
One of the key approaches adopted by the COSBU 
to reshape its path dependencies was to improve its 
entrepreneurial fitness.  Its management recognised 
the need to be more strategic in order to achieve the 
value enhancing orchestration of assets within its own boundaries, and between 
enterprises and other institutions within its business ecosystem.  The COSBU had an 
entrepreneurial philosophy which could be traced to the firm’s founder.  He was 
technically creative but also understood that research was needed to achieve business 
goals (SBU7).  However, entrepreneurship was ad hoc and needed discipline and 
focus to achieve its business objectives (SBU1, SBU8). 
 
The entrepreneurial philosophy was enhanced by 
the firm’s collegiate culture (SBU7, SBU6, SBU5) 
which recognised the “people-centredness” of 
innovation.  It was characterised by the sharing of information, acceptance of failure, 
ease of access to management, “working hard, (and) solving difficult problems” 
(SBU6).  In addition, “you did what you had to do”, “were free to think and put up 
ideas” and staff felt comfortable working in “an entrepreneurial environment, where 
risks were taken” (SBU5).  The open access to management and the “freedom to get 
up and walk around, talk to one another” promoted information sharing and also 
reduced the impact of information decay (SBU3). 
 
The culture was symbolised by the beer fridge.  The founder was a traditional 
engineer where beer was a part of the culture so the fridge became “a meeting place 
where guys could just have a beer and sit down around the table and discuss anything 
from technical problems to the projects they were working on” (SBU6, SBU1).  It 
continued to be part of the culture in the COSBU (SBU1). 
 
The imperative for action and the entrepreneurial 
culture in the original firm, was encapsulated in the 
frequently quoted maxim -“Seek forgiveness, not permission but don’t be suicidal” 
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(SBU1, SBU5, SBU7).  This approach was exemplified by the founder’s reliance on 
the heroics of individuals and their ability to achieve the right results for the business.  
“He gave you a pretty blank canvass…(and the) freedom to bring whatever you 
thought was right to the table” and wanted staff  to “(g)o out and do things” (SBU7). 
 
The leadership was proactive in focusing the entrepreneurial drive of the COSBU on 
strategic and disciplined innovation.  The General Manager said: 
As leaders we need to be constantly generating, otherwise at best we will sustain 
the business at its current level or worse, it will decline.  The requirement to 
“generate” is intimately linked to the process of innovation and it must become a 
core competency throughout the organisation, not just within an R&D group or 
isolated within one section of the company.  It needs to pervade the way we do 
business (SBU1, emphasis added). 
 
The Roadmap provided the analytical framework 
for innovation and focused on the COSBU’s 
Innovation Management System – ideation, product 
evaluation and selection, product development and product commercialisation.  The 
General Manager recognised that new routines were required to expand absorptive 
capacity to effectively and efficiently transfer, translate and transform the new 
knowledge acquired from the new relationships formed (see strategy 2 below in 
Figure 4.5 on page 112). 
 
In order to “generate” the required innovation, 
build on the COSBU’s ad hoc innovation processes 
and develop a sustainable competitive advantage, 
the COSBU leadership team implemented three 
strategies (SBU8). The impact of these strategies 
on the COSBU’s Innovation Management System is 
depicted in Figure 4.5 below.  
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Figure 4.5  Innovation Management System Strategy Impact 
 
The first strategy was to create the right environment for innovation (Enhancing the 
Innovation Culture section 4.4.3.4).  This required a commitment to innovation at the 
leadership level and the commitment of time and resources even though immediate 
revenue targets were of primary concern.  The COSBU appointed a Product and 
Innovation Manager with responsibility to manage and champion the innovation 
process.  The Manager reported to the General Manager and was a member of the 
Management Team.   
 
The Roadmap created a shared understanding of the COSBU’s objectives and 
accelerated the innovation process through the prioritisation of products and solutions 
and the development of capabilities aligned to the Roadmap. 
 
The second key initiative was to form the right relationships with external research 
organisations, customers, partners and, where appropriate, with competitors to gain 
access to research, intellectual property and complementary knowledge (SBU7) 
(Developing an Innovation Absorptive Capacity, section 4.4.3.1).  The third strategy, 
to be successful in project delivery, product commercialisation and strategic focus 
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(this section), recognised “that innovation was ineffective unless it could be 
converted to a business outcome” (SBU8). 
4.4.2.3 An Organisation-Wide, Generative Learning Capability supporting a 
Problem Solving approach to Innovation 
The importance of learning to the COSBU can be 
readily inferred as its organisational values and 
problem solving capabilities support a strong 
learning orientation (SBU7).  One of the key elements of the COSBU’s Vision was to 
“solve difficult problems” and this was supported by its people-centered employment 
value proposition crafted around the understanding that its staff were passionate 
about technology, highly intelligent and committed to solving difficult and unique 
problems.  Staff were “challenged to do something that someone else hasn’t been able 
to do or no one else has done before which is going to stretch them as well and take 
technology to a new level or take design to a new level for them.  That’s what they 
get turned on by.  That’s what they think is exciting and good fun” (SBU7). 
 
The COSBU employed highly skilled staff and 
fostered an environment of trust (SBU1).  This 
environment allowed staff to feel comfortable about failing in their quest for the next 
innovative product or solution.  The COSBU introduced a reward and recognition 
scheme and key performance indicators for its line of business managers related to 
their involvement in and support of the innovation process to ensure they provided 
their staff with the necessary “thinking time” away from projects to be innovative 
(SBU1).  This allocation of time for ideation and innovation was critical as there was 
pressure to ensure that all employees were engaged in paid project work (SBU5). 
 
The COSBU’s learning capability was reflected in 
the desire of its staff to “challenge old 
assumptions”.  This generative, double-loop learning approach enabled the COSBU 
to “change its view of the world” and solve difficult and novel problems (SBU1).  
The COSBU had formal and informal learning routines to facilitate knowledge 
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sharing and socialisation.  “Lunch and Learn” was a regular forum where 50-100 
people heard about lessons learned from project successes and failures, innovative 
research or interesting technology developments from internal or external speakers 
(SBU1, SBU3, SBU5, SBU6).  These information dissemination sessions also 
provide opportunity for discussion about technical and co-ordination issues and 
difficult challenges within projects. 
 
Most sharing of technical knowledge took place at 
the monthly meetings of the Product and 
Innovation Group where representatives from each 
line of business shared project-related technology 
developments, identified opportunities for collaboration or joint projects and 
transferred, translated and transformed knowledge gained from customers and 
external sources.  This Group sponsored forums and some informal networks 
(SBU1).  The COSBU also shared knowledge in the various engineering communities 
of practice.  All of these knowledge acquisition and sharing routines facilitated the 
integration and assimilation of learning so that it could be applied and implemented 
in new projects, and in doing so, facilitated innovation. 
4.4.2.4 Alliance Building Capability 
The COSBU’s second key initiative was to form the right business relationships.  As 
with the COFBU case study, there is a strong correlation between this capability and 
the innovation absorptive capacity.  These two capabilities are described together in 
more detail in section 4.4.3.1. 
4.4.2.5 Capability Life Cycle 
The capability life cycle implications of the business focus transformation are 
reflected in Figure 4.6 below.  The GHLSS capability was an established capability 
of the COSBU and CO.  The trigger of change was the realisation that the GHLSS 
was primarily focused on the engagement of overseas contractors and that, as a 
consequence, the COSBU would need to broaden its capabilities in order to survive 
(SBU1).  The decision to expand the business focus is reflected in the development of 
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a CHLSS capability which is depicted as starting with a low degree of maturity 
relative to the COSBU’s capability in the GHLSS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Capability Life Cycles within COSBU  
4.4.3 Development of Dimensions of the OIC supported by the Preconditions 
4.4.3.1 Developing an Innovation Absorptive Capacity 
Inside-Out Path Dependency 
The technical project orientation of the COSBU resulted in insular management 
practices and a limited understanding of customer drivers (SBU3).  In the GHLSS 
environment any compromise could endanger lives, so the highest level of technical 
capability was utilised irrespective of the cost, so engagement with the COSBU was, 
therefore, frequently based around the technology and the technical capabilities of its 
personnel.  In contrast, the commercial business environment balanced the cost of 
achieving technical excellence with the benefit or desirability of achieving that level 
of excellence. 
 
The research and development work of the COSBU tended to be opportunistic 
technical projects with limited time frames and budgets.  When a tender was won it 
was a long term project with a highly technical orientation.  While customer 
relationships were of some importance the technical outcome of the project was the 
predominant consideration so a mindset developed which was “driven by schedules 
and costs” (SBU6).  While this mindset did not inhibit innovation in the original firm, 
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it was a barrier in the COSBU because of its inherited project behaviours.  The focus 
was a major inhibitor of innovation as “We don’t necessarily have any room to do 
anything on standard projects other than that which was originally planned” (SBU6). 
 
Outside-In Approach 
The key elements of the outside-in approach were 
firstly, to “form the right relationships” with 
external parties who could enhance the quality and 
relevance of the ideas submitted to the ideation 
process; secondly, to re-structure of the COSBU to reflect the new external business 
focus; and thirdly, to import knowledge through the introduction of new staff who 
had experience in the markets the COSBU was targeting.   
 
Forming the right relationships was intended to 
facilitate outside-in innovation and energise the 
product ideation process and cross-fertilised teams 
that collaborated across lines of business (SBU7).  To limit its dependence on the 
GHLSS, the COSBU engaged more broadly with the science and technology 
community (co-operative research centres, universities specialising in key technology 
areas which enhanced its technical capabilities and expertise).  Regular forums were 
convened to share technical and innovation knowledge, and intellectual property, and 
to identify opportunities for idea prototyping, solution development or collaborative 
research (SBU7). This proactive engagement with customers was essential to gain 
insight into their articulated and latent needs. 
 
The COSBU’s strategic management focus was not 
limited to technology innovation.  It extended to 
managerial innovation in all parts of the business.  
The Outside-In approach helped the COSBU 
appreciate that it did not have a product and sales 
focus and this recognition provided the impetus to change the COSBU structurally 
(SBU1, SBU3).  The COSBU recognised that its knowledge was limited primarily to 
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dealing with GHLSS and that this would constrain its ability to implement its product 
and market development strategies.  It recognised it “didn’t have anyone that had an 
understanding of the market and the sales process for products” and so appointed a 
business development manager with expertise in the GHLSS and experience and 
established relationships in the CHLSS.  This manager brought understanding of the 
CHLSS, new selling skills and knowledge of channel management, and accelerated 
the assimilation of external knowledge (SBU1). 
 
Systematic Stakeholder-focused Ideation supported by an Innovation Absorptive 
Capacity 
Innovation ideas were generated spontaneously by 
staff, by planned and unplanned customer needs 
identification activities or through the development 
of “the right relationships”.  In addition, ideas were 
also captured in relation to process and business 
improvements (SBU1).  These ideas were screened based on established criteria such 
as market attractiveness and strategic alignment with the strategy of the business unit.   
 
The COSBU was proactive in its attempts to 
acquire specific knowledge from customers, 
competitors and from other generators of knowledge pertinent to its technology 
roadmap.  This emphasis was directly related to the COSBU’s unsuccessful attempts 
to commercialise technology where it “innovated so much, we cost ourselves a 
fortune, because it was bleeding edge instead of leading edge” (SBU3, SBU7).  In 
many cases the COSBU ignored market requirements and were “developing 
something and being innovative for the sake of it” (SBU3).  These experiences 
reinforced the learning that “(a)ny innovation has to be done within the framework 
and the context of the market” (SBU3).  The COSBU also collaborated with 
competitors who had “part of the puzzle” which could help it to achieve a technology 
or solution objective (SBU7). 
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Part of the COSBU’s strategy in building closer 
relationships with customers, particularly 
commercial customers, was to appoint business development managers with 
experience in working in the CHLSS (SBU3).  It also appointed a manager of sales 
and marketing for “product” in order to inject commercial reality into the R and D 
process (SBU3) to ensure that “at the end of the day, if one of these ideas did get 
up… there is always an assurance that it gets justified against market demand” 
(SBU1). 
4.4.3.2 Business-wide Strategic Innovation  
Evidence supporting the notion of business-wide strategic innovation includes the 
sourcing of ideation from all areas of the business unit as well as from external 
partners, the systematic innovation referred to in the following section as well as 
managerial innovation. 
4.4.3.3 Systematic Innovation through Portfolio Management and the New 
Innovation Process 
From Ad Hoc Product Development to Portfolio Management 
The original firm had such a small number of employees that “(e)veryone else knew 
what was going on” (SBU6).  Product development was ad hoc as products were 
developed based on GHLSS’s perceived or articulated needs and often isolated and 
costly capabilities were built irrespective of the firm’s ability to leverage such 
capability.  These unstructured innovation processes were transferred from the 
original firm to its successor and also existed for a period in the COSBU (SBU4).  
Accordingly, project selection decisions were often ineffective as decisions were 
made without reference to any strategic framework.  There was also a strong 
reluctance to kill projects even when they were unlikely to be successful (SBU5, 
SBU8). 
 
The aim of the portfolio approach was to provide 
strategic focus and assist the COSBU achieve its 
business goals, including winning projects, developing and selling products, 
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developing adjacent markets, enhancing capability, and developing strategic 
relationships (COSBU Strategic Technology Roadmap).  Portfolio management was 
critical to innovation in that it provided a balance of activities between the 
competitive tensions of short and long term priorities, across lines of business and 
also of the type of activities undertaken.  Portfolio management required sufficient 
levels of activity at each stage of the technology maturity continuum aligned with the 
strategic goals of the COSBU.  The implementation of the portfolio approach 
generated more targeted innovation opportunities with the intention of increasing 
financial performance without increasing the amount spent (SBU1, SBU4). 
 
Capability development was also a key priority.  
With key capabilities mapped in the Technology 
Roadmap, the COSBU identified opportunities for 
capability enhancement through the winning of key projects or the building of 
external alliances; or capability development, where the capability did not exist 
within the COSBU.  The focus was on developing capabilities which could be applied 
in multiple contexts to increase the probability of success (SBU1).  Even where the 
technology itself may not have achieved a favorable business outcome for the 
COSBU, opportunities for capability development were identified and delivered 
competitive advantage by securing profitable new projects and business opportunities 
based on that capability (SBU7). 
 
From Ad Hoc Idea Management to Disciplined Product Pipeline 
The COSBU established infrastructure for the 
capture and evaluation of ideas for product 
innovation and process improvement.  The systematic process for idea evaluation was 
essential as the CO required a “convincing business case to demonstrate that the idea 
(was) worth investing in” (SBU7).  To provide this discipline, the COSBU developed 
a “repeatable mechanism by which you could document an idea and develop a 
business case for it” (SBU7). 
 
 
120 
 
• Innovation culture 
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The COSBU used the NASA Technology Readiness Level framework to assess the 
maturity of its evolving technologies.  Most of the innovation activities of the 
COSBU were in the Early Stage R and D/Concept Development and Prototype 
Development/Concept Proving stages.  External projects tended to be small to 
medium in size and attracted margins typically of 10%.  However, margins in excess 
of 30% were required for product and business sustainability (SBU4).  The challenge 
for the COSBU was to select product opportunities that could be successfully 
transitioned from the prototype stage into mature products with well-defined routes to 
attractive markets.  The COSBU leadership team recognised that “crossing the 
chasm” was difficult and usually required a strong market pull.  Hence, a key success 
factor was a greater focus on an outside-in approach to understanding its customers.  
To solve this challenge the COSBU developed a series of key themes within which it 
categorised new product ideas and only funded one or two projects within each theme 
(SBU8).  
 
The need to prioritise financial and intellectual 
resources to efficiently manage product ideas was 
a major challenge so the COSBU implemented a structured framework based on 
Cooper’s Stage Gate process (Cooper 2002) (SBU4).  By establishing objective 
criteria on which go/kill decisions in the stage gate process could be made, the 
COSBU improved the quality and timeliness of decisions, improved prioritisation 
within the Product Portfolio and managed resource allocation more efficiently.  The 
General Manager stressed the importance of the process as follows: 
The lesson for us has been to try and drown those puppies that don’t stack up 
in the early stages of the business case, and focus on just a few key products 
in the pipeline.  Initially, we tried to do too many things at once, and ended up 
starving a bunch of puppies to death over a long period of time (SBU1). 
 
4.4.3.4 Enhancing the Innovation Culture 
COSBU management was committed to providing 
a challenging innovative work environment to the extent that “if we don’t give you 
what we say we’re going to give you then you come and kick us in the head and tell 
us we’re not doing it...That’s where we can differentiate as an employer because you 
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work on really interesting innovative jobs” (SBU1).  The COSBU’s recruitment 
policies also reinforced the employee’s desire to solve difficult problems with 
recruitment targeted at “the top 10% of graduates – very bright and highly motivated 
- who are really passionate about technology”.  So over a beer or coffee “the ideas 
tend to get the better of them and they start to run away with themselves and get 
enthusiastic and imaginative.  That sort of culture breeds ideas so the collegiate 
environment helps the idea generation process” (SBU7). 
 
The COSBU had a culture amendable to learning 
through its “open-mindedness” and its collegiate 
culture (characterised by egalitarian knowledge sharing and problem solving around 
the beer fridge).  Unlearning was also implicit in some of the structural changes 
within the COSBU.  With path dependent knowledge largely relating to the 
COSBU’s interaction with the technical projects for the GHLSS, there was an 
imperative to develop new learning routines for engaging with commercial customers 
and the sale of technology products and solutions. 
 
The responsible risk seeking propensity was 
balanced by the acceptance of failure.  The General 
Manager said, “You’ve got to just push the 
boundaries and by pushing the boundaries you will at times fail” (SBU1).  His role 
was to create the “environment to allow people to feel comfortable about failing … 
and giving them the framework in which to fail comfortably and feel that that’s not 
career limiting for them”.  By providing this psychological safety, a no blame culture 
was promoted with a focus on “failing forward” - learning from the failure, analysing 
why it went wrong and sharing the lessons (SBU1). 
4.4.4 Conclusion 
The changing focus of the GHLSS in engaging overseas prime contractors rather than 
local system and technology integrators resulted in a significant loss of revenue for 
the COSBU.  While its path dependent success could have limited its vision, 
management recognised the importance of not being constrained by its history.  Like 
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the COFBU’s OIC, this OIC had three preconditions - strategic entrepreneurship, 
innovation learning capability, alliance building capability - which emerged from the 
case analysis of the COSBU.  These are depicted in Figure 4.7 together with their 
underpinning constructs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7  COSBU Preconditions and their Underpinning Constructs 
 
The case analysis identified the pivotal role of strategic entrepreneurship through the 
COSBU management’s orchestration and co-alignment of assets and resources to 
meet its changing environment.  An essential element of its transformation was the 
purposeful transition from entrepreneurial adhocracy to a strategic entrepreneurship 
which added discipline, structure and focus.  Strategic entrepreneurship established 
the critical role in successful innovation of systematic approaches to capturing and 
synthesising knowledge generated internally and through alliance partners 
(innovation learning capability, alliance building capability and systematic 
innovation).  Through proactive leadership, the COSBU introduced an outside-in 
approach by leveraging and building social capital and forming the right relationships 
with external partners who could enhance the quality and relevance of the ideas 
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submitted to its ideation process (alliance building capability and innovation 
absorptive capacity).  This provided a continuing stimulus for innovation.   
 
These preconditions were complemented by four components - innovation absorptive 
capacity, business-wide strategic innovation, systematic innovation and innovation 
culture – which are depicted in Figure 4.8 together with their supporting constructs.  
The COSBU’s goal to acquire complementary knowledge and innovation experience 
from external knowledge providers and to exploit that knowledge to commercial 
advantage, stimulated the development of changes to the business unit’s innovation 
learning capability, alliance building capability and innovation absorptive capacity.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8  Organisational Innovation Capability Framework as derived from 
the Second Case Analysis 
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and widespread changes in innovation processes and routines to add structure and 
discipline (Entrepreneurial discipline and intentionality).  All of these management 
decisions were underpinned by the COSBU’s collegiate culture, and the willingness 
of the staff to solve difficult problems and to challenge the status quo.  The dynamism 
of these capabilities is evidenced through the continual learning and change in the 
processes, behaviours and structures that defined them. 
 
Like the COFBU, the relationship between the alliance building capability and 
innovation absorptive capacity was readily apparent as the COSBU’s strategy 
involved a high level of proactive engagement with external knowledge providers and 
partners.  The strong emphasis upon generative learning (stemming from the 
collegiate culture and willingness to challenge the status quo) provided the basis for 
continuous learning and the renewal of innovation infrastructure and business 
processes (business-wide strategic innovation and systematic innovation) to build 
congruence and complementarities among and between those processes. 
4.5 The Third Business Unit (COTBU) 
4.5.1 Introduction 
The Third Business Unit (COTBU) was established in 2002 when the CO leveraged 
the resources of the COSBU and established a business unit to commercialise a suite 
of IT security products based on intellectual property developed by the COSBU for 
the RO.  The resources transferred to the COSBU included the IT security product 
suite, GHLSS brand, intellectual property, a key technical security researcher and the 
ability to leverage the reputation, alliances and relationships of the COSBU and the 
CO. 
 
The COTBU claimed to be a world leader in the provision of secure information 
management solutions to both government and private enterprise clients.  Its products 
facilitated the secure transfer of information between separated IT networks of 
different classifications whilst maintaining the integrity and availability of both the 
network and the information transferred.  A critical element of the value proposition 
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• Innovation culture (Negative) – 
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was that the product suite was independently certified through a costly and detailed 
examination of its security features to ensure that it met the claims of the vendor.   
 
The COSBU had developed the intellectual property and secured the early sales.  
When the COTBU was established there was resentment even though the COSBU 
was contracted to continue the development of the product suite.  The relationship 
between the COSBU and the COTBU was not a normal commercial relationship 
(described as “a working relationship”) (TBU4) as the business units in the CO were 
organisational silos with little co-operation or knowledge sharing between them.  
Even though the COTBU was the COSBU’s customer, it had little influence on the 
product development timetable as the COSBU had limited time for non-scheduled 
enhancements or, when time was available, it was generally some time in the distant 
future (TBU2).  Because of its previous project focus, the COSBU also had limited 
understanding of commercial customer needs or time priorities and so were unwilling 
to change schedules to reflect customer imperatives (TBU4). 
 
The silo mentality was also evident between 
functions in the COTBU.  Despite its small size most 
discussions took place within the specialised 
functional groups.  The COTBU culture, which still existed to a degree, “suggests 
that people had defined roles and job descriptions and if innovation was not part of 
your job description then you were not part of the innovation process.  It’s related to 
knowledge and who perceives they have the actual knowledge or access to the 
knowledge in the environment” (TBU4).  Those at lower levels within the firm who 
worked in isolation from customers had ideas about product innovation, but had not 
been empowered to share their ideas (TBU4). 
 
Unlike the COFBU and COSBU, which were the outcome of the CO’s acquisition 
capabilities, the COTBU was formed as a stand-alone businesses unit.  In contrast to 
those business units, which tendered for major high value GHLSS infrastructure 
projects, the COTBU sold a product suite in the commercial market as well as the 
GHLSS.  While it had established customers in the GHLSS, the COTBU’s goal was 
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(Negative) -  Generative learning, 
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to drive sales in the Australian CHLSS and in overseas commercial and GHLSS 
markets, particularly the United States.  While the COFBU and the COSBU brought 
with them the paths, positions and processes of their predecessors, the COTBU 
followed the paths of its parent.  Accordingly, this case differs from those of the 
COFBU and COSBU and provides a contrasting negative case and perspective of the 
formation of an OIC.  
 
The CO’s decision making and problem solving frameworks were developed for high 
value long term GHLSS projects and were inappropriate for the dynamic 
environment of commercial markets.  In addition, while the COTBU and COSBU 
adapted to a rapidly changing external environment and developed dynamic 
capabilities which enhanced their innovation capability, the COTBU was 
unsuccessful in its entrance into the CHLSS market in Australia and in its expansion 
efforts (TBU1). 
4.5.2 Developing a New Business 
Having a ten year exclusive license of the IT 
security product suite (initial license was granted to 
the original firm in the mid 1990’s), and after successful initial sales to a select part 
of the GHLSS by the COSBU, the CO considered other sales opportunities within 
Australia and across the globe.  It commissioned a consultant to examine market 
opportunities for the IT security product suite and also market research from a 
leading IT research organisation.  On the basis of this research, which it accepted 
without questioning the assumptions upon which it was based, the CO decided to 
target other participants in the GHLSS as well as the CHLSS (TBU5). 
 
As the technology was unique the COTBU had first mover advantage with high 
barriers to entry.  The major challenge in making sales to the CHLSS was that the 
products were based on an IT security architecture that was rarely found outside the 
GHLSS.  While the architecture offered much greater security there was a significant 
trade off in terms of accessibility and flexibility.  Accordingly, a large part of the “go 
to market” effort was directed at customer education as failure to develop broad 
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market acceptance would limit product uptake and, therefore, the success of the 
COTBU (COTBU Five Year Strategic Plan, 2002/2003). 
 
The new paths developed by the COTBU were highly divergent from the paths of the 
CO in the following ways: 
• Solution Sale: Firstly, in the CHLSS the COTBU would be selling an IT 
security solution to satisfy an undefined and often unarticulated client need 
where in GHLSS there was a specific need defined in detail through the 
tender process; 
• Entering New Markets: Secondly, the CO and COSBU had been engaging in 
known and familiar GHLSS markets where now the COTBU would be 
competing in unknown and unfamiliar markets in Australia (CHLSS) and 
internationally (CHLSS and GHLSS), either directly or through unfamiliar 
channels. 
• Managing Distributors and Value Added Resellers: Thirdly, the CO 
generally secured projects by a tender process with a known customer and 
specified deliverables.  When successful the CO became the prime contractor 
managing a large long-term, high value, Government infrastructure project 
controlled by project managers with an engineering and technical orientation.  
The sale of the IT security product suite involved the sale of product, in large 
quantities but at a fraction of the price of a major GHLSS project, on a 
continuing basis either directly to the GHLSS or indirectly through 
distributors and value added resellers to the GHLSS or the CHLSS. 
 
The Solution Sale in Commercial Markets 
To demonstrate the attractiveness of the new market for value added resellers, the 
COTBU needed to engage directly with commercial buyers whose buying 
propensities were largely unknown.  Even though the US GHLSS market was similar 
to the COTBU’s Australian market, it was more complex, highly parochical and wary 
of new vendors.  In competing in the CHLSS, the COTBU adopted a solutions-based 
approach to satisfy an undefined client need.  For the COTBU, this required the 
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development of a level of customer intimacy to which it was unaccustomed and for 
which it was ill-equipped.   
 
The COTBU benefited from the reputation of the 
CO and the COSBU as major Australian GHLSS 
contractors and the strength of their relationship with the RO.  However, while the 
CO brand was strong in Australian Government procurement its brand strength did 
not transfer to commercial IT markets.  To enhance its selling capability to industry 
sectors in the CHLSS, business development managers were hired to target specific 
commercial sectors (utilities, health, banking and finance) that were considered to be 
more susceptible to education about the increasing importance of IT and information 
security.  Hiring industry specialists was designed to increase understanding of 
commercial customer product selection drivers. 
 
Entering New Markets and Managing Distributors and Value Added Resellers 
The COTBU was committed to developing its capability to enter new markets both in 
Australia (the CHLSS market) and overseas (the CHLSS and GHLSS markets).  The 
initial demonstrable market was anticipated to be from the GHLSS which was 
familiar with the network-separation architecture.  The largest of these targets was the 
US GHLSS, followed by GHLSS agencies in the UK, Canada and other NATO 
countries, which had formal certification requirements for IT products connected to 
government networks (COTBU Five Year Strategic Plan for 2002/2003).  
 
The major challenge for the COTBU was that the product suite was in a new product 
category as everybody “trusted their operating system” and there were insufficient 
incidents to warrant commercial organisations increasing the level of security 
(TBU5).  The development of the end user market was a necessary condition to 
stimulate a distributor and Value Added Resellers (VARs) interest as they would 
provide access to high volume commercial markets as they had strong customer 
connections.  Tapping into this network was intended to give the COTBU a multiplier 
effect providing potentially hundreds of front line sales staff marketing the IT 
security product suite.  However, the COTBU had little experience in engaging with 
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these top tier distributors as a supplier and little understanding of its target markets.  
As a consequence, the COTBU sought to enhance its alliance management capability 
and by extending its existing partner learning capabilities into new areas.  By 
developing these capabilities it hoped to improve its understanding of customer needs 
and drivers (COTBU Five Year Strategic Plan for 2002/2003). 
4.5.3 The Unsuccessful Business Outcome 
The COTBU was largely unsuccessful in its 
attempts to enter the commercial market in 
Australia and the GHLSS markets in the US and UK.  While the COTBU identified 
reasons for the failure as the absence of the mainstream adoption of the separated 
networks methodology, the lack of global distributions channels in place and the 
inability to achieve commercial sales (COTBU Five Year Strategic Plan, 2002/2003), 
the lack of success was attributed by interviewees to its failure to move from its 
engineering focus, its failure to understand customer drivers and failure to adapt its 
value proposition to reflect customer needs (TBU1, TBU3). 
 
In its first two years commercial sales were low 
with three of the four Australian based CHLSS 
business development managers failing to make a sale.  “(T)he appropriate market 
research of the customer base hadn’t been done to a degree and a level that was 
required” (TBU1) and “we didn’t study or understand the market enough” (TBU3).  
While product trials were offered to customers there “have been times where we’ve 
thrown the (IT security product suite) ‘over the fence’ to the customer and said, ‘You 
guys test it and come back to us with a purchase order’” (TBU2). 
 
The COTBU failed to learn from its lack of success 
due to the technically oriented information barriers 
it unconsciously held.  As one interviewee expressed it, “failure has been accepted for 
a long time.  We are one big failure or one succession of failures” (TBU3).  The 
reliance on its parent’s knowledge caused the COTBU to adopt a product push focus 
with emphasis on the technical merits of the product rather than looking at value and 
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benefits from a customer’s perspective.  The limited absorptive capacity and 
information barriers led to the misguided assumption that “if we build a better IT 
security product suite the world will come knocking at our door and that we would 
sell thousands of seats to organisations such as Telstra” (TBU3). 
 
These information barriers led to the COTBU’s 
failure to assimilate customer feedback and 
marketing practice which would have guided 
customer engagement.  The General Manager said, “There weren’t major strategic 
changes.  There were more subtle incremental changes which eventually led to 
abandoning the approach to the commercial market.  I don’t think there was one 
major strategic change” (TBU1). 
4.5.4 Capability Life Cycle 
An example of the capability development life cycle for the COTBU is depicted in 
Figure 4.9 below.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9  Capability Life Cycles within COTBU  
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The COTBU projected the trajectory of the change capability it was building to 
facilitate its entrance into the CHLSS (depicted by the dotted line AB).  However, its 
trajectory (AC) was inhibited by the COTBU’s path dependence and lack of 
managerial perception, and so the capability failed to reach the projected level.  With 
its lack of success, the change in management and the realisation of the inadequacy of 
its capabilities the COTBU renewed its strategies by implementing new capability 
initiatives resulting in a proposed new trajectory of CD. 
4.5.5 Capability Renewal 
After several years and a change in senior management the failure to achieve success 
in the commercial market place forced the COTBU to adopt new strategies and 
develop new capabilities. 
 
The Boundary Spanning Approach 
In 2006 the Australian Region of the COTBU 
appointed a technical manager (“the new 
manager”) from the GHLSS.  He brought new 
knowledge and contacts, and a broader 
understanding of high level security sector 
customer needs.  The manager was experienced in product certification and, more 
importantly the accreditation of systems in which the IT security product suite would 
be embedded, and understood both the engineering and political issues within 
GHLSS. Accordingly, he was “able to build something or conceptualise something 
that he knows is going to address the concerns and issues” in the Australian and 
international GHLSS (TBU1).  From a business perspective he was “imported 
innovation” (TBU3). 
 
The new manager also became a catalyst for 
change: 
I’ve been a change which has made it possible for other changes to take place in 
the organisation.  So any time you get new blood opens up some of the old 
wounds or can of worms with regard to things.  When I come in I’m allowed to 
ask the stupid questions.  I am allowed to ask the “why” question whereas a lot 
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• Organisational learning capability – 
Generative learning, Unlearning 
of people after they’ve been there for a period of time feel that they can no longer 
ask that question (TBU4). 
 
As a result staff “are starting to ask questions about 
why things are occurring…and we’re starting to see 
some major changes over the last six months”, 
particularly with the discussion of innovation more on the agenda than what it had 
been in the past (TBU4).  The COTBU looked to enhance its absorptive capacity by 
scanning within the industry for complementary knowledge and also engaging 
academia in the information security area to understand the latest developments.  The 
appointment of the new manager was also part of the strategy to import new and 
diverse knowledge and to introduce external knowledge and knowledge sources. 
 
The COTBU began to improve its innovation 
process and the way it progressed from ideation to 
business case to product development to product 
commercialisation.  The requirements gathering process was identified as of prime 
importance to ensure product development reflected real customer needs (TBU4).  
Associated with these changes were changes in the innovation ideation process both 
within the COTBU and from external sources (TBU1, TBU5).  These new ideation 
collection routines were implemented to provide a degree of discipline and strategy to 
the ideation process.  While the sources of ideation had been limited to a few 
technical specialists, ideas were now welcomed from all parts of the organisation 
“making sure that it’s all inclusive”.  Some of the best ideas “emerged from people 
who in the past thought that they didn’t have much to add or contribute but they have 
been sitting on a bit of a gem” of an idea.  Tentative steps have been taken to keep up 
to date on current research and development trends in information security (TBU4). 
 
Increased Customer Engagement and Understanding 
Despite the COTBU’s adaptive approach to 
learning, one business development manager 
recognised that “(u)nless you can add value there’s no point in proposing something 
to a customer…”.  He realised that the IT security product suite’s technical merits 
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were the qualifier for consideration by the customer and not the primary determinant 
for purchase and refined the value proposition to focus on business efficiency and 
productivity (TBU3).   
 
Managerial innovation also took place in regard to 
partner identification.  The COTBU had been 
focused primarily on identifying channel partners 
who were suppliers of IT security products.  With a greater understanding of its 
business as a solution provider, the COBTU identified companies that worked in the 
same IT security domain or provided products or services that were complementary 
to its own.  In doing so it gained additional industry knowledge and identified areas 
where it can “get effective multipliers by working together in greater partnership with 
other companies or organisations” (TBU4).  
 
Creating an Innovation Culture 
The new leader of COTBU stated that “The big 
thing is that we’re trying to bring in cultural change.  
Trying to create an environment where, at least, the discussion of innovation is more 
on the agenda than what it has been in the past” (TBU4).  Routines which created this 
environment included more open communication, wider sources of ideation within 
the business unit and new knowledge sharing routines both within and between 
functions (TBU4).  
 
In the COTBU, communication had been along 
functional lines with limited communication between 
groups either locally or regionally.  With the focus on innovation the technical group 
gained a greater appreciation of its role as an internal service provider to the sales 
group.  New innovation knowledge sharing routines were developed which facilitated 
sharing of details of its technical projects and product enhancements.  This insight 
provided the sales group with an understanding of the impact of project schedule 
changes and enabled them to prioritise needs more effectively (TBU4). 
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Through these new routines the culture began to 
change.  “There’s an atmosphere that things are happening; things are moving 
forward.  There’s this general feeling that the openness of sharing ideas from all parts 
of the organisation is less of a problem that what it was in the past…” (TBU4).  The 
new openness and flexibility provided better job satisfaction as the engineers feel 
good about themselves as they have a direct influence on the success of the company 
and this gives them the motivation to be more innovative (TBU2). 
4.5.6 The Development of the OIC Preconditions 
The COTBU case study provided little evidence of the two preconditions 
(entrepreneurial intensity and organisational learning capability) derived from the 
literature.  While the formation of the COTBU was in itself an act of 
entrepreneurship, little entrepreneurship was demonstrated thereafter.  The COTBU’s 
leadership was not proactive and failed to promote innovation as a corporate-wide 
task.  As a result “the culture wasn’t one which actively promoted an environment 
where innovation could come from anywhere” (TBU4). 
 
The COTBU had no innovation strategy.  
Innovation was narrowly defined and largely 
limited to incremental product innovation: “We are 
reactive.  Everything we’ve done has been 
incremental.  There have been no giant leaps forward” (TBU2).  Apart from technical 
innovation directly pertaining to the IT security product suite, innovation routines 
were ad hoc with innovation “primarily left up to the individual” who had to sell the 
idea themselves, establish a business plan, and justify the concept before they could 
move the idea forward (TBU1, TBU5).  There was a “short term business 
orientation” focused on the “here and now” (TBU3).   
 
Within the COTBU there was no formal process for 
gathering ideas from staff, customers or 
competitors.  Ideation was ad hoc and serendipitous: “We don’t go and solicit ideas 
but sometimes the sales force comes back with suggestions about ways to improve 
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• Organisational learning capability 
(Negative), Unlearning, Adaptive 
learning 
the products” (TBU3).  Customers, of their own initiative, generated many of the new 
ideas and identified “different things that we haven’t thought of applying our product 
to” and, in these cases, the COTBU looked at ways to build a solution around its 
products to meet those requirements (TBU2). 
 
The COTBU’s learning was adaptive and, generally 
in response to a business crisis.  The COTBU, like 
the CO, had a highly technical focus.  While market research was gathered, it was 
conducted without reference to commercial customers or their buying propensities.  
The COFBU “had a 'rose colored glasses' culture at the time” and was “committed to 
innovation but not committed to adding value”.  The COTBU management assumed 
that the fledgling technology from the GHLSS would be rapidly adopted in the 
commercial world but had little understanding of commercial customers (TBU3). 
 
Adaptive learning was applied consistently when generative learning and unlearning 
were required to overcome deeply ingrained assumptions, information filters, and 
problem solving strategies that made up its largely inherited world view.  
Accordingly, due to the absence of renewal in behaviours and routines, no 
organisational learning capability could be identified in the case study.  Despite its 
continued lack of sales and innovation success, it failed for several years to identify 
the need for change and, consequently, failed to formulate a response or implement 
alternative courses of action.  Its learning approach can best be characterised as crisis 
reactive adaptive learning. 
 
The absence of effective preconditions demonstrates that the innovation capability 
within the COTBU was not dynamic and was merely a function of a new product 
development process and individual innovation champions.  This case demonstrates 
that the preconditions derived from the literature are critical to building an 
organisation-wide innovation capability where emphasis is placed on continued 
renewal of the capability through firm-wide commitment to innovation and ensuring 
that the capability is constantly renewed to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness 
of its stakeholder perspective and the commitment of staff to innovation. 
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4.5.7 Developing the Dimensions of the OIC 
The OIC experience of the COTBU can be segmented into the period before and after 
the appointment of the new manager7.  Before the appointment, the COTBU business 
activities, particularly those which focused on the CHLSS, were unsuccessful due to 
the absence of the preconditions identified in the literature.  The transition from the 
GHLSS to the CHLSS required the COTBU to understand the significant differences 
between these markets, the nature of the distribution channels to reach the CHLSS 
and the difference between a project and a solutions market.  Its product-push focus 
promoted the technical merits of its product suite without regard to the customer’s 
needs or it’s entrenched IT security platforms and supplier relationships.  As a result 
of the absence of a generative learning approach and the bounded rationality of the 
management of the COFBU and CO, the COFBU had a low innovation intensity 
(limited primarily to adaptive technical innovation), limited absorptive capacity and 
innovation leadership. 
 
Around the time of the appointment of the new manager the COTBU attempted to 
develop new capabilities.  The employment of this manager, with new synergised 
customer and technical knowledge and broad business and technical contacts, brought 
learning, relationships and experience to the COTBU and facilitated organisational 
change and innovation.  His experience enabled the COTBU to achieve broader and 
proactive engagement with customers to better define their solution requirements. 
 
Change began to occur as a result of this appointment with increased innovation 
leadership, knowledge sharing and collaboration.  The framework which emerged 
from this case study after the appointment of the new manager is depicted in Figure 
4.10 below. 
 
The preconditions and components of the OIC had begun to emerge at the time of the 
research but had not reached any degree of maturity.  Limited evidence was provided 
                                                 
 
7 It is recognised that the catalyst for change is the result of several factors.  The selection of the appointment of 
the manager has been selected as a major trigger for change due to the multiple impacts that his appointment had 
upon the COTBU. 
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in terms of its effective implementation.  While other components of an OIC were 
present in the case study they did not have sufficient strength, intensity or frequency 
to warrant inclusion in the COTBU OIC framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10  Organisational Innovation Capability Framework as derived from 
the Third Case Analysis 
4.5.8 Conclusion 
While the COFBU and COSBU provided different but interrelated OIC frameworks, 
the COTBU provided a compelling negative case.  The absence of any definitive 
evidence to support the presence of the two preconditions identified in the literature, 
entrepreneurial intensity and organisational learning capability, limited the business 
unit’s ability to build an OIC.  The absence of generative learning enabled the 
COTBU’s inherited innovation barriers to remain unchallenged. 
 
Following the appointment of the new manager, the COTBU attempted to develop 
new capabilities to address its poor performance.  New innovation behaviours began 
to appear (collaboration, innovation leadership, a broader view of organisational 
innovation) and, as a result, a third OIC model began to emerge. 
4.6 The Cross-Case Comparison 
4.6.1 Introduction 
The previous sections of this Chapter focused on the within-case analysis of three 
business units within the CO.  The focus of this section will be a cross-case analysis 
between the three business units to identify similarities and differences in the OIC 
Preconditions OIC Components 
Organisational innovation 
intensity  
(Product Focus) 
Crisis reactive adaptive 
learning 
 
Innovation leadership  
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frameworks.  As demonstrated already in this Chapter, the three business units 
inherited path dependencies from the CO.  For the COFBU and COSBU, these 
dependencies were blended with those inherited from their predecessor organisations. 
 
An essential element of the case comparison is the emphasis on how the management 
of each business unit recognised the existence and impact of path dependent 
behaviours and took steps to counter the constraints of those dependencies and build 
an OIC to achieve environmental fitness with their new business environment.  The 
cross-case analysis reveals the key triggers of change within each business unit and 
the leadership and process dimensions which were preconditions for the change 
within the business unit.  Following this analysis, the culture change to support the 
new capabilities is identified together with the key components of the OIC framework 
which emerged from the case analysis. 
4.6.2 Triggers of Change 
The COFBU and COSBU were both faced with the possibility of an exogenous shock 
– the decline in income as their principal client, the GHLSS, transferred all (in the 
case of the COFBU) or part (for the COSBU) of its contracts to overseas suppliers.  
For the COFBU, the move to purchase aircraft from overseas meant it would be 
unlikely to survive without changing its business model and operating routines as 
these routines would become core rigidities.  While the situation for the COSBU was 
not as severe, it was likely that it would lose significant revenue with the GHLSS 
largely contracting with overseas prime contractors. 
 
The COFBU and COSBU management both recognised that they were not trapped by 
their history and that they could shape their businesses through strategic renewal.  For 
the COFBU the market was more dynamic than for the COSBU and COTBU with the 
outcome of the GHLSS changes predictable in terms of its impact of revenue but 
unpredictable in regard to the likely or most profitable alternative revenue 
opportunities available. 
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Unlike the COFBU and COSBU, the COTBU was a new business unit.  Despite its 
lack of experience in the sale of products and in dealing with commercial firms, the 
COTBU anticipated high demand based on the world-leading technical merits of its 
product suite.  The COTBU encountered a relatively stable environment with a 
limited degree of dynamism.  The market boundaries and key players (customers, 
competitors) as well as the accepted IT security systems and routines were well 
defined.  Changes to systems and routines were slow as in IT security first mover 
advantage was not considered desirable.  However, the COTBU’s product suite was a 
disruptive technology.  While this could have been a significant trigger of change for 
the COTBU, its management failed to perceive the implications of the disruption.  Its 
lack of success in the CHLSS (both in Australia and the US) and the slowness of its 
adoption in the US GHLSS ultimately provided the trigger for change.  
4.6.3 Higher Order Capability Building as Preconditions of Change 
The development of higher order capabilities through which a OIC could function 
was critical for all three business units as they were each entering new markets.  In 
the cross-case analysis, the data demonstrated that three higher order capabilities 
were important as preconditions to the effective operation of an OIC: the 
development of a strategic entrepreneurial capability, an organisational learning 
capability and a strategic alliance capability.  The absence of these preconditions in 
the third case prohibited the development of an OIC beyond isolated actions. 
4.6.3.1 Building a Strategic Entrepreneurship Capability 
When the COFBU and COSBU were confronted with a threat to their survival, 
management scanned their respective environments to identify the capabilities 
required to achieve environmental fitness.  The COFBU and COSBU were intentional 
in their commitment to developing an operation-wide entrepreneurial business unit 
through strategic renewal.  They were proactive in risk taking and in disciplined and 
informed exploration and both had strong senior management commitment to and 
visible support for innovation.  While the COSBU’s business model transformation 
was incremental, the transformation for the COFBU was related to but beyond its 
existing suite of capabilities. 
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The COSBU demonstrated its entrepreneurship through its proactive transformation 
from an enterprise with one GHLSS client to a business which was diversifying its 
reach both in terms of clients and technologies.  A key element of its transformation 
was the transition from the entrepreneurial adhocracy of the original firm to strategic 
entrepreneurship, which added discipline, structure and strategic focus and ensured 
that innovation was commercialised “within the context of the market” (SBU3).  The 
COSBU management also demonstrated a strong and consistent commitment to 
innovation.  It developed a Strategic Technology Roadmap which provided a shared 
understanding of its increased focus on business and customer outcomes and enabled 
the COSBU to determine what products, solutions and capabilities to develop and 
which projects to prioritise in the tender process. 
 
The strength of strategic entrepreneurship in the COSBU can be attributed to the 
shared entrepreneurial vision inherited from the original firm as well as the continued 
articulation of that vision and the characterisation of innovation failure as “failing 
forward”.  The latter approach is consistent with Hamel and Prahalad’s “mandate to 
learn when inevitable setbacks occur” (1991) and reinforces the relationship between 
strategic entrepreneurship and organisational learning. 
 
While entrepreneurship per se was not mentioned in the case analysis of the COFBU, 
the approach of management in anticipating the exogenous shock and in taking 
decisive, yet risky and measured, steps to preempt its impact is entrepreneurial in 
nature.  To achieve its commercial and results-oriented emphasis, the COFBU 
focused on internal and external boundary spanning behaviours.  There was 
recognition within the COFBU that silo thinking was a major problem in the CO and 
between and within the business units (FBU6).  Through proactive leadership the 
COFBU conducted a global search and identified a new business model outside of its 
traditional learning boundary.  It developed a considered strategy to become the 
leader in through-life support for the Australian GHLSS aerospace industry.  In this 
major shift, the COFBU recognised that despite the risk of entering what was for it an 
untested and untried business, new strategic alliances would provide a mechanism for 
quickly achieving competitive advantage through acquiring new capabilities. 
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By contrast with its peers, the COTBU was limited by the technical orientation of the 
CO.  The COTBU reflected the view of its parent organisation with innovation 
purportedly being important but, with little support from senior management, there 
was a mismatch between the espoused theory and theory in use.  Innovation was 
generated by individual action or occurred as result of customer initiative.  The 
organisational myopic focus was on the technical merits of the product (TBU3).  
Functional and disciplinary separation was evident.  Management reinforced, rather 
than challenged existing, entrenched mental models which were a barrier to 
knowledge acquisition and sharing, proactive risk taking and open communication 
(TBU4). 
 
Where there was a strong (COSBU) or a moderate/strong (COFBU) level of strategic 
entrepreneurship, the dynamic components of the OIC were generally of comparative 
strength.  Similarly, the COTBU, with no strategic entrepreneurship, provided an 
example of a negative case.  The weakness of the intensity resulted in the COTBU’s 
innovation activities being ad hoc.  Its strong technical orientation and associated 
information barriers ensured that any learning was adaptive.  The need for significant 
marketing innovation, because of its failed sales strategies, was not recognised.  The 
dynamic components of the OIC were largely non-existent or, where they existed, 
were weak or ineffective. 
4.6.3.2 Building a Learning Capability 
Organisational learning capability was common to the OICs of the COFBU and 
COSBU.  The COSBU, because of the greater maturity of its business, focused its 
organisational learning on innovation learning while for the COFBU organisational 
learning was broader because of the novelty of its business.  The framework for 
building the organisational learning capability differed between the COFBU and 
COSBU.  While the COFBU transformed its learning capability through a change in 
organisational structure, the COSBU used its collegiate culture and recruitment 
strategy as the foundation for innovation learning. 
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The COSBU’s culture was a learning culture characterised by its “open-mindedness”, 
its appreciation of the importance of “failing forward”, and its willingness to 
challenge the status quo.  It also recognised that failure to refresh its existing 
knowledge base could result in organisational insularity and so it developed new 
learning routines for engaging with commercial customers and for the sale of 
technology products and solutions.  This business focused learning arose from the 
lessons learned from previous failures in developing “bleeding edge” technologies 
which were often innovative for the sake of it (SBU3, SBU7).  The learning culture 
was also reinforced by formal and informal learning routines to facilitate the 
socialisation, absorption and integration of the acquired knowledge (SBU1, SBU3, 
SBU5, SBU6) so that it could be applied and implemented in new projects, and 
consequently facilitate the commercialisation of its innovation. 
 
The COFBU’s learning focus was on boundary spanning behaviour across silos, 
projects and teams, between CO business units and complementary entities external to 
the organisation.  Its matrix approach provided the overlap between projects and 
domains to facilitate interaction, knowledge sharing and learning between individuals 
or groups in a strategic and disciplined manner (FBU2).  This restructure leveraged 
the use of organisational memory and experience pertaining to innovation, and 
provided access to complementary knowledge from customers, partners and research 
organisations.  This increased its absorptive capacity and improved the efficiency of 
knowledge sharing and acquisition, and utilisation as well as encouraged the sharing 
of relationships and insights. 
 
While the COFBU and COSBU were committed to advancing their learning 
capability through a generative approach, the COTBU’s organisational learning 
culture was adaptive and characterised by a resistance to unlearn its embedded 
technical orientation or to challenge the mental models which constrained its business 
approach.  It was not until the new technical manager was appointed that it began to 
integrate new customer specific knowledge and to share that knowledge across the 
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organisation with the introduction of the new manager improving the capabilities of 
all staff (Penrose 1995, p. 47). 
 
The knowledge-questioning values in relation to the market, while of critical 
importance to the business units, were only part of the learning that was required 
(Slater and Narver 1995, p. 63).  Accordingly, this position is consistent with the 
view that market-focused learning is a subset of the overall learning activity 
(Weerawardena 2003, p.411; Slater and Narver 1995, p. 67) and that “a superior 
learning environment will leverage the use of all resources” (Baker and Sinkula 1999, 
p. 411).  In these case studies, the evidence supports the view that the priority placed 
on a market perspective and its use in the strategic planning process was a function of 
the strategic entrepreneurship of the business unit rather than a lower order market 
orientation (see Baker and Sinkula 1999, p. 412; Slater and Narver 1995, p. 63). 
4.6.3.3 Developing an Alliance Building Capability 
An alliance building capability was essential to the rapid acquisition and integration of 
knowledge.  Alliance building was the foundation of the COFBU’s business model 
transformation as it placed the COFBU on a related, although divergent learning, track 
aimed at increasing its knowledge breadth.  This higher level of alliance learning was 
essential for the COFBU because an incremental variation to its business model or 
simply increasing its knowledge depth would not have been sufficient for its survival.   
 
Once the COFBU’s new business model had been implemented, the COFBU’s 
alliance building focus was on increasing the depth of its knowledge base.  It 
developed inter-organisation routines to facilitate alliance-based knowledge sharing 
and collaboration based on common objectives.  It expanded its alliance building 
capability by establishing multiple relationships within the RO to gain broader 
insights into customer needs. 
 
While the COTBU made attempts to establish meaningful external alliances with 
prospective channel partners when it first entered the CHLSS, its lack of alliance 
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development skills and experience in both the GHLSS and CHLSS, and its adaptive 
learning approach, meant the COTBU failed to understand the best ways to establish 
meaningful alliances with Tier 1 distributors both in Australia and in its key target 
market. 
4.6.4 Changing Culture to support New Capabilities 
4.6.4.1 Changing Mental Models 
The COFBU’s objective was stated emphatically by the General Manager: “(w)e 
don’t accept the status quo.  We have got to have a paradigm change” (FBU4).  The 
COSBU’s move to strategic entrepreneurship ensured that the new behaviour was 
entrenched in its innovation infrastructure and routines.  Sharing across boundaries 
ensured that information was widely utilised and applied in the product development 
process.  While both the COFBU and COSBU sought to move from the CO’s mental 
models through cultural change (acceptance of failure, knowledge sharing, and 
collaboration) and proactive strategic entrepreneurial leadership, they did so in 
different ways.  The COSBU’s mental models were continuously scrutinised as a 
consequence of hiring staff that challenged the status quo and were passionate about 
solving difficult problems.  While the COFBU aimed to achieve a similar outcome, 
its focus was on implementing a matrix structure to facilitate knowledge 
development, sharing and utilisation in and across functions, projects and domains. 
 
The mental models of the COTBU reflected those of its parent.  As the COTBU had 
an adaptive learning orientation its mental models remained unchanged and 
unchallenged.  This led to its failure to effectively assimilate customer feedback or 
explore alternative marketing strategies.   
4.6.4.2 Changing Attitude to Risk 
The CO had a “risk averse”, narrowly defined customer culture, characterised by 
defensive reasoning, low levels of freedom of choice and when things went wrong, 
the “blame game” with “(h)uge recriminations, beating of chests” (FBU2/FBU5).  
This culture was evident in the COFBU and the COTBU (FBU5/TBU4) and it 
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fostered conservative, compliant, risk averse behaviour which discouraged innovation 
within the CO and within and between business units. 
 
The COFBU’s blame culture originated from in its predecessors and was reinforced 
when it was acquired by the CO.  However, its management was aware of the impact 
of the “blame game” upon innovation, and so there was, at the time of the change in 
business model, a focus on reducing blame and increasing personal responsibility and 
accountability (FBU1, FBU5).  This change was reinforced by the introduction of a 
participative performance-based culture with acceptance of failure as integral to 
innovation. 
 
The COSBU’s risk taking propensity was part of the entrepreneurial ethos of the 
original firm where the General Manager was a risk taker and encouraged responsible 
personal initiative (SBU6).  While the COSBU had, amongst the CO business units, a 
relatively high risk taking propensity, its level of risk taking was lower than within 
the original firm as its behaviour was modified by the risk averseness, blame culture 
and the organisational impediments to personal initiative of the CO (SBU7). 
 
While there was no discussion in regard to risk by any of the COTBU interviewees 
the entrance into the CHLSS market in Australia and the US involved risk-taking 
behaviour.  However, the high level security nature of the product and the high cost 
involved in making any changes meant that risk taking behaviour was not encouraged 
or supported. 
4.6.4.3 Culture Change Drivers 
The COFBU and COSBU were committed to culture change to facilitate their 
transition to the new competitive environment although the degree of change required 
varied.  For the COFBU, its generative approach reflected management’s desire to 
shift from the entrenched entitlement mentality to a results-oriented culture.  It sought 
to improve employee engagement in the belief that engaged employees were more 
committed, involved and enthusiastic about their roles.  This focus on personal 
performance, responsibility and accountability resulted in a significant increase in 
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engagement in 18 months (FBU4).  The COSBU had an engaged workforce with an 
engagement score double that of the COFBU, so its approach was adaptive.  It sought 
to build on its collegiate culture by increasing the systematisation of its innovation 
process but without losing the spontaneity and willingness to challenge of its staff. 
 
Initially, the COTBU’s management was unaware of its cultural impediments to 
innovation.  It was not until there had been a continued lack of success in the 
commercial sector that the new technical manager was appointed, and his 
appointment became a catalyst for change (TBU4).  These changes included 
increased collaboration across functions, increased facilitative leadership and the 
encouragement of ideation from all parts of the business unit. 
4.6.5 Innovation Infrastructure and OIC Renewal 
The three business units did not have a defined and documented innovation strategy 
(FBU4, SBU1, TBU1).  However, both the COFBU and COSBU recognised that 
structural change was an important enabler of behavioural and innovation system 
renewal and initiated the appropriate change within their organisations.  The 
difference in approach to innovation infrastructure renewal should also be noted.  
While the COFBU’s focus was on using organisational structure (project and domain 
matrix) to facilitate innovation learning and knowledge sharing, the strategy for the 
COSBU was to establish disciplined innovation processes and an innovation portfolio 
planning approach.  In contrast to the COFBU and COSBU, the COTBU had little 
innovation infrastructure or the capacity to renew its infrastructure.  Innovation, 
where it did occur, was limited to the technical experts.  Its product development 
process was described as “infantile” and it had no formal ideation capture process or 
innovation strategy (TBU4).  As a consequence of its lack of market success, the 
COTBU’s management began to increase knowledge sharing and collaboration 
through increasing interaction between the functions and to develop a more structured 
innovation process. 
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4.6.6 Organisational Innovation Intensity 
The COSBU had a high innovation intensity (called business-wide innovation).  
There was recognition that in order to grow and be competitive, the COSBU needed 
to develop a strong framework of innovation that encompassed “all of its business 
model” and was a “core competency throughout the organisation” (SBU1).  Senior 
management recognised that innovation needed to encompass all the business - 
business processes, financial processes and customer engagement - and took steps to 
ensure that innovation pervaded the way it did business (SBU1).  While ideas were 
sought from trusted external parties, innovation took place primarily within the 
confines of the COSBU. 
 
The COFBU also had high innovation intensity (innovation pervasiveness).  
However, it was not articulated in such a holistic manner as within the COSBU and 
was not supported by the same level of innovation infrastructure.  It adopted CMMI 
as a guide to process improvement across the organisation with the ultimate objective 
to improve business performance.  It had mapped all of the business processes with 
the aim of revising all process, policies and procedures from top to bottom (SBU5).  
In addition, it also ensured that its research and development activities were aligned 
with its business objectives.  The COTBU also introduced new ways to improve 
customer relationships and interactions and this encompassed all aspects of the 
business with “no boundary to it” (FBU2).  The latter term implied an innovation 
expansiveness which extended beyond the firm (FBU4) and this strategic 
entrepreneurship resulted in the development of the through-life support business 
model (FBU4). 
 
The high innovation intensity of the COFBU and COSBU was fuelled by their drive 
for improved commercial outcomes and management’s increased recognition of the 
need for greater customer intimacy and awareness (SBU1, FBU4).  This increased 
awareness was the catalyst for cultural change within the business unit and the high 
level of targeted engagement with customers, complementary partners and research 
organisations to gain a greater understanding of research and development 
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imperatives and market drivers.  This in turn resulted in innovation in business 
processes, customer engagement and idea capture. 
 
Conversely, the CO’s knowledge and resource constrained innovation and myopic 
customer understanding were evident in the COTBU interviews (TBU2, TBU3), and 
frustrated the interviewees.  This resulted in low innovation intensity with innovation 
being reactive, incremental and adaptive, and primarily being limited to technology 
(TBU2).  Any innovation within the COTBU was the result of individual initiative or 
prompted by the customer (TBU4), rather than a firm-wide innovation focus. 
4.6.7 Innovation Absorptive Capacity 
Both of the positive cases were committed to proactively building relationships with 
external parties which could provide accelerated access to complementary 
knowledge.  This knowledge, when combined with the knowledge each held, 
provided a stimulus for innovation and capability development, which in turn, 
provided further impetus for innovation (SBU1, FBU4).  Both business units had 
externally focused innovation learning structures and processes to facilitate the 
development of innovation oriented managerial competencies. 
 
In analysing absorptive capacity within the case studies, depth and breadth 
dimensions were identified.  When new knowledge was added which pertained to the 
firm’s existing knowledge base, it increased the depth of its knowledge and, with this 
increased specialisation, it enhanced the rationalisation, routinisation and efficiency 
of knowledge absorption.  The breadth dimension of absorptive capacity enabled the 
absorption of knowledge from domains which were outside, but related to, the firm’s 
existing knowledge base.  This dimension is of particular relevance to increasing 
knowledge scope as well as to knowledge exploration.  
 
The relevance of analysing absorptive capacity in terms of its depth and breadth is 
that it provides alternative strategies for transforming a firm’s knowledge.  The two 
positive cases support this view as the COFBU significantly increased the breadth of 
its knowledge through the addition of its through-life support capability.  In contrast, 
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the COSBU increased the depth and specialisation of its knowledge, but also slightly 
increased its knowledge breadth through its acquisition of knowledge and experience 
pertaining to the CHLSS.  These innovation knowledge acquisition strategies are 
depicted in Figure 4.11 below.  As the COTBU entered the CHLSS as well as the 
GHLSS in the US and UK, its innovation knowledge acquisition map should have 
been similar in breadth to that of the COFBU and depth to the COSBU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11  Knowledge Acquisition Strategies – Breadth and Depth 
 
While knowledge transformation is important, it is the commercial exploitation of 
that knowledge that can lead to competitive advantage.  “(A)bsorptive capacity refers 
not only to the integration or assimilation of information by an organisation but also 
to the organisation’s ability to exploit it” (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, p. 131). 
 
Both the COFBU and COSBU were committed to increasing the absorptive capacity 
of their external knowledge sources through a process of mutuality and embedded 
resource sharing external collaboration.  The COSBU had regular workshops with the 
RO, for example, a forum on national security where COSBU specialists spent a day 
with their counterparts sharing research on seven subjects and, in the process, 
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also encouraged its staff to participate in both RO and academic knowledge transfer 
through presentations at or participation in conferences and post doctoral seminars 
and, in doing so, it extended its expertise and absorptive capacity (FBU6). 
 
Another strategy for external innovation knowledge acquisition for all three business 
units was the employment of staff that had expertise or experience that the business 
unit lacked.  The employment of the business development manager by the COSBU 
(SBU3) and the new manager employed from the GHLSS who brought with him 
knowledge of IT security product acquisition processes as well as knowledge of 
product certification and accreditation of systems (TBU1, TBU3), provide examples 
of this approach. 
4.7 Core Dimensions of an Innovation Capability: Processes, Skills And 
Integration 
This research examined the development of an OIC within three business units of the 
CO to seek to explain how heterogeneity of innovation resources is developed and 
how firms use resources and capabilities to achieve competitive advantage.   
 
From the case analysis the OIC is represented by the following elements:  
• three preconditions which facilitated development of an organisational 
innovation capability: strategic entrepreneurship, organisational learning 
capability and alliance building capability; 
• A functional innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal component, which 
provided the organisational structure which supported innovation and 
included an innovation management system, innovation experience and 
innovation memory; 
• An integrative innovation absorptive capacity component incorporating 
externally focused innovation learning  structures and processes, embedded 
resource sharing external collaboration, and transformative and exploitative 
learning; 
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• An innovation culture component which included values that support and 
encourage innovation (facilitative leadership, collaboration, and tolerance for 
risk taking and no blame behaviour); 
• An organisational innovation intensity component which incorporated a multi 
innovation focus – product, managerial, process, marketing, and strategic 
innovation. 
The three preconditions and their underpinning constructs are depicted in Figure 4.12 
while the OIC framework components, supporting constructs and linkages are 
presented in Figure 4.13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12  Case-derived Preconditions and their Underpinning Constructs 
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Figure 4.13  Organisational Innovation Capability Framework as derived from 
the Case Analysis 
4.8 Preconditions required to support an OIC 
Weerawardena contends that the firm’s entrepreneurial intensity is the key factor 
determining its capability building activity (2003 p. 410).  The case analysis supports 
this position as where there was either moderate or strong levels of strategic 
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about building system efficiency and effectiveness.  Management sensed, in their 
strategic decision-making, the changing environmental conditions and the need for 
business model revision or overhaul, and proactively and purposefully took measured 
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provided the basis for differentiating these business units from their competitors.  The 
analysis of the COFBU and COSBU case studies also suggests that there was a strong 
correlation between the strength of the strategic entrepreneurship and other 
preconditions and the subsequent development of the four innovation capability 
components.  Conversely, in the negative case, as a consequence of the absence of 
strategic entrepreneurship, there was limited organisational learning and similarly low 
levels of the other OIC dimensions. 
 
Strategic entrepreneurship provided the purpose (intentionality), focus (discipline) 
and impetus from most innovation behaviours and played a key role in the innovation 
capability building routines of the COFBU and COSBU.  The pre-eminence of 
strategic entrepreneurship is also supported by the experience of the COFBU where 
the dynamic capabilities built were designed to assist in achieving evolutionary 
fitness, in part by helping to shape the evolving aerospace environment in Australia.  
This environment shaping element of dynamic capabilities is entrepreneurial in nature 
supporting Teece who equated the importance of entrepreneurial fitness with 
evolutionary fitness (2007, p. 1321).  The combination of evolutionary fitness with 
strategic entrepreneurship results in the expanded definition of innovation intensity 
from an internal focus to include innovation of the business model and ecosystem.  
Through strategic entrepreneurship the COFBU identified the need for strategic 
renewal beyond the boundaries of the firm.  In doing so, by its proactive leadership, a 
new business model was designed which reshaped its ecosystem.  The new business 
model directly impacted on organisational innovation intensity and, in particular, 
strategic innovation.   
 
Strategic entrepreneurship and organisational learning capability are important in 
shaping innovation culture.  In particular, facilitative leadership provided the impetus 
for the behaviour change required to foster and encourage innovation.  Facilitative 
leadership created the “right environment” (either from a cultural or structural 
perspective) to encourage knowledge sharing and collaboration, and the 
psychological safety to challenge the status quo (Edmondson 1999) and take 
innovation risks without the institutionalised blame.  Consistent with Augier and 
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Teece this leadership also led the organisation forward to seize opportunities that 
were sensed by the firm’s entrepreneurial function (2009, pp. 417, 418). 
 
It was entrepreneurial proactiveness and intentionality that focused the COFBU and 
COSBU’s attention on the identification and assessment of alliance partners and 
complementary external knowledge sources that could accelerate learning and 
capability development or provide augmented resources.  The external focus of the 
alliance building capability suggests a strong relationship between innovation 
absorptive capacity and organisational innovation intensity.  The presence of 
innovativeness, proactiveness and risk taking propensity were also strongly 
associated with (a) knowledge acquisition through exploration and, therefore, alliance 
building capability and innovation absorptive capacity, (b) challenging assumptions 
to create generative learning and, therefore, the organisational learning capability, and 
(c) the rapid development of new behaviours to leverage learning and, therefore, 
innovation culture.  These causal associations observed in the case data are consistent 
with those described in Slater and Narver (1995, p. 68). 
 
Learning from external organisations (a component of an organisational learning 
capability) is facilitated through an effective and efficient alliance building capability 
(particularly the alliance learning construct) and integrated through an innovation 
absorptive capacity (particularly the transformative and exploitative learning).  The 
case analysis supports Slater and Narver’s contention that “(o)rganisational learning 
is a function of the form and strength of the organisation’s interdependence with its 
learning partners” (1995, p. 70).  Organisational learning capability is an important 
driver of an innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal.  Learning from and about 
innovation became entrenched in organisational memory and experience and was 
deployed to renew the innovation management system.   
 
Innovation culture was both a facilitator of and driven by the CO’s organisational 
learning capability.  Leadership values and attitudes to the status quo and existing 
mental models determined whether behaviour change and generative learning took 
place within the business unit.  This relationship between culture and learning also 
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provided the organisational flexibility to reconfigure architecture or resources to meet 
environmental changes.  The learning experiences, such as the COSBU’s “failing 
forward” where no blame was attached to failure, also became embedded in the 
innovation culture. 
4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the analysis of the data collected, identified key themes 
and patterns in the data and revealed new understandings of innovation capability 
preconditions and OIC components in each of the three embedded case studies.  The 
case analysis explored the embedded and inherited path dependencies of the three 
business units to establish how those path dependencies affected each case in its 
response to internal and/or external environmental pressures and how or if they 
embraced change in their approach to innovation.  The data was interrogated to 
identify how each business unit’s innovation approach emerged. 
 
In the case comparison, triggers of organisational change were identified as well as 
similarities and differences in approaches in the formation each OIC.  An OIC 
framework was developed based on the case comparison with three preconditions and 
four OIC components.  The three preconditions which facilitated renewal of an 
innovation capability are strategic entrepreneurship, organisational learning capability 
and alliance building capability.  The four components of the OIC are an innovation 
absorptive capacity, an innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal, an innovation 
culture and organisational innovation intensity.  Constructs defining each of these 
preconditions and OIC components were also identified from the case analysis and 
the interrelationships between the preconditions and OIC dimensions supported.  
 
Chapter 5 provides a comparison between capability preconditions, components and 
linkages between the literature and case-derived OICs.  The Chapter continues with 
an outline of the contributions of the research to innovation theory and management 
practice. 
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Chapter Five 
5CONTRIBUTION AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Introduction 
In the continuous search for organisational competitive advantage, business and 
academic commentators recognise that innovation is fundamental with the 
expectation that it is endogenous to the firm (Hunt and Davis 2008, p. 12).  However, 
despite this universal recognition of the importance and value of innovation, 
innovation success rates are at unacceptably low levels.  Even more baffling is that 
numerous innovation critical success factors lists have been compiled over the last 
forty years, yet innovation is still a significant challenge for most organisations 
(McKinsey 2010). 
 
What most organisations have failed to recognise is that the very foundation of 
entrepreneurship is the practice of systematic innovation (Drucker 1985, p. 31).  
While there is often a focus on the new product development process, there has been 
a failure to recognise that innovation is essential for the entire organisation, but, most 
importantly, the management of innovation itself (Hamel 2005; 2006).  “As Peter 
Drucker often points out, every failure is a failure of management” (Leonard 1998,   
p. 55). 
 
The imperative for the development of an innovation management capability is 
founded in the identification of barriers to innovation and the recognition that 
organisational core capabilities can simultaneously be core rigidities (Leonard 1998, 
p. 55; Newey and Zahra 2009).  Therefore, when an organisation operates in a 
turbulent environment, a dynamic organisational innovation capability is essential. 
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An organisational innovation capability (OIC) was conceptualised from the literature 
in an IT solutions context.  The literature derived OIC consisted of two preconditions 
- organisational learning capability and entrepreneurial intensity – and three 
components - organisational innovation intensity, market-focused learning capability 
and innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal.  The OIC was then studied in three 
embedded business units within the one case organisation.  As each business unit had 
its own distinctive paths, processes and positions, the analysis provided an 
opportunity to study the development of an OIC within different organisational 
contexts. 
 
This research focused on answering the following research question: “How can an 
OIC be conceptualised in an information technology solutions context, and what is 
the role of learning in organisational innovation capability renewal”.  The intention 
of this research question was to provide an explanation of the components of an 
organisational innovation capability, the organisational preconditions that support its 
renewal and the ability of the OIC to support innovations that are both continuous and 
discontinuous to the organisation. 
 
This fifth and concluding chapter provides a comparison between the capability 
descriptors and linkages between the components of the literature and case-derived 
OICs.  The Chapter continues with an outline of the contributions of the research to 
innovation theory and management practice. 
5.2 Capability Descriptors:  A Comparison with the Literature 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 consolidate the descriptors from the three embedded cases in the 
case organisation (CO) and the OIC capability and identify where the descriptors 
have been previously identified in the innovation literature.  The Tables comprise 
four columns with the first indicating the Preconditions/Components and Constructs; 
the second, the key descriptors from the case analysis which support the constructs; 
and the third the key concepts from the literature.  The fourth column indicates 
whether the descriptors from the case analysis support, extend, refute or are silent 
with respect to the literature (Column 3).  Where the literature has been extended a 
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section entitled “Comments” has been added at the end of the precondition or 
component.  A more detailed analysis of the content of the Tables is included in the 
Appendix. 
 
While the analysis of the capability descriptors was generally supportive of the 
innovation literature it has highlighted an expanded and integrated conceptualisation 
of the strategic entrepreneurship precondition and innovation intensity OIC 
component.  In addition, it has provided alternative strategies for developing an 
organisational learning capability and an innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal. 
 
While most of the elements of the strategic entrepreneurship precondition have been 
identified previously in the literature, this dissertation has brought them together for 
the first time and provided a framework for strategic entrepreneurship.  Of particular 
importance, this research has highlighted the role of strategic entrepreneurship in 
stimulating the development/renewal of linked organisational preconditions (i.e. an 
organisational learning capability and an alliance building capability) critical to 
developing an organisation-wide innovation capability. The case data confirmed that 
where these preconditions were absent, innovation was contained within an 
innovation development process and limited by individual product championing. 
 
The inclusion of the traditionally accepted entrepreneurship constructs of 
innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking propensity has been supported by the 
comparison between the case findings and the literature.  The addition of the business 
model design and ecosystem shaping construct, and entrepreneurial discipline provide 
qualitative evidence in support of the current literature (Teece 2007, pp. 1325, 1326; 
Drucker, 1985, p. 19; Helfat et al., 2007, p. 7).  The final construct in the strategic 
entrepreneurship precondition is entrepreneurial intentionality.  While the definitions 
of dynamic capability have a strong focus on intentionality of resource configuration, 
the case analysis requirement for entrepreneurial intentionality focused on 
intentionality at the strategic level.  The purposeful creation, extension, and 
modification of a firm’s resource base is encapsulated in such a characterisation but, 
while it is an important tool of strategic management, it is but one strategy tool from 
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of a “dynamic set of initiatives, activities and processes” (George and Bock 2011,    
p. 102). 
 
The comparison also revealed a broader definition of the innovation intensity 
capability.  The first construct of the capability, multi-innovation focus – product, 
managerial, process and marketing - is consistent with and supportive of the 
literature.  Through this research the definition has been extended from an internal 
focus to include external factors such as the firm’s business model, strategic alliances 
and its ecosystem.  While success may lie with innovation of the firm’s products, 
process or management behaviour, in dynamic markets managers must be prepared to 
examine the sustainability of the firm’s business model and take appropriate steps to 
refresh, rejuvenate or even retire the model.   
 
Table 5.1 Comparison between Case Descriptors and Innovation Capability 
Literature – OIC Preconditions 
 
Preconditions Case Descriptors Literature Impact on 
Literature  
Strategic 
entrepreneur-
ship 
 Managers sense and shape the future, 
address path dependency barriers and 
augment knowledge assets to establish 
new resources (Teece 2007). 
Extend 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
propensity 
The COFBU and COSBU 
proactively surveyed their 
environment, identified threats and 
took anticipatory steps to transition 
to new business models. 
Conceptualised in terms of its 
innovativeness, proactiveness and risk 
taking propensity (Weerawardena 
2003, p. 410). 
Focus on looking outward/forward 
(Cope 2005). 
Support 
Business model 
design and 
ecosystem 
shaping 
Evident in the selection and 
implementation of the COFBU’s 
differentiated and hard to imitate 
through-life support business model. 
Managers shape ecosystem and 
marketplace outcomes through 
innovation, entrepreneurship, and semi-
continuous asset orchestration and 
business reconfiguration (Teece 2007; 
Garnsey et al., 2008). 
Support 
Entrepreneurial 
discipline 
COSBU – demonstrated by its move 
from ad hoc to strategic 
entrepreneurship.  
“Discipline of entrepreneurship” 
(Drucker 1985). 
The business strategy provides focus 
and a filter for all enterprise decision 
making (Teece 2007). 
Support 
Entrepreneurial 
intentionality 
Purposeful steps taken to analyse the 
exogenous “shock” and 
development of new strategies to 
pre-empt impact. 
Dynamic capability definitions focus 
on purposefulness (Helfat et al., 2007; 
Zahra et al., 2006). 
Support 
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Preconditions Case Descriptors Literature Impact on 
Literature  
Comments The research was supportive of the elements of the strategic entrepreneurship precondition 
which had been identified previously in the literature.  However, this dissertation has brought 
them together for the first time and provided a framework for strategic entrepreneurship.  Of 
particular importance, this research has highlighted the role of strategic entrepreneurship in 
stimulating the development/renewal of linked organisational preconditions (i.e. an 
organisational learning capability and an alliance building capability) critical to developing an 
organisation-wide innovation capability.  
Organisational 
learning 
capability 
Case analysis reinforced the 
importance of organisational 
learning in a positive and negative 
sense. 
Organisational learning is endogenous 
to the firm. 
Provides the basis for learning about 
marketplaces, clients, competitors and, 
themselves (Hunt 1999).  
Extend 
Adaptive 
learning 
All business units displayed 
evidence of adaptive learning.  In 
COTBU, generally occurred in 
response to a business crisis. 
Only capable of facilitating incremental 
innovation (Baker and Sinkula 1999a).   
Occurs within a set of recognised and 
unrecognised organisational constraints 
(Wang 2008). 
Support 
Generative 
learning 
Staff passionate about challenging 
“old assumptions” and mental 
models.Achieved through culture 
(COSBU) and structure (COFBU). 
Challenging paradigms, perceptual 
filters and fundamental 
beliefs/practices that define a firm’s 
innovation processes (Baker and 
Sinkula 1999a; 1999b; Kang et al., 
2007; Morgan and Berthon 2008). 
Extend 
Unlearning as above Past learning inhibits new learning 
(Sinkula 2002); unlearning crucial for 
absorptive capacity (Cepeda-Carrion et 
al., 2010). 
Extend 
Comments Organisational learning capability has been extended primarily though the identification of the 
different strategies employed by two of the business units to achieve the same path dependency 
breaking outcomes through generative learning and unlearning.  While the COSBU achieved 
this objective through its collegiate culture where staff were passionate about challenging “old 
assumptions” and an unwillingness to accept the status quo, the COFBU achieved the same 
generative learning paradigm through a change in organisational structure (project/domain 
matrix) as this provided the framework for knowledge sharing and questioning of the status 
quo.   
Alliance 
building 
capability 
  Support 
Strategic 
alliance partner 
identification 
and assessment 
The focus of COFBU and COSBU 
was on identifying partners to fill 
their knowledge and capability gaps 
and accelerate their learning. 
In dynamic environments, knowledge 
absorption is focused on exploration 
(scope and flexibility dimensions) and 
partners who have that knowledge (Van 
den Bosch et al., 1999).  
Support 
Alliance 
learning 
Focus on accelerating external 
learning through strategic alliance 
partnerships at varying levels of 
complexity. 
Important strategy for joint capability 
building and learning (Hamel 1991) 
and learning about the process of 
alliance management (Kale and Singh 
2007). 
Support 
Creation of 
idiosyncratic 
alliance 
resources and 
capabilities 
Crucial aim of the COFBU’s OEM 
strategy - develop exclusive and 
idiosyncratic alliance resources and 
capabilities which augmented the 
firm’s resources.  
Firms need to move to systematic 
investments in the alliance relationship 
in order to create an idiosyncratic 
combination of resources and 
capabilities (Dyer and Kale 2007).  
Support 
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Table 5.2 Comparison between Case Descriptors and Innovation Capability 
Literature – OIC Components 
OIC 
Components 
Case Descriptors Literature Impact on 
Literature 
Organisational 
Innovation 
Intensity 
  Extend 
Multi innovation 
focus  
Broad innovation focus 
encompassing all aspects of the firm.   
Internal innovation primarily focused 
on products, processes, work 
organisational systems or marketing 
systems” (Weerawardena 2003).  
Support 
Strategic 
innovation: new 
business model 
COFBU – new through-life support 
business model.   
See literature relating to Strategic 
Entrepreneurship, Business Model 
Design and Ecosystem Shaping (above) 
Extend 
Comments The research extended the definition of organisational innovation intensity.  The first construct 
of the capability, multi-innovation focus – product, managerial, process and marketing - is 
consistent with and supportive of the literature.  Through this research the definition has been 
extended from an internal focus to include external factors such as the firm’s business model, 
strategic alliances and its ecosystem.   
Innovation 
absorptive 
capacity 
 Ability to exploit external knowledge a 
critical component of innovative 
capabilities/performance at all levels of 
a firm (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).  
Support 
Embedded 
resource sharing 
external 
collaboration 
Collaborative knowledge sharing by 
strategic alliance partners 
entrenched in organisational 
routines. 
 
Collaboration, inter-partner trust 
relationship interconnectedness and 
openness are key behavioural 
dimensions that demonstrate that a 
relational association exists (Jarratt 
2004; Inkpen 2000).   
Support 
Externally 
focused 
innovation 
learning 
processes and 
structures 
Development of structures and 
processes to capture external 
innovation knowledge from 
complementary knowledge owners 
or holder. 
 
Learning structures and processes 
focused on acquiring knowledge 
external to the firm (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990; Lane and Pathak 2006; 
van den Bosch et al., 2003).   
Support 
Transformative 
and exploitative 
learning 
Understanding depth and breadth 
dimensions provides alternative 
strategies for transforming a firm’s 
knowledge. 
 
External knowledge must be exploited 
and then applied in the 
commercialisation of that knowledge 
(Lane and Pathak 2006). 
Knowledge has depth and breadth 
dimensions (van den Bosch et al., 
2003).   
Support 
Innovation 
Infrastructure 
and OIC 
Renewal  
 Focus on renewal leads to proactive 
innovation and continuous learning 
designed to anticipate customer needs 
and necessary structural changes to 
innovation infrastructure (Hunt 1999).   
Extend 
Innovation 
Management 
System 
COSBU - Innovation Management 
System included project 
prioritisation routines and embedded 
learning.  
Portfolio management approach with a 
balanced project mix, and continuous 
and discontinuous innovations (Cooper 
and Edgett 2003). 
Extend 
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OIC 
Components 
Case Descriptors Literature Impact on 
Literature 
COFBU - project/domain matrix 
provided innovation knowledge 
sharing.  
Ecosystem framework to sense market 
and technological opportunities (Teece 
2007).  
Innovation 
experience and 
memory 
Development of organisation 
routines to capture and share 
innovation experience in structured 
and unstructured ways. 
Repetition and experimentation enable 
tasks to be performed better and 
quicker (Teece et al., 1997).  Learning 
becomes embedded into behavioural 
routines (Moorman and Miner 1997). 
Extend 
Comments This OIC component has been extended on a similar basis as to the organisational learning 
capability through the identification of the different strategies employed.  The difference in 
approach between the COFBU and the COSBU demonstrated two options available for firms 
involved in innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal.  While the former’s focus was on 
knowledge sharing, organisational structures and routines, the renewal process for the COSBU 
focused on increasing the discipline and strategic alignment of its innovation management 
system.   
Innovation 
culture 
 Behaviour which challenges 
established organisational norms 
(facilitative leadership); supports 
learning (collaboration, Jarratt 2004, p. 
302); provides an understanding of risk 
taking in innovation (tolerance of 
risk/no blame behaviour) 
(Weerawardena 2003). 
Extend 
Facilitative 
leadership 
Proactive leadership involved in 
creating the right environment for 
innovation. 
Essential to create the innovation 
behaviour change needed to perform in 
complex environments and to manage 
paths to effective generative learning 
(Slater and Narver 1995; Osterberg 
2004). 
Support 
Collaboration Achieved through collegiate culture 
and formal informal knowledge 
sharing routines COSBU and 
structural transformation (COFBU). 
Essential for knowledge sharing and 
influences the type/depth of knowledge 
from partners.  Behaviours include 
sharing information/ideas, 
communication openness and 
forbearance (Jarratt and O’Neill 2002). 
Extend 
No blame Importance of responsible risk 
seeking propensity balanced by the 
acceptance of failure in innovation 
(failing forward). 
A risk taking propensity is an essential 
part of entrepreneurship in strategic 
decision making (Weerawadeena 
2003).   
Extend 
Comments The extension to innovation culture was primarily driven by the increase in collaboration 
through alternative strategies.  In the COSBU it was achieved through its collegiate culture and 
formal and informal knowledge sharing routines while in the COFBU increased collaboration 
was the result of its structural transformation.  In addition, while risk taking is widely 
recognised as imperative to innovation, this research stresses the importance of responsible risk 
seeking propensity balanced by the acceptance of failure in innovation (failing forward). 
 
The other primary contribution of this research is the contrast between how two 
business units addressed the constraints of path dependencies and mental models 
through different strategies.  The strategy used by the First Business Unit (COFBU) 
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and the Second Business Unit (COSBU) to overcome these barriers was generative 
learning.  The COSBU achieved this objective through its collegiate culture where 
staff were passionate about challenging “old assumptions” and unwillingness to 
accept the status quo.  This generative approach enabled the COSBU to gain a 
reputation for solving difficult problems and anticipating client needs (SBU1).   
 
By contrast, the COFBU achieved the same generative learning paradigm through a 
change in organisational structure (project/domain matrix) as this provided the 
framework for knowledge sharing and questioning of the status quo.  This structure 
also provided the foundation for the COFBU’s innovation infrastructure and OIC 
renewal as it facilitated the capture of innovation memory and the sharing of 
innovation experience.  The COSBU achieved the same renewal objective through its 
line of business structures, its Strategic Technology Roadmap and collegiate culture. 
5.3 Comparing OIC Frameworks 
In the following section a comparison will be made between the framework derived 
from the literature and the OIC framework that has emerged from the case analysis.  
Figure 5.1 depicts the literature derived OIC superimposed over the case derived 
OIC.  The oval shapes with bolded lines and descriptors represent those preconditions 
and constructs which are common between the two OICs.  The dotted lines represent 
a component and linkage from the literature derived OIC (market-focused learning 
capability) which has not been included in the case derived OIC.  The remainder of 
the Figure represents components and linkages in the case derived OIC not present in 
the literature derived OIC. 
 
The case derived OIC consisted of three preconditions – organisational learning 
capability, strategic entrepreneurship (instead of the literature derived entrepreneurial 
intensity) and alliance building capability.  The third pre-condition, alliance building 
capability, provided vital external knowledge sources to increase the depth or breadth 
of knowledge within the business unit (van den Bosch et al., 2003, p. 14).  While two 
of the same components from the literature derived OIC were present (organisational 
innovation intensity and innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal), two additional 
 
164 
 
components emerged from the case analysis (innovation culture and innovation 
absorptive capacity).  The market-focused learning capability component evidenced 
through the literature review was incorporated in the organisational learning 
capability pre-condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1  Organisational Innovation Capability Framework Comparison 
5.3.1 OIC Preconditions 
5.3.1.1 Strategic Entrepreneurship 
In the literature derived OIC entrepreneurial intensity was defined in terms of 
innovativeness, proactiveness and risk taking propensity (Weerawardena 2003,         
p. 410).  While this analysis has reinforced the importance of these constructs, three 
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additional constructs were added as the literature derived entrepreneurial constructs 
were not, of themselves, sufficient to achieve competitive advantage.   
 
Following Teece’s submission that firms “with good dynamic capabilities will have 
entrepreneurial management that is strategic in nature…” (2007, p. 1344), 
entrepreneurial intensity (a dimension of the literature derived OIC) emerged from 
the case data as strategic entrepreneurship to reflect the need for entrepreneurial 
behaviour to be exercised with a purpose (entrepreneurial intentionality) and in a 
systematic and disciplined manner (entrepreneurial discipline).  This is an important 
finding from the research and a key difference between the two models. 
 
While the three original entrepreneurial intensity constructs were similar between the 
two frameworks, there were distinct differences in application.  Innovativeness, 
proactiveness and risk taking propensity take place within a context including 
different industries, technologies, functional areas and organisations (Helfat et al., 
2007, p. 7).  For example, Weerawardena determined the entrepreneurial intensity of 
machinery and equipment manufacturing and metal products manufacturing firms 
(2003, p. 414).  According to IbisWorld (2008), these industries are in the mature life 
cycle stage where the industry is growing slower than the economy (over an extended 
period), innovation is focused on existing products and there is the rising threat of 
import penetration.  In addition, there is typically a well defined and established 
product market which provides little incentive to undertake the manufacture of new 
goods which can be a time consuming and costly procedure.  Accordingly, the 
entrepreneurial intensity measures are predominantly product, service or project 
related with only one measure extending beyond these limitations (item 10, 
Weerawardena 2003, p. 427).  Weerawardena also acknowledged that research in 
other industries, particularly the rapidly growing services sector, is required to 
validate the relationships explored in his study (2003, p. 420).  The sixth component, 
business model design and ecosystem shaping (following Teece 2007, p. 1341), is 
included to reinforce the importance of looking for innovation at a more fundamental 
level than product, service or project and often beyond the firm’s boundaries.   
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5.3.1.2 Organisational Learning Capability 
In both frameworks organisational learning capability was of high importance.  The 
case analysis supports the view that organisations are residues of past learning with 
the lessons of prior successes and failures embodied in their routines (Grey and 
Antonacopoulou 2004, p. 23; Edmonson and Moingeon 1998, p. 7).  These routines 
dominated the CO’s organisational life with the result that “action stem(med) from a 
logic of appropriateness or legitimacy, more than from a logic of consequence or 
intention” (Levitt and March, 1998, p. 320).   
 
Wijnhoven’s argument that there is a direct relationship between environmental 
complexity and dynamics and learning needs (2001, p. 183) is supported from the 
case analysis although it is the accuracy of management’s perception of the 
environment which is of importance.  As the COFBU and COSBU’s complex and 
dynamic environments were characterised by a wide diversity of dissimilar 
environmental factors which were in a constant state of change, learning needs were 
high and, therefore, double loop learning was required to develop and innovate 
existing action-outcome theories and mental models (Wijnhoven 2001, pp. 183, 185).  
Successful innovation required each business unit to adopt a new way of looking at 
things and it was generative learning and their unlearning capability, which enabled 
the COFBU and COSBU to question long held assumptions and mental models 
(Senge 1990, p. 8; Argyris 1999, p. 68).  By contrast, it was the COTBU 
management’s bounded perception of the environment, the inadequacy of its 
inherited adaptive learning orientation and the absence of a generative learning 
approach which led to its poor business performance.  
 
From each of the three case studies organisational unlearning was as important as 
organisational learning (Sinkula 2002; de Holan, Phillips and Lawrence 2004, p. 49, 
Fiol and Lyles 1985, p. 804).  It was essential to counteract the path dependent mental 
models and defensive routines, eliminate old logics and develop new approaches in 
order to achieve superior value for the stakeholders (Prahalad and Bettis 1986).  As 
the competitive intensity of the market in which the business units competed was 
changing (in the case of the COFBU and COSBU) or novel (in the case of the 
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COTBU), unlearning was required to reorient the organisational values, norms and 
behaviours by changing cognitive structures, mental models, dominant logics, and the 
core assumptions which guided behaviour (following Sinkula 2002, pp. 255, 256).  
Perhaps this also offers an explanation of why the market learning capability in the 
case data was integral to the organisational learning capability, and a separate 
dimension of the OIC within the literature derived structure. 
 
The difference in how the COFBU and COSBU learnt should also be noted as the 
former’s learning and knowledge sharing processes were based on its reconfigured 
organisational project/domain matrix structure.  By contrast, the COSBU achieved its 
generative learning through its collegiate culture and recruitment strategies.  Both of 
these strategies appeared successful in leveraging innovation. 
5.3.1.3 Alliance Building Capability 
The alliance building capability was not a dimension of the literature derived OIC.  
Strategic alliances have been defined as the “relatively enduring interfirm cooperative 
arrangements, involving flows and linkages that utilise resources and/or governance 
structures from autonomous organisations, for the joint accomplishment of individual 
goals linked to the corporate mission of each sponsoring firm” (Parkhe, 1991, p. 581).  
Following Dyer and Kale’s argument that relational capabilities are preconditions for 
firms to access the benefits of their networks, it is argued that this capability was 
critical as a precondition because of the close correlation between it and innovation 
absorptive capacity and the need to move quickly in reconfiguring its market 
position.  The establishment of alliances with partners with complementary 
knowledge was the impetus for the implementation of the innovation absorptive 
capacity and a major contributor to achieving environmental fitness (Dyer and Kale 
2007, p. 71).  The formation of alliances was also important in helping the COFBU 
manage the increased perceived competitive complexity within its target markets 
(Mazzarol and Reboud 2008, p. 248). 
 
Traditional models adopt a more organisational centric understanding of innovation 
and the incorporation of an alliance building capability within an OIC framework is 
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recognition of the fundamental importance of alliances as sources of innovation, 
reflecting a stakeholder approach to innovation.  Therefore, the case data confirms 
that an OIC represents the integration of innovation, relationship linking, and market 
linking, i.e. the core marketing capabilities. 
5.3.2 OIC Components 
5.3.2.1 Innovation Absorptive Capacity 
In the literature derived OIC the innovation absorptive capacity was not a component 
as external learning was derived from market focused learning (Weerawardeena 
2003).  The case analysis supports the view that there is a recursive relationship 
between innovation and absorptive capacity (Lane and Pathak 2006, p. 849).  In the 
framework arising from the case analysis the innovation absorptive capacity was 
comprised of three constructs – externally focused innovation learning structures and 
processes, embedded resource sharing external collaboration, and transformative and 
exploitative learning. 
5.3.2.2 Organisational Innovation Intensity 
Weerawardena defined innovation as “the application of ideas that are new to the 
firm, to create added value either directly for the enterprise or indirectly for its 
customers, regardless of whether the newness and added value are embodied in 
products, processes, work organisational systems or marketing systems” (2003,        
p. 412).  While the definition appears expansive, its primary focus is innovation 
within the boundaries of the firm, an approach consistent with the early broadening of 
the definition of innovation from technical innovation to non-technological value-
creating activities.  The measures that were adopted by Weerawardena reinforce this 
view as they capture the extent of the firm’s product, process, managerial, and 
marketing innovations with high scores on the innovation intensity scale indicating 
that the firm has introduced radical innovations in the four value creating activities 
(2003, p. 415).  This current analysis parallels the discussion with respect to strategic 
entrepreneurship where the narrowness of the definition emanated from the mature 
manufacturing industries chosen for analysis by Weerawardena.   
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Like strategic entrepreneurship, the COFBU and COSBU provide a more expansive 
definition of innovation intensity.  For the COFBU, innovation intensity encompassed 
both technological and non-technological innovation within the firm but, because of 
the loss of its manufacturing business, also extended to “improvement in the business 
model itself” (FBU4) and, by implication, innovation of the ecosystem in which it 
operated even though the customer remained the same.  Similarly, the COSBU sought 
to sell its security solutions to a new target market.  While this form of innovation 
could arguably be included within Weerawardena’s intensity measures (perhaps 
under the headings managerial or marketing innovations), the data suggests that 
innovation of a target market, i.e. market leadership, would be an explicit measure of 
a market learning capability.  Therefore, as a consequence of this research, the 
understanding of innovation intensity has been expanded beyond product, process, 
managerial, and marketing innovations to innovation in relation to primarily external 
factors such as the business model and strategic alliances. 
5.3.2.3 Innovation Infrastructure and OIC Renewal 
From the case analysis, the innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal component 
included the establishment and renewal of the firm’s innovation management system, 
and the accumulated experience, expertise and knowledge embedded in the 
organisational memory.  The difference in approach between the COFBU and the 
COSBU demonstrated two options available for firms involved in innovation 
infrastructure capability renewal.  While the former’s focus was on knowledge 
sharing, organisational structures and routines, the renewal process for the COSBU 
focused on increasing the discipline and strategic alignment of its innovation 
management system.   
 
The move to formalise the project/domain matrix structure was a key initiative by the 
COFBU.  This structure removed the functional barriers that constrained knowledge 
flow, facilitated the sharing of innovation experiences, increased innovation memory 
as well as access to that memory, and encouraged open-minded communication 
within a commonly held framework.  It also increased the number of strategic 
partners with whom it shared, acquired and developed complementary knowledge.  
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The COSBU’s focus was on its Strategic Technology Roadmap which, when 
combined with its Product Portfolio and Stage-gate processes, achieved a disciplined 
ideation capture and management process for new products/solutions, processes and 
management ideas.  For these two business units infrastructure renewal was driven by 
the need to ensure that innovation achieved commercial, and not simply research, 
outcomes (a function of its strategic entrepreneurship) as well as the need to ensure 
that the new business model and its associated routine and process changes were 
rapidly adopted (organisational learning capability).  For the COSBU, this analysis is 
consistent with the view that portfolio planning and management is a dynamic 
capability that lies at the heart of routine adaptability of the organisation (Newey and 
Zahra 2009, p. S97). 
5.3.2.4 Innovation Culture 
The fourth component of the case derived OIC is innovation culture, which included 
facilitative leadership, collaboration and a no blame orientation.  Culture can act as a 
de facto governance system as it influences the behaviour of individuals (Teece et al., 
1997, p. 520). 
 
The CO’s culture comprised Schien’s three cultures of management (1996):  firstly, 
an operationalisation culture responsible for the delivery and production of key 
assets; secondly, an engineering culture responsible for the engineering design of 
infrastructure assets; and thirdly, an executive culture.  This amalgam of cultures 
originated in the CO’s predecessor and was transferred notwithstanding the change in 
the ownership structure.  The engineering culture was characterised by “problem 
oriented knowledge workers…focused on delivering acceptable products to their 
customers” with those in executive management in the “deep command and control 
hierarchy” preoccupied with “increasing short term shareholder-added value” at the 
expense of longer term objectives such as innovation (Cor4). 
 
As Slater and Narver concluded, there is a correlation between entrepreneurship and 
organisational culture as new behaviours can leverage learning (1995, p. 68).  These 
behaviours generally enable the entrepreneurial firm to “innovate, initiate change, and 
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rapidly react to change flexibly and adroitly” (Naman and Slevin 1993, p. 137).  In 
the OIC developed from the case analysis, it was essential that the three business 
units recognised, understood and confronted the strategic limitations of the CO’s 
culture and its impact on their business operations.   
5.3.3 OIC Component Relationships 
While entrepreneurial intensity was one of the two preconditions identified in the 
innovation literature its importance was not compelling.  Zahra et al., without 
differentiating between preconditions and components, identified entrepreneurship as 
the starting point for dynamic capability development as it influenced the selection of 
skills and resources and promoted organisational learning processes to capture 
external knowledge as new situations arise (2006, p. 925).   
 
This research identified strategic entrepreneurship as the commencement point for the 
development of an OIC as it provided the impetus for the organisational learning 
capability (the learning orientation) and the alliance building capability (the learning 
focus).  Without the proactiveness and intentionality of strategic entrepreneurship, 
possibly prompted by the likelihood of an exogenous shock, the OIC development 
process was unlikely to have commenced.  In the literature, entrepreneurial intensity 
was linked to the organisational innovation intensity and the innovation infrastructure 
and OIC renewal.  While the case-derived strategic entrepreneurship precondition had 
the same linkages, it was the nature and strength of the linkages, rather than their 
existence, which was of importance.  Strategic entrepreneurship extended innovation 
intensity from an internal focus to considered innovation of the business model and 
elements of the firm’s ecosystem.  
5.4 Further Implications for Theory 
5.4.1 Opening the Organisational Innovation “Black Box” 
By opening the innovation “black box”, this research has provided a higher order 
capability which may provide some guidance to strategic managers as they attempt to 
build, systematise and replicate an innovation capability within their organisations.  
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The OIC is a capability which provides managers with the capacity to manage the 
component capabilities of the framework together with their linkages and 
interdependencies.  It enables managers to impact the firm’s existing “resource base 
and transform it in such a way that a new bundle or configuration of resources is 
created so that the firm can sustain or enhance its competitive advantage” (Ambrosini 
and Bowman 2009, p. 35). 
 
The OIC framework which emerged from the case analysis answers the call to 
address the “abstract and intractable” nature of dynamic capabilities (Danneels 2008, 
p. 536) through detailed, micro mechanisms based on qualitative fieldwork to identify 
how a capability is deployed and how it works (Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, p. 37).  
Through the analysis of the formation of an OIC in three embedded business units in 
the CO, this research has focused on understanding the complex world of 
contemporary experience from the point of view of its participants (Yin 2009, pp. 8, 
11), and, in doing so, provided a closer, richer, thicker, more subjective view of an 
idiosyncratic organisational innovation phenomena (McKelvey 2003, p. 6) beyond 
the common unit analysis of the firm. 
 
The research examined whether an OIC existed for the CO or whether the capability 
is conceptualised differently depending on the organisational context of the business 
unit.  By exploring a dynamic capabilities perspective to innovation, the case analysis 
demonstrated that although the three business units were embedded in the one case 
organisation, one OIC was not common across the three business units.  The analysis 
found that different but interrelated OIC frameworks existed in the COFBU and 
COSBU and that a third model was beginning to emerge in the COTBU.  Although 
each model exhibited some differences in dimensions and the constructs defining 
those dimensions, nevertheless a common framework emerged out of the cross-case 
analysis of the two positive cases and the negative case.  The difference between the 
three OICs reflected the different environmental contexts, management’s perceptions 
and interpretations of those contexts, and the effectiveness of management’s actions 
in relation to the constraints of path dependency. 
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Despite the different component names there was a high degree of commonality in 
the intent and operation of the respective components and this commonality 
facilitated the development of the OIC from the case data.  This outcome supports the 
view that “while dynamic capabilities are idiosyncratic in their details…specific 
dynamic capabilities…exhibit common features that are associated with effective 
processes across firms” (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, 1108).  For instance, a primary 
strategy of the COSBU was to “create the right environment” for innovation (SBU1).  
A major environmental element was its collegiate culture which was characterised by 
open communication, respect for the views of colleagues and a willingness to 
collectively solve difficult technical problems.  For the COFBU the focus was on 
increasing employee engagement through peer to peer knowledge sharing, a “can do 
attitude” and high degree of personal accountability (FBU4).  It was also moving 
quickly to tolerate failure without blame while the COSBU had the same approach 
although expressed in terms of “failing forward” (SBU1). 
 
The case derived OIC consists of three preconditions – an organisational learning 
capability, strategic entrepreneurship and an alliance building capability – and four 
components - innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal, an integrative innovation 
absorptive capacity, an innovation culture and organisational innovation intensity.  
Idiosyncratic constructs for each of the preconditions and components have been 
derived from the case studies.  From the case analysis, an OIC is defined as a higher 
order capability which has the capacity to systematically reconfigure the firm’s 
resource base in order to transform knowledge and ideas into new business models, 
products, processes and systems for the benefit of the firm and its stakeholders. 
 
The case analysis also supports Eisenhardt and Martin contention that “(t)he 
existence of common features among effective dynamic capabilities does not, 
however, imply that any particular dynamic capability is exactly the same across 
firms” by demonstrating that while the OIC’s in the two positive cases had common 
attributes,  the constituent elements of those differed and also, there are many starting 
points and “multiple paths (equifinality) to the same dynamic capabilities” (2000,   
pp. 1109, 1116).  The development of the innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal 
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of the COFBU and COSBU reflected their different starting points and organisational 
contexts, similar though different paths and the different decisions of their respective 
managements.  However, they serve to illustrate this argument as the capability was 
established through the COFBU’s project/domain matrix structure while for the 
COSBU the same objective was achieved through its Strategic Technology Roadmap, 
stage gates and its portfolio planning approach.  Similarly, the COFBU’s structure 
provided the foundation for its generative learning while the COSBU achieved this 
objective through its collegiate culture and recruitment strategies. 
5.4.2 Intentional and Disciplined Strategic Entrepreneurship 
Ireland et al. highlighted the need for empirical research “to explicate and understand 
how entrepreneurial leaders manage resources strategically to create competitive 
advantages” (2003, p. 983).  Welter argued that a contextualised view of 
entrepreneurship is required to increase our knowledge of when, how, and why 
entrepreneurship happens and stresses the need for qualitative research to capture the 
richness and diversity of organisational context (2011, pp. 176, 177).  O’Connor et al. 
commented on the difficulty experienced by firms “in making an immediate, strong, 
shared or consistently helpful connection between ‘discipline’ and 
‘entrepreneurship’” and in the understanding of entrepreneurship as bricolage 
(freedom to play and do whatever is necessary) and disciplined thought and 
activity…” (2007).  This research provides valuable insights into these and other 
entrepreneurship issues and increases the understanding of its nature, richness and 
dynamics (Zahra 2007, p. 451). 
 
This research has brought together for the first time the previously identified 
entrepreneurship components and provided a framework for strategic 
entrepreneurship.  In doing so, while supporting the innovation literature and the 
inclusion of each construct, it extends the current understanding of entrepreneurship 
by combining it with the intentionality and discipline of strategic management to 
complement the risk orientation inherent in entrepreneurship.  While Helfat et al. 
consider that entrepreneurship and strategy are often linked (2007, p. 1), this research 
suggests that the linkage is a requirement for innovation success.   
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Weerawardena’s entrepreneurship model reflects the display of firm behaviours 
(innovativeness, proactiveness and risk-taking propensity) (2003, p. 410) without 
identifying the underlying causes and the firm’s level of intentionality in 
implementing those behaviours.  Entrepreneurial intentionality has been included as a 
construct as the invisibility of innovation critical success factors and the low 
innovation success rate (Cooper 1999, pp. 2, 8, 9; de Waal, Maritz and Shieh 2010) 
requires the development of an organisational capability to bring about innovation 
such that “the outcome bears a definite resemblance to what was intended” (Dosi et 
al., 2000, p. 2; see also Helfat et al., 2007, p. 4).  It should be noted that the source of 
the purposefulness arises from the entrepreneurial mantra to identify and respond to 
change to achieve a higher productivity and yield (Drucker 1985, p. 25).  
Intentionality is important as an “organisation that adapts in a creative but disjointed 
way to a succession of crises is not exercising a dynamic capability” (Zollo and 
Winter 2002, p. 340).   
 
The research supports Teece’s contention that the key strategic function of 
entrepreneurial “management is to find new value-enhancing combinations inside the 
enterprise, and between and amongst enterprises, and with supporting institutions 
external to the enterprise”, develop new organisational structures and business 
models and make brave decisions to develop new business models, ecosystems and 
strategic architectures (2007, pp. 1341, 1346).  It also emphasises the importance of 
making disciplined and purposeful entrepreneurial decisions.  This intentionality 
enables a firm to better prioritise the allocation of its scare resources (Teece 2007,    
p. 1324) as the purposefulness narrows the search horizon and enables those 
resources to be applied more effectively and efficiently.  This requirement for 
intentionality is also consistent with the Zahra et al. definition of dynamic capabilities 
“as the abilities to reconfigure a firm’s resources and routines in the manner 
envisioned and deemed appropriate by the firm’s principal decision-maker(s)” (2006, 
p. 924 emphasis added).  The conceptualisation of entrepreneurial intentionality is 
consistent with the entrepreneurial strategic vision of Ireland et al. which “represents 
a commitment to innovation and entrepreneurial processes and behaviour that is 
expressed as the organisation’s philosophical modus operandi” (2009, p. 26). 
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Strategic entrepreneurship enables a firm to be more in tune with its business 
environment and to sense changes or potential exogenous shocks and to proactively 
find new and better opportunities for revenue generation and competitive advantage.  
Newey and Zahra suggest that endogenous entrepreneurship, that is, “the firm’s 
initiatives in developing new products, services and/or businesses arising from the 
firm’s own internal opportunity recognition”, causes the firm to take the initiative 
“without the dominating pressure from an exogenous shock” (2009, p. S83, emphasis 
added).  In the case analysis, the management of the COFBU and COSBU acted 
through endogenous entrepreneurship in anticipation of an exogenous “shock” and, in 
doing so, minimised the later impact of the exogenous “shock” when it occurred.  
This proactive and anticipatory action enabled its entrepreneurial managers to sense 
and shape the future, unshackle their business unit from the past, and implement 
strategies to augmenting their knowledge resources, establishing new value 
enhancing asset combinations, and transforming organisational structures to achieve 
evolutionary and entrepreneurial fitness (Teece 2007, p. 1346).  
 
The relationship between strategic entrepreneurship and organisational discipline is 
evident from the need for the function that a dynamic capability performs to be 
repeatable and to consist of patterned and practiced activity (Helfat et al., 2007, pp. 4, 
5), for discovery to be grounded in organisational processes” (Teece 2007, p 1323) 
and to be “a learned and stable pattern of collective activity through which the 
organisation systematically generates and modifies its operating routines in pursuit of 
improved effectiveness” (Zollo and Winter 2002, p. 340).  The firm’s ability to sense 
opportunities and threats can also be facilitated if it explicitly or implicitly employs a 
systematic and analytical decision making framework to assist in prioritising 
innovation (Teece 2007, p 1323) at the level required to achieve environmental 
fitness.  The COSBU’s move from ad hoc to strategic entrepreneurship illustrates this 
disciplined approach to strategic entrepreneurship.  
 
Another point of difference between the case data and the literature is the application 
of the measure “risk taking propensity”.  Weerawardena’s measures implicitly 
support the view that the higher the risk the greater the entrepreneurial intensity 
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(items 5, 7, 10, p. 427).  For example, “a strong tendency for high risk investments 
(with chances for very high rates of return)” is a factor which contributes 
significantly to a high entrepreneurial intensity.   
 
The positive cases suggest that while risk taking is important it must be related to 
management’s perceptions of the environmental change taking place, and be designed 
to shift resources from areas of low productivity and yield to areas of higher 
productivity and yield (Drucker 1985, p. 25).  It is not simply about having a high 
tolerance for risk per se.  In addition, the risk of not taking any action also needs to be 
considered as the failure by the COFBU to take action may have resulted in the 
closure of the business.   
 
In the dynamic capabilities framework the entrepreneur/manager’s role in the modern 
corporation is not necessarily an individual but a function which is part 
Schumpeterian (the entrepreneur introduces novelty and seeks new combinations of 
resources), part evolutionary (the entrepreneur endeavors to promote and shape 
innovation learning) and part Porterian (as the entrepreneur seeks to achieve strategic 
fit with its internally controlled assets and those of its alliance partners) (Augier and 
Teece 2009, pp. 417, 418).  While recognising that entrepreneurship is multi-
disciplinary and a complex domain of human practice with few or no enduring rules 
or solutions (O’Connor et al., 2007), this research has provided an increased 
understanding of the role of management and entrepreneurship in achieving enhanced 
business performance. It has also stressed the need for the entrepreneurial strategic 
vision to be a “defining mind-set shared by the organisation’s top managers” (Ireland 
et al., 2009, p. 40). 
5.4.3 The Breadth of Innovation Intensity 
The traditional focus of innovation has been on a firm’s products, processes, 
management or marketing approach.  As has been demonstrated in sections 5.3.1.1 
and 5.3.2.2, Weerawardena’s innovation and entrepreneurial intensity measures were 
developed in a manufacturing and metal products environment.  In this environment, 
where the market and technology is stable, the internally focused definition of 
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innovation intensity is appropriate in order to minimise the development costs of 
dynamic capabilities (Zahra et al., 2006, p. 942).  While this research supports 
Weerawardena’s definition of innovation intensity, the definition has been extended 
from the internal focus to include external factors such as the firm’s business model, 
strategic alliances and its ecosystem.  Accordingly, from the case analysis 
commercial success was as dependent on management, entrepreneurship and business 
model design and implementation as it was on technological innovation. 
 
This broadening of the definition of innovation intensity expands the search horizon 
for opportunities available to firms to achieve environmental fitness from within the 
firm to include innovation opportunities of the firm’s architecture, its business model 
or its ecosystem.  As the selection/design of business models is a key micro-
foundation of dynamic capabilities, management’s role is, particularly in rapidly 
changing environments, to systematically deconstruct existing business models and to 
evaluate each element with an idea toward refinement or replacement, and to design 
the new integrated business model having regard to the anticipated business/customer 
environment and the trajectory of technological development in the industry. 
 
The COFBU case study illustrates, in a positive manner, the increased breadth of 
innovation intensity and its management’s willingness to seek innovation beyond its 
organisational and learning boundaries.  While it implemented innovation within the 
firm’s boundaries (processes, structure, culture), it also looked beyond its boundaries 
to find a new business model in through-life support.  By contrast, the COTBU 
illustrates the constraints of a low innovation intensity (limited primarily to adaptive 
technical innovation) and the failure to design and implement an effective business 
model. 
 
In today’s global economy, strategic managers must behave in an entrepreneurial 
manner as the intensity of the firm’s innovation performance will determine whether 
or not it continues to retain a competitive advantage.  While success may lie with 
innovation of the firm’s products, process or management behaviour, in dynamic 
markets managers must be prepared to examine the sustainability of the firm’s 
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business model and appropriate take steps to refresh, rejuvenate or even retire the 
model.  The anticipation of an exogenous shock may also lead to innovation within 
the firm’s ecosystem as the firm seeks to achieve a sustainable competitive 
advantage. 
5.4.4 The Importance of Managerial Perception and Capability Intensity 
When environmental changes occur or are anticipated, managers must interpret those 
changes and decide upon a course of action, including the decision whether or not to 
change the resource base.  The degree of alignment between management’s 
perception of the environment and the actual change will impact upon the success of 
the dynamic capabilities selected to bring congruence between the firm and its 
environment.   
 
The importance of managerial perception of the nature and degree of environmental 
change has been identified as a key success factor determinant for dynamic 
capabilities (Ambrosini et al., 2009, p. S13).  The role of managers in designing and 
guiding strategic and organisational change is influenced by their perception and 
interpretation of the external environment and, accordingly, they must be able to 
“accurately sense changes in their competitive environment, including potential shifts 
in technology, competition, customers, and regulation” (Harreld et al., 2007, p. 24, 
emphasis added).  One reason why managers may misperceive or misinterpret 
environmental signals is because their “bounded rationality” emanating from “their 
history, their expectations, and the probabilistic judgments that they make when 
scanning the organisational context will have an impact on the way they manage the 
firm’s portfolio of resources” (Moliterno and Wiersema 2007, p. 1081).  If managers 
misperceive the impact of environmental changes they may develop inappropriate 
capabilities (Adner and Helfat 2003, p. 1020; Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, p. 39, 
41; Ambrosini et al., 2009, p. S22). 
 
While the literature has focused considerable attention on the formation of dynamic 
capabilities, the capability intensity level selected in the formation process 
(regenerative, renewing or incremental (Ambrosini et al., 2009, p. S10) also needs to 
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be considered.  An appropriate dynamic capability can be identified for formation but 
if the capability intensity level is inappropriate then the case analysis suggests it is 
likely to fail.  The cross-case analysis suggests that there is a correlation between the 
degree of accuracy of a manager’s perception of the variance in the environment 
(between the actual and perceived) and the level of capability intensity selected.  The 
COFBU and COSBU’s management both correctly recognised that there was a high 
degree of environmental variance between its former and new environments.  
Accordingly, the management selected a regenerative capability intensity to achieve 
new change capabilities. 
 
Conversely, the COTBU was a newly formed business unit.  However, its starting 
point reflected the paths of the CO – the supply of high value infrastructure products 
to the government high level security sector (GHLSS).  Its new environment, while 
partly embracing this market, also extended to the GHLSS in the US and other 
countries, as well as the commercial high level security sector (CHLSS).  Its 
challenge was to develop change routines in and for an environment in which it had 
limited or no experience.  The degree of variance between its parent’s business paths 
and its new environment was very high.  However, the COTBU’s management 
perceived that the variance was low.  The difference between the actual (very high) 
and perceived (low), resulted in the COTBU deciding to renew its GHLSS capability 
rather than seeking a fundamental reconstruction of its change capabilities. 
 
This research has emphasised the importance of managerial perception and validates 
the views of Adner and Helfat (2003) and Ambrosini and Bowman (2009) in relation 
to this issue.  While these authors have highlighted the impact of managerial 
perception this research has contributed to theory and practice by focusing attention 
on the gap in perception between the actual environmental change and management’s 
perception of that change, and the impact of the gap on both the nature and capability 
intensity of the dynamic capabilities deployed to impact the firm’s resources. 
 
In summary, the key contributions of this dissertation to theory are the development 
of a comprehensive innovation capability framework that managers can employ 
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within their organisations, and which places a primary focus on the organisational 
precondition of strategic entrepreneurship (and in particular, the constructs of 
discipline and intentionality) and the expansion of the definition of innovation 
intensity. 
5.5 Implications for Management Practice 
5.5.1 Introduction 
The case analysis has placed strategic entrepreneurship at the centre of strategic 
management and in the building of an OIC.  More importantly, it provides guidance 
to managers in defining the firm’s competitive arena and ecosystem and the trajectory 
of its future evolution through the co-ordination and assembly of disparate and 
usually cospecialised elements. 
5.5.2 The Importance of Understanding Path Dependencies 
The dynamic capabilities framework recognises that the firm is shaped but not 
necessarily constrained by its past.  Accordingly, one of the key implications for 
practice arising from the case analysis is the need for managers to make explicit the 
path dependencies, and information, belief and behaviour barriers to innovation 
within their firms, particularly where past learning inhibits or excludes new learning.  
By identifying path dependencies and understanding their impact upon the intended 
future direction of the firm in its quest for environment congruence, managers can 
make a significant difference to achieving and retaining competitive advantage 
through its investment choices and priorities, and through implementing strategies for 
unlearning.  The application of these capabilities is in itself an important class of 
dynamic capabilities which “emerges around a manager’s ability to override certain 
‘dysfunctional’ features of established decision rules and resource allocation 
processes” (Teece 2007, p. 1327) 
 
The key barriers to innovation which emerged from the analysis include: 
(a) the need for organisations to be aware that its strengths and capabilities can 
simultaneously be weaknesses and, accordingly, that core capabilities can 
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become core rigidities in the absence of dynamism in the maintenance, 
development and continuous enhancement of that capability; 
(b) the inertia or complacency in relation to the subtle transformation of a core 
capability to a core rigidity generally results from belief system barriers, where 
there is a gap between theories in use and espoused theories, or from 
information barriers, where information is excluded from consideration due to 
pre-existing biases or mental models; 
(c) organisational behavioural barriers which manifest themselves in defensive 
routines which are triggered by the possibility of embarrassment or threat 
resulting in the entrenchment of a culture where failure is unacceptable, 
inflexibility is embedded and errors not discussed without blame or criticism. 
5.5.3 The Importance of Generative Learning and Unlearning 
The case analysis reinforced the importance of having an effective organisational 
learning capability to identify new knowledge and new sources of knowledge and, 
most importantly, to challenge mental models and information barriers (cf. Mazzarol 
et al., 2009 p. 338 where the emphasis is on thinking skills to challenge “strategic 
myopia”).  The emphasis from the case analysis was upon generative learning and 
unlearning (i.e. changing the way we do things) as central to the dynamic capability 
formation and renewal process.  The COFBU and COSBU business units recognised 
that their learning was a path dependent process in which what they learnt depended 
on the knowledge they possessed, and both business units developed mechanisms to 
provide a culture in which challenging the status quo was accepted as a norm.  
Generative learning and unlearning enabled the COFBU and COSBU to recognise 
their dysfunctional routines and prevent strategic blindspots (Teece and Pisano, 1994 
p. 545). 
 
As has been stated in sections 4.6.3.2 and 5.3.1.2, different methods of fostering and 
promoting generative learning were developed by the COFBU and COSBU and these 
provided options as to how managers can develop generative learning within their 
firms at both an organisational and individual level.  A change in organisational 
structure (project/domain matrix) reinforced the generative learning paradigm within 
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the COFBU and provided the framework for knowledge sharing and questioning of 
the status quo.  This finding is consistent with that of Jarratt (2009) who confirmed 
the importance of formal and informal structures in supporting learning and the 
application of new knowledge. 
 
This change in formal and informal structures was achieved in the COSBU through 
its collegiate culture and recruitment strategies and its focus on solving difficult 
technical problems.  These organisational changes facilitated knowledge sharing and 
problem solving and generated patterns of interactions that represented successful 
solutions to particular problems.  Through this disciplined approach new knowledge 
was then embedded into the innovation management system, added to innovation 
experience and stored in the innovation memory.   
 
Generative learning was also fostered through boundary spanning behaviours and co-
ordinated search routines where the focus was on identifying complementary 
knowledge sources external to the firm.  These included research partners, 
universities and the RO.  The COSBU case analysis emphasises that while 
understanding how individuals and firms learn is important, what they learn is equally 
important.  Managers must develop intentional and systematic generative search 
routines based on product/solution and capability gaps within the firm to maximise 
the acquisition, integration and exploitation of new knowledge from beyond its 
learning and organisational boundaries. 
5.5.4 Strategies for Increasing Absorptive Capacity 
Absorptive capacity is the “ability of a firm to recognise the value of new, external 
information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990, p. 128 emphasis added).  A question which arises from this definition is, When 
does the recognition of the knowledge value takes place and what is involved in the 
process of recognition?  Is the value proactively recognised and identified before the 
new information is acquired?  Is the value of information recognised systematically 
through an organisational routine of knowledge identification and evaluation or does 
recognition occur serendipitously?  Both the COFBU and COSBU proactively 
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identified valuable knowledge that was not within their current knowledge base and 
deliberately and strategically sought to acquire that knowledge (hence the linkage 
between strategic entrepreneurship and innovation absorptive capacity).  This early 
recognition of the potential value of new knowledge and of potential alliance partners 
who possessed such knowledge was an important factor in accelerating their 
knowledge acquisition and integration, and therefore, the development of their 
respective OICs. 
 
The case analysis also provides guidance for managers in relation to the external 
knowledge acquisition strategies that are available to them.  Section 4.6.7 highlights 
the options available to firms seeking to expand their organisational knowledge and 
absorptive capacity.  Consistent with van den Bosch (2003, p. 43), the case analysis 
demonstrated that a firm can elect to firstly, increase its knowledge breadth by 
acquiring knowledge related to its existing knowledge base but outside its current 
learning boundary, secondly, it can increase the depth of its knowledge base by 
acquiring more of the same knowledge it currently holds, or thirdly, increase the 
breadth and depth of its knowledge base.  The question as to which of these 
absorptive capacity strategies to adopt will depend on the dynamism in the firm’s 
market, the likelihood of exogenous shocks and their anticipated impact on the firm, 
as well as management’s perceptions of the firm’s environment and the impact of any 
environmental changes. 
5.5.5 The Importance of Coherence 
The way in which a firm coordinates and integrates mutually consistent and 
supportive resources and assets within the firm and between the firm and its 
ecosystem determines the level of coherence between those routines.  Through the 
intentionality and discipline of strategic entrepreneurship, the firm leverages its 
“architectural knowledge or knowledge about the ways in which the components are 
integrated and linked together into a coherent whole” (Henderson and Clark, 1990,   
p. 11).  The architecture of system components may provide insight into the ways in 
which OICs differ from each other and provide a source of competitive advantage as 
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partial imitation of a successful model may yield zero benefits (Teece et al., 1997,    
p. 519; Henderson and Clark, 1990, p. 11). 
 
The case analysis, particularly the COFBU and COSBU case studies, support the 
view that an essential element to prevent imitation is the level of coherence between 
the processes and routines, as both business units, in their own ways, were focused on 
developing disciplined frameworks for innovation, behaviour and learning.  Learning 
was a critical objective as organisational learning was the product of synergies among 
the management innovation practices and routines. 
5.5.6 Understanding Capability Life Cycles  
The concept of capability life cycle provides strategic managers with a common 
language and way of thinking about the evolution of capabilities as well as 
recognisable life cycle stages as they seek to increase their resource and capability 
heterogeneity (Helfat and Peteraf 2003, p. 998).  Consistent with the RBV, the 
intentionality and discipline constructs of strategic entrepreneurship demonstrate the 
need for strategic managers to understand the stage of the life cycle of their 
capabilities, the capability options arising from the existing capabilities and, where 
transformation is to take place, the intended development path trajectory of those 
dynamic capabilities. 
 
By understanding the life cycle of capabilities and their evolution over time managers 
are better able to identify capability options and identify those which may best suit 
environmental triggers.  Failure to understand the evolutionary process of resources 
and capabilities will limit management’s ability to “answer questions about 
competitive advantage and disadvantage over time based on capabilities and 
resources” (Helfat and Peteraf 2003, p. 1008).  Depending upon the nature of 
environmental factors, the selection of the renewal, redeployment or recombination 
branches may lead to a substantial alteration to the original dynamic capability, 
particularly if multiple episodes of branching along different renewal, redeployment 
or recombination paths are involved (Helfat and Peteraf 2003, p. 1008).   
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The COFBU provides a research-based case study of the way in which management 
evaluated its capability options and identified a dynamic capability development path 
and trajectory.  It provides evidence and management insights into the founding and 
development stages of the capability life cycle. With the retirement of its aircraft 
manufacturing capability, the COFBU decided that its future lay in through-life 
support.  To accelerate its capability development in this related knowledge domain it 
developed strategic alliances with overseas aerospace OEMs to accelerate its 
capability development with this acceleration represented by the steepness of the 
curve in Figure 4.1.  Key insights from this case study include the need for 
management proactiveness in anticipating exogenous “shocks” before they occur, the 
need for management to proactively retire a capability, the importance of identifying 
the capability development trajectory and identifying ways to increase the steepness 
of the capability curve (i.e. its speed of capability development). 
5.5.7 Boundaryless Innovation 
Another major path dependency is the architecture and structure of the firm with silos 
common between business units, functions and projects.  The case analysis provides 
guidance for managers in building an OIC as awareness of the location and 
permeability of the firm’s internal boundaries can provide opportunity for restructure 
in order to increase knowledge sharing and collaboration.  The COFBU provides an 
example of how generative learning and increased innovation memory and 
experience can result from a restructure of the firm.  This case study also 
demonstrates that open innovation takes place beyond the internal boundaries and 
extends externally to the boundary of the firm’s ecosystem and also to its learning 
boundaries.  It also provides examples of both outside-in and inside-out open 
innovation (Chesbrough and Garman 2009, p. 70).  See Figures 4.2 and 4.11. 
5.5.8 Dynamic Capabilities and Competitive Advantage 
This research has confirmed management is not constrained by a prescribed 
innovation capability framework.  The case analysis demonstrated that there are 
multiple ways in which an OIC can flourish through establishing preconditions that 
support their development and then building the core components of the framework.  
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The preconditions and core framework of an OIC will be shaped by the paths and 
positions of the firm, the accuracy of its managements perception of the environment 
in which it operates and managerial actions taken in relation to those path 
dependencies and to environmental changes.  Most importantly, the analysis 
demonstrates that while history matters, historical paths can be changed by 
disciplined and intentional entrepreneurial action. 
 
Managers need to remember that the development and implementation of a dynamic 
capability does not necessarily lead to competitive advantage.  The dynamic 
capability literature supports the view that “there are more or less effective ways to 
execute particular dynamic capabilities” (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, p. 1108) with 
the result that a firm can either achieve sustainable or temporary competitive 
advantage, competitive parity or failure (Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, p. 38).  The 
COTBU’s initial activities in regard to dynamic capability formation were 
unsuccessful and its management was forced, through this lack of success, to 
recalibrate those capabilities.  Accordingly, the COTBU case study supports the 
views that “dynamic capabilities may not necessarily have the intended effect or a 
positive outcome” (Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, p. 35) and that a change to the 
resource base “implies only that the organisation is doing something different, but not 
necessarily better, than before” (Helfat et al., 2007, p. 5).  The case data suggests that 
an OIC will flourish where management attention has first been directed towards 
developing preconditions that guide and sustain an OIC. 
 
In summary, the key contributions of this research to practice include the imperative 
for management to understand the nature of the firm’s path dependencies and their 
impact upon organisational change, the imperative for generative learning to 
challenging the status quo and the firm’s mental models, the criticality of the 
preconditions supporting OIC sustainability and the accuracy of management’s 
perceptions of the firm’s environment and the impact upon innovation capability 
development.  One other primary contribution is the emphasis upon coherency of the 
way the components are integrated and linked together to form the OIC. 
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5.6 Limitations 
This research, like all research, suffers from some limitations.  Firstly, it has 
investigated a single CO with its own peculiar characteristics, diverse business 
contexts and three embedded units each with differing paths, positions and processes.  
The business context included the CO’s broad industrial diversification and its 
endeavours to capitalise on its acquisitions by expanding into new markets as well as 
its transition from a single project GHLSS technology contractor to a broader supplier 
of products and services to both the high level security sector and the commercial 
sector.  In addition, there are the idiosyncratic business contexts of each business 
units.  Accordingly, the OIC, preconditions, components and their respective 
relationships derived from the single case, despite the cautious and prudent approach 
to the research methodology, raise questions in regard to the generalisability of the 
findings.   
 
Secondly, as the analysis is based on data from one firm, the ability to make inter-
firm comparisons is limited.  The diversity of the business units of the CO provided a 
limited basis for comparison between firms in other industries.  Accordingly, as 
dynamic capabilities are context-dependent, it is not clear to what extent the results 
are generalisable across firms and industries as some of the dynamic effect captured 
in this study could be lost in a non-IT solutions environments. 
 
A third limitation is that the primary industry focus of the research was on IT 
solutions firms operating in the GHLSS with a limited focus on the CHLSS.  While 
this research employed a holistic approach within the IT solutions environment there 
may be other factors which impact the formation and development of an OIC.  As the 
OIC preconditions and components arose out of each business unit’s economic and 
commercial environment and context, differing environments and contexts may 
resulting in the identification of a different OIC framework or a similar framework 
comprised of different preconditions and components. 
 
Fourthly, as the qualitative research was conducted over several months it did not 
provide opportunity to gain an understanding of the competitive advantage created 
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over time or the challenges faced by the business units is sustaining any advantage 
that was created.  Ideally, a longitudinal study over at least several years supported by 
suitable quantitative research would provide deeper and more robust insights into the 
innovation capability formation process and any evolutions over time in the models 
developed.  Studies of this nature would increase the generalisability of the findings. 
 
A final limitation may be the employment of the researcher by the CO.  While this 
employment assisted in the research and facilitated access to interviewees and 
confidential information, there is the possibility that the researcher’s experience 
within the CO may have influenced the selection of interviewees or led to a less 
objective analysis of the cases.  As Popper observed all observations are “theory-
impregnated” by the life experiences, dispositions and education of the researcher 
(1972, pp. 71, 72).  For this researcher those life experiences, dispositions and 
education included the researcher’s employment by the CO, his experience in 
working in several parts of the CO and understanding of the operation of the CO.  In 
addition, the fact that the researcher was known to many of the interviewees may 
have affected their response in some way. 
5.7 Further Research 
One major opportunity for future research is the conduct of longitudinal studies to 
better understand the preconditions, components and constructs of the case derived 
OIC to further open the organisational innovation black box.  Several related research 
questions could also shed light on the OIC.  These questions include: Is there a 
correlation between strength of strategic entrepreneurship precondition and the 
strength of the organisational learning capability and the strength of the other OIC 
components?  Is it the strength of the strategic entrepreneurship and the strength of 
the organisational learning capability that is correlated to a corresponding strength in 
the other OIC components? 
 
While Teece et al. (1997) and Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) make no clear distinction 
between capabilities performed at corporate rather than business unit level, the 
business unit may have dynamic capabilities which could be enhanced by different 
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capabilities applied at the corporate level (Bowman and Ambrosini 2003, p. 293) and 
presumably could also be constrained by those capabilities as well.  “Because of 
causal ambiguity we cannot be certain that particular activities that the centre engages 
in will result in the creation of true resources that pass the VRIN8 tests” and this leads 
to “a possible blurring between (strategic business unit) level competitive strategy 
issues, and corporate level strategy” (Bowman and Ambrosini 2003, p. 293).  
Accordingly, one research opportunity is to examine the nature of the relationship 
and interaction between corporate and business unit dynamic capability development 
in respect of the creation of new rent generating resources.  While there has been a 
significant level of  firm-level dynamic capability research there has been no research 
on the way corporate level dynamic capabilities impact on firm performance and the 
development and effectiveness of dynamic capabilities at the business unit level. 
 
The concept of the learning boundary and its impact on organisational learning and, 
consequently, innovation, is well known (Slater and Narver 1995).  This case analysis 
raises questions in regard to how best a firm can identify the nature of the recognised 
and unrecognised constraints which constitute its learning boundary, the nature of and 
the positioning of the learning boundary and how far a firm needs to go beyond the 
learning boundary in order to secure the knowledge it seeks to acquire and develop.  
A related issue, of particular relevance to the innovation absorptive capacity, is 
identifying the strategies for facilitating the permeability of the boundary with trusted 
partners in order to maximise its augmented resources. 
 
The composition of components and attributes of an OIC depend on the nature of the 
environmental changes (magnitude of difference between the current and anticipated 
environment both actual and perceived) and the nature of the change required to bring 
congruence with the environment.  Further research needs to be conducted on 
managerial perception and the manner in which the accuracy of the management’s 
perception of its environment impacts upon the selection and development of an OIC. 
 
                                                 
 
8 Valuable, Rare, Imperfectly Imitable, Non-substitutable (Barney 1991) 
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Research could also be conducted to develop measures to quantify the existence and 
strength of the preconditions, components and constructs of the OIC and the nature of 
their relationships to each other.  This analysis could also be extended to measuring 
the strength of the OIC itself. 
 
The focus of this research has been conducted at the firm level.  Penrose emphasises 
the importance of the individual and states that “experience produces increased 
knowledge about things and contributes to ‘objective’ knowledge in so far as it 
results can be transmitted to others.  But experience itself can never be transmitted; it 
produces a change – frequently a subtle change – in individuals and cannot be 
separated from them” (2009, p. 48).  Accordingly, further research could be 
considered into whether learning and entrepreneurial behaviours are truly firm level 
constructs or whether it is an individual that influences the character and culture of 
the organisation.  This research could also consider questions around how and why 
individuals interact with the firm to shape an OIC. 
 
The final research opportunity is consistent with that identified by Ireland et al. - to 
verify the “presence and strength of an entrepreneurial strategic vision as a defining 
mind-set shared by the organisation’s top managers” (2009, p. 40, emphasis added).  
While this research has identified the importance and existence of that vision, it has 
not addressed in any quantitative manner the strength of that vision. 
5.8 Conclusion 
Innovation is regarded as the principal source of sustainable competitive advantage 
(McKinsey 2010; Hunt and Davis 2008; Teece 1998, pp. 55-60; Leonard and 
Sensiper, 1998, p. 112; Teece et al., 1997, p. 515), yet many firms approach 
innovation haphazardly and without discipline, expecting another serendipitous 
Newtonian apple to fall from the sky.  These organisations appear poorly equipped to 
implement a comprehensive innovation strategy as they focus only on incremental 
innovation and are “genetically programmed to preserve the status quo” (Stringer 
2000, p. 71). 
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Applying the dynamic capabilities framework this research has answered the call for 
fine-grained qualitative case studies to look at the detail of how dynamic capabilities 
are deployed to better understand how these capabilities work in practice and whether 
and how they might differ across firms (Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, p. 46).  The 
analysis of three embedded business units in the one case organisation has provided a 
capability framework for strategic managers to build, systematise and replicate within 
their organisations.  It provides guidance to managers as they manage the component 
capabilities of the OIC framework, together with their linkages and 
interdependencies, to transform the firm’s existing resource base to enable the firm to 
sustain or enhance its competitive advantage” (Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, p. 35). 
 
The analysis found that a different OIC existed in the COFBU and COSBU, and that 
a third model was beginning to emerge in the COTBU.  Although each OIC 
framework had different components and different constructs supporting those 
components, common elements in each framework were identified.  The cross-case 
analysis enabled a case derived OIC to be developed comprising three preconditions 
– an organisational learning capability, strategic entrepreneurship and an alliance 
building capability – and four components - innovation infrastructure and OIC 
renewal, an integrative innovation absorptive capacity, an innovation culture and 
organisational innovation intensity. 
 
Of these preconditions and components, strategic entrepreneurship was the most 
prominent as it provided the linkage to all of the OIC components.  Through its 
proactiveness and intentionality, and, in association with the alliance building 
capability, it provided the focus on externally focused innovation learning, the 
integration and exploitation of that learning and the impetus for broadening the 
innovation intensity beyond the boundaries of the firm and into its external 
environment and ecosystem.  Through its entrepreneurial discipline, its innovation 
infrastructure is developed and renewed.  Underpinning all of these relationships is 
the focus on cultural change to provide the facilitative leadership to foster innovation, 
the right environment for collaboration and knowledge sharing and the psychological 
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safety to fail without blame.  This culture also provides the foundation for 
questioning the status quo and existing mental models. 
 
In summary, this research is part of the increasing momentum in understanding the 
“how” of dynamic capabilities (Helfat and Maritan 2007, p. 37) by providing theory 
that is interesting and testable (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, p. 26).  It provides 
learning for management on how dynamic capabilities originate, how firms built and 
deployed their OIC and how distinctive processes support the creation, modification, 
reconfiguration and augmentation of firm resources to achieve competitive 
advantage.  Most importantly, it has provided a framework for an OIC which can be 
applied in practice. 
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Appendix 
Semi-structured Interview Template 
 
Date of Interview  
Place of Interview  
Interviewee’s Name  
Interviewee’s job title  
Interviewee’s BU  
Time in current role  
Previous roles within BU  
Previous roles within 
Case Organisation 
 
Reporting lines  
Industry background  
Qualifications  
Role in the innovation 
process 
 
 
1 Tell me how innovation happens in your BU 
 
2a Tell me about an innovation success story in your BU 
2b What were the reasons for the success?  
2c What about another success story? 
 
3a What about a story where the innovation wasn’t a success?   
3b What were the reasons for the failure? 
3c If there has been a failure, what happens next? 
 
4 What stimulates innovation in your BU?  
 
5 Do you have an innovation process? 
How has your BU’s innovation process changed over time?   
If there has been a change, what were the drivers for the change and how 
have they been successful?  
 
6 What impact does the structure of your organization have on your ability to 
be successful at innovation consistently? 
 
7 Does your organisational culture support or hinder innovation? 
 
8 What barriers to innovation do you encounter? 
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Table 5.1 Comparison between Case Descriptors and Innovation Capability 
Literature – OIC Preconditions 
 
Preconditions Case Descriptors Literature Impact on 
Literature 
Strategic 
entrepreneur-
ship 
 Entrepreneurial managers can sense and even 
help shape the future, address path 
dependency barriers and augment knowledge 
assets to establish new resources (Teece 
2007, p. 1346) . 
Extend 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
propensity 
The COFBU and COSBU 
proactively surveyed their 
environment, identified threats and 
took anticipatory steps to transition 
to a new business model in through-
life support (COFBU) and to the 
addition of sales to the CHLSS 
(COSBU).   
Conceptualised in terms of innovativeness, 
proactiveness and risk taking propensity 
(Weerawardena 2003, p. 410. 
Focus on looking outward and forward 
(Cope 2005, p. 379). 
 
Support 
Business model 
design and 
ecosystem 
shaping 
Evident in the selection and 
implementation of the COFBU’s 
differentiated and hard to imitate 
through-life support business 
model. 
Managers shape competition, ecosystem and 
marketplace outcomes through innovation, 
entrepreneurship, and semi-continuous asset 
orchestration and business reconfiguration 
(Teece 2007, pp. 1325, 1344, 1345). 
The business model guides the acquisition 
and allocation of resources and specifies the 
ensemble of routines needed for value 
creation for customers and value capture for 
the firm and its investors (Garnsey et al., 
2008, p. 222). 
Support 
Entrepreneurial 
discipline 
COSBU – demonstrated by its 
move from ad hoc to strategic 
entrepreneurship.  
Established an innovation 
management system to provide a 
strategic and disciplined 
methodology for ideation, 
capability and knowledge 
acquisition and prioritisation of 
innovation.   
“Discipline of entrepreneurship” (Drucker 
1985, p. 19). 
The business strategy provides focus and a 
filter for all enterprise decision making 
(Teece 2007, p. 1326). 
 
Support 
Entrepreneurial 
intentionality 
Both the COFBU and COSBU took 
purposeful steps to analyse the 
likely exogenous “shock”.   
COFBU - focus on boundary 
spanning behaviours to acquire, 
integrate and exploit external 
knowledge, resulting in the new 
business model. 
COSBU - Strategic Technology 
Roadmap dictated which 
capabilities and products to develop 
and projects to target. 
Definitions: 
• Focus on purposeful creation, extension, 
and modification of firm’s resource 
base” (Helfat et al., 2007, p. 7) 
• Emphasis on the ability to reconfigure a 
firm’s resources and routines in the 
manner envisioned and deemed 
appropriate by the firm’s management 
(Zahra et al., 2006, p. 924). 
Support 
 
 
 
 
 
196 
 
Preconditions Case Descriptors Literature Impact on 
Literature 
Comments The research was supportive of the elements of the strategic entrepreneurship precondition which 
had been identified previously in the literature.  However, this dissertation has brought them 
together for the first time and provided a framework for strategic entrepreneurship.  Of particular 
importance, this research has highlighted the role of strategic entrepreneurship in stimulating the 
development/renewal of linked organisational preconditions (i.e. an organisational learning 
capability and an alliance building capability) critical to developing an organisation-wide 
innovation capability.  
Organisational 
learning 
capability 
The case analysis reinforced the 
importance of organisational 
learning in a positive sense 
(COFBU and COSBU) and in 
negative sense (COTBU).   
Organisational learning plays an inherent 
role in competition as it is endogenous to the 
firm and as such provides the basis for firms 
to learn about marketplaces, clients and 
competitors and, themselves (Hunt 1999, p. 
148).  
Extend 
Adaptive 
learning 
All business units displayed 
evidence of adaptive learning 
although for the COTBU the 
learning occurred generally in 
response to a business crisis. 
Capable of facilitating incremental 
innovation (Baker and Sinkula 1999a, p. 
412).   
Occurs within a set of recognised and 
unrecognised organisational constraints 
(Wang 2008, p. 638). 
Support 
Generative 
learning 
COSBU - staff passionate about 
challenging “old assumptions” 
leading to a reputation for solving 
difficult problems (SBU1). 
COFBU - change in organisational 
structure (matrix/domain) 
reinforced the generative learning 
paradigm and provided the 
structural framework for knowledge 
sharing and questioning of the 
status quo. 
Involves challenging paradigms, perceptual 
filters and fundamental beliefs and practices 
that define a firm’s innovation processes 
(Baker and Sinkula 1999a, pp. 412, 413; 
Baker and Sinkula 1999b, p. 296; Kang et 
al., 2007; Morgan and Berthon 2008, p. 
1330). 
Frame-breaking; more likely to lead to 
competitive advantage than adaptive learning 
(Slater and Narver 1995, p. 64). 
Occurs when core firm competencies are 
unlearned and new competencies are 
explored in a proactive sense (Morgan and 
Berthon 2008, p. 1331). 
Extend 
Unlearning as above Past learning inhibits new learning (Sinkula 
2002, p. 256). 
The firm’s unlearning context is a crucial 
determinant for absorptive capacity (Cepeda-
Carrion et al., 2010). 
Unlearn existing capabilities learn new ones 
(Morgan and Berthon 2008, p. 1332) 
Extend 
Comments Organisational learning capability has been extended primarily though the identification of the 
different strategies employed by two of the business units to achieve the same path dependency 
breaking outcomes through generative learning and unlearning.  While the COSBU achieved this 
objective through its collegiate culture where staff were passionate about challenging “old 
assumptions” and unwillingness to accept the status quo, the COFBU achieved the same generative 
learning paradigm through a change in organisational structure (project/domain matrix) as this 
provided the framework for knowledge sharing and questioning of the status quo.   
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Preconditions Case Descriptors Literature Impact on 
Literature 
Alliance 
building 
capability 
  Support 
Alliance 
learning 
COFBU - identification, assessment 
and selection of OEMs was intended 
to accelerate its external learning 
focus and guide its learning efforts 
towards capability sets with 
immediate payoffs in its innovation 
performance. 
Important strategy for joint capability 
building and learning ideally to achieve 
internalisation of some or all of the skills 
each partner contributes to the alliance 
(Hamel 1991, p. 84). 
Also relates to the process of alliance 
management (Kale and Singh 2007 p. 982). 
Support 
Strategic 
alliance partner 
identification 
and assessment 
Both the COFBU and COSBU 
recognised that their business 
environments were dynamic with a 
consequent turbulent knowledge 
environment so the focus was on 
increasing their innovation absorptive 
capacity by identifying partners to fill 
their knowledge and capability gaps 
and accelerate their learning. 
In dynamic environments “a firm's 
knowledge absorption is likely to be 
focused on exploration and therefore on the 
scope and flexibility dimension of 
knowledge absorption” (Van den Bosch et 
al., 1999, p.553).  For this reason, the 
identification and assessment of compatible 
and strategically complementary alliance 
partners is critical.   
Support 
Creation of 
idiosyncratic 
alliance 
resources and 
capabilities 
Crucial aim of the COFBU’s OEM 
strategy - develop exclusive and 
idiosyncratic alliance resources and 
capabilities which augmented the 
firm’s resources.  
Firms need to move to systematic 
investments in the alliance relationship in 
order to create an idiosyncratic 
combination of resources and capabilities 
(Dyer and Kale 2007, p67).  
Support 
 
Table 5.2 Comparison between Case Descriptors and Innovation Capability 
Literature – OIC Components 
 
OIC 
Components 
Case Descriptors Literature Impact on 
Literature  
Organisational 
Innovation 
Intensity 
  Extend 
Multi innovation 
focus Product, 
Managerial, 
Process and 
Marketing 
In the COSBU, innovation 
encompassed “the way we do 
business, and that constantly evolves” 
(SBU3). 
COFBU - transformation in business 
focus, and the mapping and review of 
all processes to ensure that they 
aligned with customer and 
commercial drivers.   
Internal innovation primarily focused on 
products, processes, work organisational 
systems or marketing systems” 
(Weerawardena 2003, p. 412).  
Support 
Strategic 
innovation: new 
business model 
COFBU – new through-life support 
business model.   
See literature relating to Strategic 
Entrepreneurship, Business Model Design 
and Ecosystem Shaping (above) 
Extend 
Comment The research extended the definition of organisational innovation intensity.  The first construct of 
the capability, multi-innovation focus – product, managerial, process and marketing - is consistent 
with and supportive of the literature.  Through this research the definition has been extended from 
an internal focus to include external factors such as the firm’s business model, strategic alliances 
and its ecosystem.   
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OIC 
Components 
Case Descriptors Literature Impact on 
Literature  
Innovation 
absorptive 
capacity 
 The ability to exploit external knowledge is 
a critical component of innovative 
capabilities and innovation performance at 
all levels of a firm (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990, p. 128).  
Support 
Embedded 
resource sharing 
external 
collaboration 
COFBU’s alliance with OEMs was a 
mutually beneficial and collaborative 
learning dyad where partners had 
similar basic knowledge but different 
specialised knowledge.  When they 
shared their specialised knowledge 
they assumed the role as teacher.   
Collaboration, openness, inter-partner trust 
and relationship interconnectedness are key 
behavioural dimensions that demonstrate 
that a relational association exists (Jarratt 
2004, p. 302; Inkpen 2000, pp. 1026, 
1027).   
Support 
Transformative 
and exploitative 
learning 
Understanding depth and breadth 
dimensions provides alternative 
strategies for transforming a firm’s 
knowledge. 
COFBU significantly increased the 
breadth of its knowledge while the 
COSBU primarily increased the 
depth and specialisation of its 
knowledge.   
To be exploited external knowledge must 
be transformed, assimilated and integrated 
and then applied in the commercialisation 
of that knowledge (Lane and Pathak 2006, 
p. 856). 
Knowledge has depth and breadth 
dimensions (van den Bosch et al., 2003, p. 
14).  An understanding of these dimensions 
assists in targeting the knowledge to 
acquire and the exploitation of that 
knowledge.  
Support 
Externally 
focused 
innovation 
Learning  
structures and 
processes 
The COFBU and COSBU both 
developed structures and processes to 
capture external innovation 
knowledge.  COSBU – forming 
relationships with external knowledge 
providers to gain access to 
complementary knowledge. 
The COFBU’s Human Factor 
Domain proactively kept informed of 
the latest thinking in their domain 
(members built networks and social 
capital within the academic 
community, with complementary 
partners, and participated in academic 
forums).   
Focus on acquiring knowledge external to 
the firm (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, p. 
128; Lane and Pathak 2006, p. 856) and, 
therefore, it follows that learning structures 
and processes, will be externally focused 
e.g development of routines to capture 
knowledge from external partners who 
have knowledge which will increase the 
breadth or depth of the knowledge held 
(van den Bosch et al., 2003, p. 14).  
Essential structures include prior related 
knowledge such as innovation learning 
experience and skills, problem solving 
methods and a shared language as well as 
internal mechanisms (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990, pp. 130, 133, 134). 
Support 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
199 
 
OIC 
Components 
Case Descriptors Literature Impact on 
Literature  
Innovation 
Infrastructure  
and OIC 
Renewal  
This capability involves the 
establishment of the innovation 
infrastructure and the continued 
renewal of the OIC.   
Focus on renewal leads to proactive 
innovation and continuous learning 
designed to anticipate customer needs and 
necessary structural changes to innovation 
infrastructure (Hunt 1999, p. 154).   
Extend 
Innovation 
experience and 
memory 
COSBU - introduced Cooper’s style 
stage gate process combined with a 
product portfolio approach to ensure 
that its innovation management 
system achieved the intended 
business outcome.   
Regular stage gate reviews enhanced 
the COSBU’s innovation memory 
and provide innovation experiences to 
inform future decision-making.   
COFBU - reconfigured organisational 
structure so that its domain structure 
overlaid its project structure.  
Learning is a process where repetition and 
experimentation enable tasks to be 
performed better and quicker (Teece et al., 
1997, p. 520). 
Innovation experience - innovation routines 
become embedded into formal and 
informal behavioural routines such as 
information sharing mechanisms 
(Moorman and Miner 1997, p. 92). 
Innovation memory - subset of 
organisational memory.  Consists of mental 
and structural and institutional artifacts 
pertaining to innovation and stored for 
future use (Kruse 2003, p. 334; Stata 1989, 
p. 64). 
Extend 
Innovation 
Management 
System 
COSBU - Innovation Management 
System included processes to direct 
internal R and D and select new 
technologies and capability to 
complement existing technologies 
and capabilities, to tap developments 
in exogenous science, to access 
supplier and complementor 
innovation and to identify changing 
customer needs, and customer 
innovation.   
COFBU - project/domain matrix 
provided vertical/horizontal 
knowledge sharing.  The COSBU 
achieved the same flexibility 
objective through its line of business 
structures, its Strategic Technology 
Roadmap and collegiate culture.   
Need a portfolio management approach 
with a balanced mix of high to low priority 
projects, and continuous and discontinuous 
innovations (Cooper and Edgett 2003). 
An ecosystem framework to sense market 
and technological opportunities includes 
processes to direct internal R and D and 
select new technologies, processes to tap 
supplier and complementor innovation, 
processes to tap developments in 
exogenous science and technology, and 
processes to identify target market 
segments, changing customer needs and 
customer innovation (Teece 2007, p. 1326). 
  
Extend 
Comments This OIC component has been extended on a similar basis as to the organisational learning 
capability through the identification of the different strategies employed.  The difference in 
approach between the COFBU and the COSBU demonstrated two options available for firms 
involved in innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal.  While the former’s focus was on 
knowledge sharing, organisational structures and routines, the renewal process for the COSBU 
focused on increasing the discipline and strategic alignment of its innovation management system. 
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OIC 
Components 
Case Descriptors Literature Impact on 
Literature  
Innovation 
culture 
 Captured through behaviour which 
challenges established organisational 
norms (facilitative leadership); behaviour 
which supports learning and the 
dissemination of learning (collaboration, 
Jarratt 2004, p. 302); and an understanding 
of the fundamental role of risk taking in 
innovation (tolerance of risk and no blame 
behaviour) (Weerawardena 2003). 
Extend 
Facilitative 
leadership 
COFBU – initiated a performance 
oriented cultural change and 
introduction of domains to facilitate 
the transfer, translation and 
transformation of knowledge across 
silos.  
COTBU – tried to create an 
environment where discussion of 
innovation is more on the agenda, 
increase openness of communication, 
wider sources of ideation, new 
knowledge sharing routines both 
within and between functions 
(TBU4).  
COSBU – enhanced collegiate 
culture; failing forward. 
Facilitative leadership is essential to create 
the innovation behaviour change required 
to perform effectively in complex 
environments and to “manage the tension 
between the exploration and exploitation 
paths to effective learning” (Slater and 
Narver 1995, pp. 66, 69) and to adopt a 
generative learning orientation aligned with 
its strategy and market (Osterberg 2004, p. 
146).   
Facilitative leadership also includes a focus 
on the development of staff through 
providing challenging work which 
stretched their technical, learning and 
problem solving capabilities and, in doing 
so, motivated their “people to do more that 
what is expected of them” and to want to 
learn and unlearn (Slater and Narver 1995, 
p. 69).   
Support 
No blame COSBU - responsible risk seeking 
propensity was balanced by the 
acceptance of failure in innovation 
(failing forward).  The COFBU was 
also moving to tolerate failure 
without blame. 
A risk taking propensity is an essential part 
of entrepreneurship in strategic decision 
making (Weerawadeena 2003, p. 410). 
Removal of the fear of failure was evident 
in the best performing innovative 
organisations (Cooper et al., 2004, p. 37).   
High tolerance of risk as innovation cannot 
exist without risk taking.  Risk taking 
occurs through challenging and diverting 
from the entrenched mental models and 
from challenging the dominant logic.  
Learning opportunities arise from 
experimentation and responsible risk and 
frame-breaking entrepreneurial activities 
and this learning informs future product 
innovations (Slater and Narver 1995, p. 
68).   
Extend 
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OIC 
Components 
Case Descriptors Literature Impact on 
Literature  
Collaboration COSBU - collegiate culture and 
formal informal knowledge sharing 
routines.  
COFBU - achieved through structural 
transformation (domain/project 
matrix). 
Externally, both the COFBU and 
COSBU demonstrated a willingness 
to collaborate openly with 
complementary knowledge holders. 
Collaboration is essential for knowledge 
sharing both within and external to the 
business unit and influences the type and 
depth of knowledge available from external 
and complementary partners.  
Collaborative behaviour includes sharing 
information and ideas, communication 
openness and forbearance (Jarratt and 
O’Neill 2002, p. 25).   
Extend 
Comments The extension to innovation culture was primarily driven by the increase in collaboration through 
alternative strategies.  In the COSBU it was achieved through its collegiate culture and formal and 
informal knowledge sharing routines while in the COFBU increased collaboration was the result of 
its structural transformation.  In addition, while risk taking is widely recognised as imperative to 
innovation, this research stresses the importance of responsible risk seeking propensity balanced by 
the acceptance of failure in innovation (failing forward). 
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